This matter arose from a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment concerning the transfer or jurisdiction of a criminal trial from an Anti-Terrorism Court to an ordinary court. The core legal question was whether mere vague allegations of demanding Bhatta (extortion) and aerial firing in a murder case arising out of personal enmity attract the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's findings, holding that in the absence of tangible material showing the financial status/income of the complainant, specific details of extortion demands, or evidence that the act created a sense of fear, panic, terror, and insecurity among the public at large, the offence remains a simple case of murder motivated by private vendetta. The Supreme Court affirmed that every heinous crime or murder does not automatically fall within the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court unless the peculiar circumstances defined under Sections 6, 7, and 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 are strictly established. Leave to appeal was accordingly refused.
' GULZAR AHMED, J.---Learned ASC for the petitioner has contended that not only in the FIR there is an allegation of demand of Bhatta by the accused party which has been also substantiated through evidence so far recorded by the trial court and there is sufficient material on the record to try the case in the Anti-Terrorism Court.
2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record.
3. High Court in the impugned judgment has observed as follows: "10. The averments of FIR are silent regarding the financial status and source of income of the complainant against which accused have been demanding Bhatta. Complainant has also not disclosed the specific dates, times and places of demanding Bhatta by accused persons nor any such evidence was produced before the Investigating Officer to prima facie establish such allegations. In absence of any tangible material, mere allegations of demanding Bhatta do not attract section 6(2)(k) of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, in the present case nor said section was mentioned in the FIR and Challan. Perusal of Challan reflects that Investigating Officer had made a request to the Anti-Terrorism Court for return of FIR and other documents so that Challan may be submitted before the ordinary Court of law as no case under the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 was made out, but his request was declined by the Anti-Terrorism Court vide order dated 09.06.2014, and cognizance was taken by the Court.
11. Cumulative effect of the averments of FIR, surrounding circumstances and other material available on record have replicated that offence having been committed on account of previous old enmity with a definite motive. The alleged offence occurred at Faiz Wah bridge, which is not situated in any populated area, consequently, the allegations of aerial firing have not appeared to us to be a case of terrorism as the motive for the alleged offence was nothing but personal enmity and private vendetta. The intention of the accused party did not depict or manifest any act of terrorism as contemplated by the provisions of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997. Consequently, we are of the considered view that complainant has failed to produce any material before the Investigating Officer that at the time of occurrence sense of fear, panic, terror and insecurity spread in the area, nevertheless it was a simple case of murder due to previous enmity, thus, alleged offence does not fall within purview of any of the provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997.
While probing the question of applicability of provisions of Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, in any crime, it is incumbent that there should be a sense of insecurity, fear and panic amongst the public at large to invoke the jurisdiction of the Anti-Terrorism Court. Indeed, in each murder case there is loss of life which is also heinous crime against the society but trial of each murder case cannot be adjudicated by the Anti-Terrorism Court, except existence of peculiar circumstances as contemplated under sections 6, 7, 8 of Anti-Terrorism. Act, 1997. "
4. We note that observation made by the High Court is based upon the record of the case and no misreading in this respect was pointed out before us. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioner that in evidence petitioner has brought on record sufficient material to substantiate the fact of demand of Bhatta in FIR that complainant party was doing business of brick kiln. There is no allegation in the FIR that complainant party was engaged in brick kiln business. Be that as it may, we find that High Court has rightly dealt with the matter and prima facie there is nothing on record to deviate from the same. The petition is, therefore dismissed and leave refused.