STATE through Advocate-General, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Peshawar vs WAHID
This criminal appeal was filed by the State under Section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, challenging the acquittal of the respondent by a Judicial Magistrate regarding charges under Sections 420, 468, and 471 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The core legal question was whether the State’s appeal, filed significantly after the impugned judgment, was barred by limitation and whether the administrative delay in obtaining sanction from the Home Department constituted sufficient grounds for condonation of delay. The Court held that the appeal was hopelessly time-barred. It established that the limitation period prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, being a special law, prevails over the general provisions of the Limitation Act 1908. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the State is not entitled to a different yardstick regarding limitation periods compared to private litigants. Additionally, the Court reiterated that an acquittal judgment carries a double presumption of innocence, and appellate interference is only warranted in extraordinary cases involving perverse, shocking, or jurisdictional errors, none of which were demonstrated here. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed in limine.
- Does the limitation period prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 prevail over the Limitation Act 1908 for state appeals?
- Can administrative delays in obtaining government sanction justify the condonation of delay in filing a criminal appeal?
- Is the State entitled to a more lenient standard regarding limitation periods than private litigants?
- Under what circumstances can an appellate court interfere with an order of acquittal?
- Section 417, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 420, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 468, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 471, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Limitation Act 1908
ORDER
' MALIK MANZOOR HUSSAIN, J.---This appeal has been filed by the State through Advocate-General under section 417, Cr.P.C. Against the judgment dated 10-12-2012 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Takht Bhai, Mardan, whereby the respondent has been acquitted of the charges levelled against him under sections 420/468/471, P.P.C., registered under F.I.R. No.699 dated 18-11- 2011.
2. At the very outset, a query was made by the Court from the learned A.A.-G. Appearing on behalf of State/appellant that whether the instant appeal has been filed within time prescribed under law.
It was contended by him that the same could not be filed within time because of lengthy procedure of sanction from the concerned quarters and prayed for condonation of delay on this ground.
3. Perusal of record reveals that the impugned judgment was passed on 10-12-2012. As per record annexed, application for procuring attested copies was made on 18-12-2012 and the delivery of the same was made on 5-1-2013. The sanction letter of Home Departments attached with the file depicts the date of sanction as 11-4-2013 whereas the present appeal has been filed on 3-7-2013.
From 11-4-2013 up till filing of the appeal, there was no justification for the State to make any delay in filing of the appeal and this Court does not agree with the contention of the learned A.A.-G. That due to process of sanction the appeal was delayed. The right of appeal under section 417 has been provided under Special Law i.e. Cr.P.C. And it is by now well settled that the provision contained in Special Law would prevail upon provision contained in General Law. When Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 had provided limitation then the provision of Limitation Act, 1908 could not be invoked.
Appeal filed after expiry of 30 days was clearly barred by time and it is no justification that the leniency should be made in case of appeal filed by the State. The Court of law cannot adopt a different yardstick for the State, in case of Limitation. Appeal is hopelessly time barred and no justification has been shown in the application as well as during the arguments for condonation of delay. Even otherwise on merits, no case is made out for interference of this Court. It is well settled that in appeal against acquittal, double presumption of innocence is attached to the order of acquittal passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction and in extra ordinary cases, where the judgment found to be perverse, shocking or suffering from error of jurisdiction, the Appellate Court can interfere.
' Under the circumstances, this appeal being without merit is dismissed in limine.