KHUSHI MUHAMMAD vs FEDERAL LAND COMMISSION AND Other
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a constitutional petition by the High Court, which had upheld an order passed by the Chief Land Commissioner under Martial Law Regulation No. 115. The core legal questions involve the maintainability of a constitutional petition against a land commissioner's order, the existence of laches, and whether a lessee possesses the requisite locus standi to challenge such orders. The Supreme Court held that the constitutional petition was rightly dismissed by the High Court as it suffered from an inordinate delay of nearly two years constituting laches, and furthermore, that a mere lessee of the land in dispute had acquired no proprietary rights and consequently lacked locus standi to maintain a writ petition. The key principle laid down is that a lessee without underlying proprietary rights lacks standing to challenge land resumption or administrative orders through a constitutional petition, particularly when the petition suffers from unexplained laches.
- Whether a lessee of land has the locus standi to file a constitutional petition against an order passed under Martial Law Regulation No. 115?
- Does a delay of two years in filing a constitutional petition constitute laches sufficient to warrant its dismissal?
- Is the High Court justified in dismissing a writ petition where no serious question of law has been raised?
- Martial Law Regulation No. 115
ORDER
ASLAM RIAZ HUSSAIN, ACTG. C. J.-The petitioner seeks Leave to Appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge of the High Court, dated 24-2-1977, dismissing his constitutional petition against the order of the Chief Land Commissioner, dated 31-10-1972 under M. L. R. 115.
2. We have gone through the impugned judgment and heard the learned counsel for the parties.
In the first place, the constitutional petition suffered from laches, inas--much as it was filed almost 2 years after the passing of the impugned order passed by the Additional Chief Land Commissioner. Secondly, as admitted by the petitioner's counsel, he was merely a lessee of the land in dispute and as such had nut acquired any rights. Therefore, hip had no focus standi to file the writ petition. In any case, no serious question of la has bee raised by the petitioner's counsel before us. We feel that the High Court was justified in dismissing the petition. We have no reason to interfere with the same.
The petition is, therefore, dismissed as being without any merit.