MUHAMMAD AFZAL MALIK vs GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN And Other
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an order of the Service Tribunal, which had dismissed the petitioner's appeal for non-prosecution following his compulsory retirement under Martial Law Regulation 114. The petitioner sought restoration of the appeal, claiming he had not been served with notice. The Service Tribunal rejected this application, finding that notice had been duly served via registered post to the petitioner's counsel's office, as evidenced by a signed acknowledgment receipt. Before the Supreme Court, the petitioner argued that the individual who signed the receipt was no longer employed by the counsel's firm at the time of service, thereby invalidating the notice. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that the question of whether the individual was an employee at the time of service was a question of fact. The Court declined to interfere with the Tribunal's finding of fact, noting that the petitioner's argument regarding the individual's employment status was implausible given the circumstances of the delivery and receipt of the notice.
- Is the question of whether a notice was properly served on a counsel's office a question of fact?
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with a finding of fact made by the Service Tribunal regarding the service of notice?
- Martial Law Regulation 114
ORDER
MUSHTAQ HUSSAIN, J.-The petitioner was an appellant before the Service Tribunal in consequence of his compulsory retirement under M.L.R.
114. The petition was dismissed in default for non- prosecution on 25-4-75. The petitioner applied for restoration of his appeal on the ground that he had not been served with a notice. This application was dismissed on 26-6-75 by the Service Tribunal, Islamabad, on the ground that a notice had been sent by registered post acknowledgement due to the petitioner's counsel who works in Shaukat Law Associates at Lahore.
It was duly received by an official of that Organization and so the acknowledgment was duly received back by the Tribunal. The Tribunal was of the view that in these circumstances the order of dismissal in default had rightly been passed.
2. It has been submitted before us that Talib Hussain who signed the acknowledgment was no longer connected with Shaukat Law Associates and, therefore, it did not constitute proper service.
3. It is not denied that Talib Hussain had been in the employ of Shaukat Law Associates. That Talib Hussain had left the service on 2nd October, 1974 while the petition was dismissed on 25-4-75, does not appeal to us, inter alia, because if Talib Hussain was not in the employ of Shaukat Law Associates on the date when the notice was served how could he be in the office of Shaukat Law Associates and why should he pose as an employee of the Company when the notice was presented to him. In any cause, it is a question of fact and it is not the function of this Court to go into it. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.