Badost vs The State
This bail application arose from FIR No. 28 of 2014, involving charges under the Pakistan Penal Code 1860, the Explosive Substances Act, and the Anti-Terrorism Act 1997, following a violent incident in Kharan resulting in the death of a levies personnel. The applicant sought post-arrest bail after the trial court dismissed his initial application. The core legal question was whether the applicant was entitled to bail despite a judicial confession and circumstantial evidence linking him to the crime. The court held that the applicant was not entitled to bail, noting that the judicial confession, even if retracted, could be considered at the bail stage for a tentative assessment of the prosecution's case. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, the court affirmed that incriminating evidence, including a confessional statement, provided sufficient grounds to connect the accused to the offence, thereby precluding the grant of bail. The court emphasized that the validity of a retracted confession is a matter for trial and not to be determined during bail proceedings.
- Can a retracted judicial confession be considered by the court at the bail stage?
- Does the existence of a judicial confession constitute sufficient incriminating evidence to deny bail?
- Should a criminal bail application be dismissed for non-prosecution if the applicant's counsel fails to appear?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 353, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 186, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 427, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 3, Explosive Substances Act 1908
- Section 4, Explosive Substances Act 1908
- Section 5, Explosive Substances Act 1908
- Section 7, Anti-Terrorism Act 1997
- Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
' MUHAMMAD KAMRAN KHAN MULAKHAIL, J---The applicant Badost seeks bail in FIR No. 28 of 2014 registered with Police Station City, Kharan on 3-3-2014 under Sections 302, 324, 353, 186, 427 of the Pakistan Penal Code ("PF'C"), Sections 3, 4, 5 Explosive Substances Act read with Section 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 ("the Act").
2. That prior to instant bail application an application for grant of bail has been dismissed by the Special Judge, Anti-Terrorism Court, Khuzdar ("trial court") vide order dated 23rd May, 2014.
2A. Brief facts of the case as narrated in the FIR are that the complainant SHO Mir Muhammad Yousuf lodged a report before the Police Station City, Kharan on 3 3-2014 averring therein that on the stated date, time and place he along with Deputy Commissioner, Risldar Moula Bakhsh and other levies personnel raided at accused Muhammad Raheem's house. The applicant/accused along with co-accused persons made firing upon them, in retaliation the police party also made firing. One of levies personnel namely Umer Shah died during the firing. He further alleged that the accused persons also threw grenades upon the levies personnel, however, the accused persons made their escape good from the scene of crime, but one of the accused persons namely Khuda Bakhsh apprehended and a Kalashnikov along with cartridges were recovered from his possession.
Thus, the said FIR was lodged.
3. Learned counsel for the applicant/accused was not in attendance on the date when this case was finally heard. This application was filed on 21-1-2015 and came up for hearing on 28-1-2015.
Ever since then the applicant's counsel did not turn up on 4-2-2015, 9-2-2015, 12-2-2015, 16-2-2015, 19-2-2015 and 20,2-2015. Keeping in view the principle that the criminal cases cannot be decided and dismissed for non-prosecution, therefore, I have decided to proceed with the matter on basis of the arguments advanced by the learned special ,prosecution and the available record.
4. The learned Special Prosecutor strongly opposed the plea of bail and contended that on basis of circurhstatial evidence, prima facie the case is made out against the applicant therefore he is not entitled for the relief claimed. He urged with vehemence that the applicant/accused has recorded his confessional statement before the learned Judicial Magistrate, wherein he has admitted his guilt. He contended that the offence committed by the accused/applicant is heinous in nature and falls within the ambit of prohibited degree of section 497 Cr.P.C. He finnally submitted that at this stage granting bail to the accused/applicant and rendering any observation thereto may effect the merits of the case, therefore this application is liable to be dismissed.
5. Heard.
6. Admittedly, the evidence available on the record i.e. in the form of statement made by the applicant/accused, fore the Judicial Magistrate Kharan. In his statement he has categorically admitted his guilt; that co-accused Raheem Called him and told to him to go to Shahzada son of Ma lang, who will give him Kalashnikov, rounds and money, as no one would doubt if he would bring the said articles being an old man. From the examination of this statement, it is clear that the co-accused voluntarily made exculpatory statement. So far, the question of retracted judicial confession is concerned, that question cannot be addressed at the bail stage. In this connection the case of Farooq Mengal v. The State through A. G Sindh Karachi (2007 SCM R 404) and Raja Muhammad lrshad v. Muhammad Bashir Goraya (2006 SCM R 1292) provide proper guideline. In the case of Farooq Mengal supra the Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 5 of the judgment observed as under:-- "5...This is settled principle of, criminal administration of justice that B retracted judicial confession if found truthful and confidence-inspiring, can be relied upon and on the basis of tentative assessm ent of the prosecution evidence, it would not be possible to doubt the credibility of the confessional statement at this stage."
Whereas in the case of Raja Muhammad lrshad supra it was observed by the Hon'ble apex Court in para 13 that:--- "13....As now the confession of a co-accused can be used as circumstance and not as an exclusive evidence for the purpose of recording of the conviction. Besides, the judgment which has been referred to herein above also pertains to final determination of the case for the purpose of considering the same as material confession of co-accused cannot be used, but for cancellation of bail, such statement, implicating the accused, can be validly taken into consideration. Reference in this behalf can be made to Naseem Malik v. The State 2004 SCM R 283."
There is ample incriminating evidence available on the record to connect the applicant/accused with the commission of the offence; thus it is not a fit case for grant of bail. In the light of the afore referred judgments of the apex Court, I am not persuaded to extend the concession of bail to the 'petitioner. Accordingly this application being bereft of merits is dismissed.
However, the observations made herein are tentative in nature, which shall have no bearings on the merits of the case.