This appeal was filed under the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996, by a limited company challenging a decision of the High Court. The primary legal question concerned the locus standi and the validity of the appeal's institution, specifically whether the individual who signed the memorandum of appeal possessed the requisite legal authority to represent the juristic person. The High Court had dismissed the appeal on the grounds that it was not filed by an authorized person. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed that a company, being a juristic person, cannot initiate litigation without express authority derived from its articles of association or a specific board resolution. The Court noted that the appellant failed to produce any documentation, such as a board resolution, to establish that the Chief Executive Officer was authorized to sign the memo of appeal. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the appeal lacked merit due to the absence of proper authorization, reinforcing the principle that corporate litigation must be backed by documented institutional consent.
' MIAN SAQIB NISAR, J.---The appeal filed by the appellant under the provisions of the Pakistan Telecommunication (Re-Organization) Act, 1996 has been dismissed by the learned High Court on the ground that the same has not been filed by an authorized person; admittedly the appellant is a limited company and the appeal has not been filed by someone having due authority under the articles of association of the company authorization by the board resolution. It is a settled law that a Its cannot be initiated on behalf of the company which is a juristic person, without having due authority either in terms of the articles of association or by the board resolution. This is conspicuously missing in the present case. The appellant has not even appended herewith any document to establish that the CEO of the company, who allegedly signed the memo of appeal, had the authority.
2. In light of the above, we do not find any merit in this appeal calling for interference by this Court in the instant jurisdiction. Dismissed accordingly.