Pakistan Case Law
2018 LHC 424, 2018 PLD Lahore 423, 2018 KLR Criminal Cases 193

Muhammad Latif vs The State, etc.

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Citation2018 LHC 424, 2018 PLD Lahore 423, 2018 KLR Criminal Cases 193
CourtLahore High Court
Case No.Criminal Misc. No, 156603-B of 2018
Date2018-03-01
Judge(s)Muhammad Anwaarul Haq
ResultBail refused
Summary

This matter concerns a post-arrest bail petition filed by the petitioner, Muhammad Latif, who was charged under sections 324, 353, 334, 186, and 109 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petitioner was accused of deliberately driving a dumper truck over a police officer, resulting in the amputation of the officer's leg. The core legal question was whether the petitioner was entitled to bail, specifically addressing the argument that the incident constituted a bailable offense under Section 337G of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 rather than an intentional act. The Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to bail, reasoning that the allegation of intentional use of a vehicle as a weapon against a public servant removes the incident from the scope of a mere traffic accident. The Court emphasized that deeper appreciation of evidence is reserved for the trial stage and that driving a heavy vehicle without a license while attacking law enforcement creates significant public insecurity. Consequently, the bail petition was dismissed.

Questions settled in this judgment
  • Can a vehicle used to intentionally cause injury to a police officer be classified as a weapon of offence?
  • Is the benefit of Section 337G of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860 applicable to cases where criminal intent is specifically alleged?
  • Does the court engage in deeper appreciation of evidence during the bail stage?
Laws & provisions referred
  • Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 353, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 334, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 186, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 109, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
  • Section 337G, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
post-arrest bailintentional actrash and negligent drivingweapon of offencepublic servant on dutycriminal intent

ORDER

MUHAMMAD ANWAARUL HAQ, J. --- Through this second petition, petitioner Muhammad Latif seeks his post arrest bail in a case F.I.R. No, 196 dated 16.06.2017 registered under sections 324, 353, 334, 186 & 109, PPC at Police Station City, Pindi Bhattian, District Hafizabad. The first petition i,e, Crl.Misc. No, 71377-B of 2017 was dismissed for want of prosecution on 14.12.2017.

2. Allegaticn against the petitioner is that he deliberately and intentionally drove his dumper/truck over Muhammad Aslam, ASI who at the relevant time was performing his duty in uniform. It is duly mentioned in the F.I.R. that complainant alongwith Muhammad Aslam, ASI and other officials tried to stop the petitioner for inspection of driving licence and other documents but he did not stop his truck and police officials followed him on their motorbikes who because of some road jump reduced speed of the truck upon which officials crossed the truck and Muhammad Aslam, ASP again cautioned the petitioner to stop his vehicle but he, with the intention to kill Muhammad Aslam, ASI, drove his vehicle over him in result of which police official lost his leg under his knee.

3. Heard. Record perused.

4. Petitioner was arrested by the police at the spot when he was trying to escape after the alleged occurrence. The injury attributed to the petitioner had admittedly resulted into amputation of right leg upto the knee of Muhammad Aslam, ASI and that was subsequently declared attracting the offence under Section 334, PPC. Argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner was not driving the vehicle but was working as a conductor and after the escape of the driver from the spot he was detained by the police officials with ma/a fide intention is not supported by any material on record. Even otherwise it is not believable that police officials including the injured one who has lost his leg would substitute the real culprit with an innocent conductor who was not driving the vehicle. The other argument of learned counsel for the petitioner that the alleged occurrence falls within the purview of Section 337G, PPC and the same is bailable, is also misconceived. In the normal course of action, in an accident case "criminal intent" is found missing whereas in this case the same has specifically been alleged in the F.I.R. and statements of the eye-witnesses. In a considerable number of cases in different jurisdictions, causing death/injury by driving over the vehicle especially in the backdrop of terrorism has been termed as deliberate and intentional when the vehicle was used as a weapon of offence, hence, benefit of Section 337G, PPC cannot be claimed by any person whose act by itself was unlawful i,e, driving a heavy duty truck without a driving licence. Even otherwise the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner is two folded, on one side he argued that the petitioner was not driving the vehicle at the time of incident and on the other hand he claimed benefit of Section 337G, PPC i,e, an exception to the general rule. It goes without saying that deeper appreciation of evidence is not permissible at bail stage and it is for the Trial Court to make a determination as to the "rash and negligent driving" or "intentional and deliberate act" of the petitioner.

5. Needless to add that driving of heavy duty vehicles by un-licenced drivers showing high handedness and using their vehicles as weapon of offence against the police officials cannot be encouraged as it validly creates a sense of insecurity in the minds of the officials on duty to control traffic offences for the safety of public at large.

In view of all above, this bail petition being devoid of any force is dismissed.

6. It is however, clarified that the observations made herein are just tentative in nature and strictly confined to the disposal of this bail petition.

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