Pakistan Case Law
2014 MLD 377

MANSOOR alias GUDO vs The STATE

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Citation2014 MLD 377
CourtSindh High Court
Case No.Criminal Bail Application No,653 of 2012
Date2013-01-11
Judge(s)Salahuddin Panhwar
ResultBail refused
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This matter concerns a post-arrest bail application filed by the accused, Mansoor alias Gudo, who was charged with offences including rape against a nine-year-old minor under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the accused was entitled to bail given the allegations of a heinous crime, the delay in lodging the First Information Report (F.I.R.), and the medical/chemical evidence. The Sindh High Court dismissed the bail application, holding that reasonable grounds existed to believe the accused was guilty of an offence punishable by capital punishment, thereby falling within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. The Court established that delay in lodging an F.I.R. is not, per se, sufficient grounds for granting bail, especially in cases involving sexual assault where families are unlikely to falsely implicate others at the cost of their own honor. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the presence of incriminating chemical evidence and the victim's statement provided sufficient prima facie links to deny bail, as the accused failed to demonstrate a case for further inquiry under the relevant statutory provisions.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Is a delay in lodging an F.I.R. sufficient ground, by itself, to grant post-arrest bail in a case of sexual assault?
  • Does an offence punishable by capital punishment fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
  • Can bail be granted when there is prima facie evidence linking the accused to a heinous crime?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Section 341, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 342, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 506/2, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
post-arrest bailrapeprohibitory clausedelay in FIRsexual assaultminor victimchemical report

ORDER

' SALAHUDDIN PANHWAR, J.---Applicant Mansoor alias Gudu Kori seeks post arrest bail in Crime No,86 of 2012 of Police Station, Bhirya City, registered for offences under section 376(i), P.W. Act, 341, 342, 506/2, P.P.C.

2. Relevant facts are that on 13-5-2012 complainant along with her husband was present in her house. Her daughter baby Naureen aged about 8/9 years, who used to take things from the shop situated in the street. Baby Naureen went to the shop of applicant Mansoor alias Gudu and did not return; complainant along with her husband went to the said shop, the same was closed. While hearing cries of their daughter from the roof of the house of Mansoor alias Gudu, immediately, they reached there and saw that accused Mansoor alias Gudu after putting his hand on the mouth of baby Naureen was committing Zina with her and a pistol was lying there. On their arrival the accused escaped, victim Naureen disclosed that one week before this incident, applicant/accused also committed rape with her by showing pistol in same manner; complainant lodged F.I.R.; victim was examined by the medical officer; swabs were taken and were sent for chemical examination.

Accused was arrested and the case was challaned.

3. Learned counsel for the applicant inter alia contends that F.I.R. Is delayed about 5 days without any plausible explanation; according to medical certificate no mark of violence is seen; chemical report is negative regarding the swa bs, which were taken by the medical officer at the time of examination of victim and he has relied upon 2004 YLR 491, 1999 PCr.LJ 942.

4. Conversely learned counsel for the complainant argued that name of applicant transpires in the F.I.R.; baby Naureen having age of 9 years, has been sexually assaulted by the applicant and she in her statement has fully implicated the applicant. He has also relied upon PLD 2009 SC 542, 2010 YLR 2019, 2Q110 YLR 1207, 2009 YLR 3.

5. Learned APG appearing for the State contended that the medical certificate reflects that sexual intercourse was committed with victim which is a heinous offence, therefore the applicant is not entitled for bail.

6. Having heard the counsel for the respective parties and after meticulous examination of the available record, it is alleged that applicant committed rape with a minor baby of 9 years age; such incident was seen by the parents of minor victim, statement of baby Naureen was recorded, which discloses that the applicant forcibly committed rape with her. Besides this, the medical certificate discloses that victim was subjected to sexual intercourse, therefore, from the tentative assessm ent; reasonable grounds exists against the applicant, regarding his involvement in a case of capital punishment, falling within the prohibitory Clause of subsection (1) of section 497, Cr.P.C.

7. Regarding the delay of 5 days in F.I.R., it is suffice to say that; it is a settled proposition of law that delay per se is not sufficient for grant of bail; in cases of Zina, it is not believable that without any reason, one would go to shoulder such an allegation with reference to name and honour of his family, which no doubt will leave an impact upon the life and career of victim, in particular, hence plea of learned counsel with regard to delay in F.I.R. Is of no help for applicant/ A accused.

8. Regarding chemical report it is pertinent to mention here that chemical report reflects that human semen was found on the shalwar of victim, therefore, this aspect also strengthen the case of prosecution.

9. In the above circumstances, prima facie the applicant is linked with the case of capital punishment and he has failed to bring his case within purview of subsection (2) of section 497, Cr.P.C, thus is not entitled for the grant of post arrest bail.

10. Above are the reasons of a short order dated 11-1-2013 whereby this bail application was dismissed.

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