AMIR DIN AND 2 OTHERS vs SIDDIQUE AND 5 Other
This petition for leave to appeal was filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan challenging an order of the Lahore High Court, which had dismissed the petitioners' Letters Patent Appeal on merits in their absence. The petition was barred by 64 days. The petitioners contended that the limitation period should run from the date of their knowledge of the dismissal, as neither they nor their counsel were aware of the disposal. The Supreme Court rejected this contention, noting that the High Court's record showed a notice was sent to the petitioners' counsel by registered post acknowledgment due. Under the General Clauses Act, a presumption of service arises when a notice is sent by registered post. Since the counsel failed to file an affidavit denying receipt of the notice, the presumption of service stood unrebutted. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred.
- Does the period of limitation for filing an appeal run from the date of knowledge of a judgment if the party claims they were not heard?
- Can a presumption of service of notice sent by registered post be rebutted without an affidavit from the addressee denying receipt?
- What is the legal effect of sending a notice to a counsel by registered post acknowledgment due under the General Clauses Act?
- Section 27, General Clauses Act 1897
ORDER
MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN, J.-L. P. A. 654 of 1966 which was transferred to Bahawalpur Circuit was dismissed by the Division Bench of the Lahore High Court at Bahawalpur on 11-I1-1974 on merits Neither the party was present nor did their counsel appear on that date. This petition seeks to challenge the order of the High Court.
2. The petition is barred by 64 days and it has been submitted before us that since neither the counsel nor the party knew that the case had been disposed of without hearing, the period of limitation for appeal should start from the date of the knowledge.
3. We are afraid we do not see eye to eye with the submission of the learned counsel, for the judgment of the High Court very clearly states that notice was sent to learned counsel for the petitioners on 22nd of October, 1974 by registered post acknowledgment due. There is a presumption under the General Clauses Act that if this has been done the notice would be deemed to have been duly received by the addressee. The learned counsel has no even filed an affidavit on his own in support of the assertion that he was not served.
4. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.