JAN MUHAMMAD vs Mst. ZUBAIDA BEGUM
The petitioner, a tenant running a barber shop, sought leave to appeal against the concurrent orders of the courts below rejecting his claim for compensation for improvements made to the demised premises upon being ordered to be evicted. The core legal question was whether a tenant is entitled to compensation for improvements made to rented property without the landlord's express consent and which do not enhance the property's value, or under the equity of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the tenant was not entitled to compensation as the improvements were made for his own business benefit over twenty years without benefiting the landlord or being made with consent, and that Section 51 does not apply to tenants. The key principle laid down is that the equity of Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is limited to persons who believe themselves to be absolutely entitled to the property improved, and does not extend to tenants.
- Is a tenant entitled to compensation for improvements made to a rented shop without the landlord's express consent?
- Does Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 apply to a tenant seeking compensation for improvements?
- Whether the equity conferred by Section 51 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882 is available to a person who is not absolutely entitled to the property?
- Section 51, Transfer of Property Act 1882
ORDER
1. DORAB PATEL, J.-The respondent is the 'owner of the shop occupied by the petitioner. The petitioner was using the shop for running his business as a barber, and, had, therefore, made improvements on the property, details of which are given in paragraph 2 of the petition for leave. However, in the events that happened, the respondent filed an eviction case against the petitioner on the ground that she needed the demised' premises for the use of her son. Eviction has been ordered by all the Courts below and Mr. Rashid does not challenge the order of eviction. However, even before the Rent Controller, whilst challenging his eviction, the petitioner had made a claim of compensation for the improvements made by him in the shop in the event of being evicted. This claim too was rejected by the Courts below and in dismissing this claim in the. High Court, the learned Judge observed in his order of 15-6-1980 : "Since the improvements are not stated to have been made with the express consent of the landlord and because they are not improvements which would enhance the value of the premises the appellant is not entitled to compensation therefor."
2. Mr. Rashid is aggrieved only by these observations and seeks leave to examine the question whether the appellant was entitled to compensation for the improvement made by him on the demised premises.
3. Learned counsel admitted that the improvement made by the petitioner had been made for the proper running of his business and he has had the benefit of these improvements and he was compelled to admit that the petitioner has had the benefit of these improvements for more than twenty years. We, therefore, asked him how the improvements could possibly benefit the respondent's property. But, learned counsel was not able to answer this question and he admitted that the respondent had not even been cross-examined on the suggestion that the improvements made by the petitioner for his own benefit would benefit the respondent. The evidence also is not' before us, therefore, it is difficult to see how Amy exception can be taken to the observation of the learned Judge.
4. Learned counsel, however, appeared to rely on the fact that the improvements had been made with the knowledge of the respondent, therefore, he appeared to think that the petitioner's case fell under the equity of section 51, of the Transfer of Property Act. The argument is fallacious for more reasons than one. In the first place, it is not Mr. Rashid's care that the improvements were made with the respondent's consent. Secondly, as to section 51 he was not able to show us how the equity conferred by this section is available to a tenant, because it is limited to a person, who believes that he is absolutely entitled" to the property which he has improved.
5. There is no merit in this petition, which is dismissed.