Malik RIZWAN SHAUKAT vs STATE and another
This criminal petition was filed under Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, seeking post-arrest bail for the petitioner, who was accused of criminal breach of trust under Section 408, Pakistan Penal Code 1860, for allegedly misappropriating Rs. 20 Lacs from his employer. The core legal questions were whether the petitioner was entitled to bail given the nature of the offence, the significant delay in lodging the First Information Report, and the evidentiary status of the case. The Lahore High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to bail. The Court observed that the offence did not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898. Furthermore, the Court noted a four-year delay in reporting the incident, which cast doubt on the veracity of the allegations, and emphasized that the prosecution's case relied on documentary evidence already collected by the investigating officer. Consequently, the Court granted post-arrest bail, establishing that where an offence falls outside the prohibitory clause and the prosecution's case is primarily documentary, continued incarceration serves no useful purpose.
- Is an accused entitled to post-arrest bail if the alleged offence does not fall within the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898?
- Does a significant, unexplained delay in lodging an FIR cast doubt on the veracity of the prosecution's allegations?
- Should bail be granted when the prosecution's case relies entirely on documentary evidence already in the possession of the investigating officer?
- Section 497, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 408, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
Through this petition filed under Section 497, Cr.P.C., Malik Rizwan Shaukat, petitioner seeks his post arrest bail in case F.I.R No. 211, dated 7.5.2015, u/S. 408, PPC registered with Police Station City Sahiwal.
2. Precisely, the allegation against the petitioner is that he being employee of the complainant committed breach of trust and misappropriated Rs.20 Lacs from the agency of the complainant.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is a delay of four years in lodging the F.I.R. Learned counsel further contended that the alleged offence does not fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C. Further contended that the matter between the parties is of rendition of account which has wrongly been converted into criminal proceedings. Further contended that nothing has been recovered from the petitioner.
4. On the other hand, learned Deputy Prosecutor General assisted by the learned counsel for the complainant opposed this petition and contended that the petitioner is specifically named in the F.I.R. They contended that the petitioner deprived the complainant of huge amount therefore, he is not entitled for grant of post-arrest bail.
5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
6. Admittedly, the alleged offence does not fall under the prohibitory clause of Section 497, Cr.P.C.
No date and time of the alleged embezzlement of the amount in question is mentioned in the F.I.R.
The cause put forth by the complainant for lodging the FIR with the delay of four years does not appeal to mind and prima facie casts doubt on the veracity of allegations leveled by him against the petitioner. Even otherwise, the entire case of the prosecution is dependent upon documentary evidence, which had already been collected by the Investigating Officer. No useful purpose would be served by keeping the petitioner behind the bars for an indefinite period. In this view of the matter the petitioner becomes entitled for the concession of post arrest bail. Resultantly this petition is allowed and Malik Rizwan Shaukat, petitioner is admitted to bail subject to his furnishing bail bonds n the sum of Rs.500,000/- (Rupees five lacs) with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned trial Court.
7. It is made clear that the observations made above are tentative in nature and will not prejudice the trial of the case.