FAZAL DIN vs WALI MUHAMMAD AND 5 Other
This matter concerns a review petition filed against an order of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, which had previously dismissed the petitioner's civil petition for special leave to appeal. The petitioner sought review on the ground that the Supreme Court failed to address whether the High Court was legally correct in disposing of a writ petition based on a compromise, rather than adjudicating the merits regarding the legality of orders passed by Settlement authorities. The core legal question was whether a party who consents to a compromise decree in the High Court can subsequently challenge that order through an appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the review petition, holding that the petitioner was disentitled to relief because he had invited the High Court's order through a voluntary compromise and could not subsequently repudiate it. The Court affirmed the established legal principle that no appeal is admissible against a consent decree. By agreeing to the compromise, the petitioner effectively withdrew the writ petition from the High Court, precluding any further judicial determination of the underlying legal issues.
- Is an appeal admissible against a consent decree?
- Can a party who invites an order through a compromise subsequently challenge that order in appeal?
- Does a compromise in a writ petition effectively withdraw the petition from further judicial adjudication on the merits?
1. SAJJAD AHMAD, J.-This petition seeks a review of our order dated the 24th of October 1969, whereby the petitioner's civil petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 224 of 1969 was dismissed.
2. Leave was declined to the petitioner on the main ground that the decision of the High Court under challenge, which was passed in writ jurisdiction, was based on a compromise, which was effected between the contesting parties, including the petitioner, as duly recorded in the High Court. The review of our order is mainly sought on the ground that we had failed to decide the question whether the High Court was legally right in disposing of the writ petition on the basis of the compromise without adverting to the question raised in the writ petition that the impugned orders of the Settlement authorities were without lawful authorities.
3. Grant of special leave to appeal from this Court cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Essentially, it is a matter of discretion with the Court, which is to be exercised on a judicial consideration of the circumstances of each case. In this case, the petitioner was obviously disentitled to seek the indulgence of this Court to grant him leave to challenge an order of the High Court, which he had invited himself on a compromise, and he cannot be permitted to repudiate it. As a matter of law and principle, no appeal is admissible against a consent decree. By agreeing to compromise the matter, the petitioner virtually withdrew his writ petition from the High Court, for any legal decision other than the one based on the compromise between the parties.
4. There is no substance in this petition, which is dismissed.