DOST MUHAMMAD vs ABDUL RASHID
This matter originated as a petition for leave to appeal against a judgment of the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an ejectment order against the petitioner-tenant regarding a commercial shop. The landlord had sought eviction on grounds of default in rent payment, personal requirement for himself and his sons, and the need for reconstruction. The Rent Controller initially ordered ejectment based solely on the reconstruction ground, rejecting the claims of default and personal requirement. The Additional District Judge maintained the ejectment order, affirming the reconstruction ground and reversing the finding on personal requirement, while upholding the finding against default. The High Court subsequently dismissed the tenant's second appeal, affirming the lower courts' findings and additionally finding that the default in rent payment was established. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the findings of the lower courts were based on the appreciation of evidence. The Court reiterated the principle that it will not re-appraise evidence in such proceedings where no substantial question of law or principle is raised, thereby maintaining the concurrent findings of the courts below.
- Can the Supreme Court re-appraise evidence in a petition for leave to appeal where concurrent findings of fact have been reached by lower courts?
- Is it permissible for a High Court in second appeal to reverse a finding of fact regarding default in rent payment if the findings of the lower courts were concurrent?
ORDER
1. NASIM HASAN, SHAH, J.-This petition is directed against the order and Judgment dated 1st April, 1980 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court in S. A. O. No. 477 of 1979.
2. The relevant facts are as follows :-- The respondent filed an application for the ejectment of the petitioner from Shop No. 633/B-1, Rail Bazar, Jhang, on the following grounds :-
(i) Default in payment of rent ;
(ii) Personal requirement of the shop for his own business and that his two sons, namely, Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad Ishtiaq ;
(iii) Requirement of the shop for reconstruction.
3. The Rent Controller by his order dated 22-6-1978 found the issue of default payment of rent and personal requirement of the shop against the respondent but found Issue No. 3 regarding requirement of the shop for reconstruction in his favour. The application for ejectment was, therefore, accepted on this ground by the learned Rent Controller.
4. Both the parties filed appeals against the said order of Rent Controller with regard to the requirement of the shop for reconstruction while the respondent challenged the finding regarding default in payment of rent and personal requirement. The learned Additional District Judge, vide his order dated 24-5-1979 dismissed the appeal of the petitioner and maintained the order of ejectment passed against him. So far as the appeal of the respon--dent was concerned, it was accepted to the extent that the findings of the Rent Controller with regard to the personal requirement of the shop for his use and for the use of his sons was correct. However, the finding of the Rent Controller that the petitioner had not made any default in the payment of rent was affirmed. The result was that the order of the Rent Controller for ejectment of the petitioner was upheld, vide order dated 24-5-1979.
5. Aggrieved by the said order, the petitioner filed a second appeal in the Lahore High Court (S. A. O.
6. No. 477 of 1979) challenging the findings of the Courts below regarding the requirement of the' shop for personal need and as regards the plea of reconstruction, the learned Judge in the High Court not only reaffirmed the findings of the Courts below but in addition thereto found that the plea of the landlord-respondent that the petitioner had committed default in payment of rent also stood established on the record. Therefore, the learned Judges dismissed the appeal and maintained the order for ejectment of the petitioner from the shop in dispute. Hence the petition for leave to appeal.
7. Sh. Ghias Muhammad, learned counsel for the petitioner, in support of this petition for special leave to appeal, submitted that there was concurrent finding of the Rent Controller and the Additional District Judge rejecting the plea of default in payment of rent. The High Court had exceeded its jurisdic--tion in reversing the said finding of fact in the second appeal. He also submitted that the conclusion arrived at by the High Court against the petitioner on the point of default was based-on fallacious approach and was erroneous in law.
8. He further submitted that Issue No. 3 relating to the reconstruction of the shop had not been adequately considered but was disposed of merely with the following observations: "The concurrent finding of the learned Additional District Judge and the Rent Controller on Issue No. 3, is, therefore, unexceptionable,"
9. The word "therefore" used above shows that the learned Judge in the High Court has linked the finding relating to reconstruction with the question of default although the two questions were distinct and separate.
10. So far as issue No. 2 relating to the requirement of the shop for use of the respondent and his two sons was concerned, it is submitted that the finding there was based on a conjectural ground.
11. After having heard the learned counsel at some length we find that there) is no force in any of these submissions. The findings of the Courts below are based on tile appreciation of evidence. The learned counsel really wanted us to re-appraise the evidence which is not possible in these proceedings. No question of law or principle was raised and we find no reason to interfere with the unanimous findings of all the Courts below that the petitioner is liable to be ejected from the shop in question.
12. This petition, therefore, must fall and is dismissed hereby. However, as the petitioner is running a commercial business in the shoe we grant him four months' time to vacate it, provided he continues to pay the rent to the respondent in accordance with law.