NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU through Chairman vs FAZAL AHMED JAT

ASIF SAEED KHAN KHOSA, J.---The respondents in these appeals had been tried by an Accountability Court on various charges and after full-dressed trials they were acquitted of the charge which acquittal had been challenged by the National Accountability Bureau before the High Court of Sindh, Karachi through different appeals. The appeals filed by the National Accountability Bureau before the High Court were dismissed by a learned Division Bench of the said Court through the impugned consolidated judgment maintaining that the said appeals had not been competently filed. The High Court had referred to the provisions of section 32(a) and section 8(d) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 and had held that an appeal could have been filed before the High Court upon the direction of the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau and such an appeal could have been filed under such direction by the Prosecutor-General Accountability whereas in the cases in hand in three of the appeals there was no permanent Prosecutor-General Accountability and in the remaining appeals there was no permanent Chairman, National Accountability Bureau or a permanent Prosecutor-General Accountability holding the said offices at the time when the appeals had been filed before the High Court. The High Court had further maintained that some of the appeals had not even been filed within the statutory period of limitation. Hence, the present appeals by leave of this Court granted on 04.11.2013.

2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case with their assistance.

3. It is quite evident from a bare reading of section 32(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 as well as from the provisions of section 8(d) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 that at a time when there is no permanent Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau no other officer of the Bureau can perform the functions or exercise the powers of the Chairman and at a time when there is no permanent Prosecutor-General Accountability holding the said office no other officer of the Bureau can be required by the Chairman to perform the functions or exercise the powers of the Prosecutor-General Accountability and this was so held by this Court in the cases of Bank of Punjab and another v. Hair Steel Industries (Pvt.) Limited and others (PLD 2010 SC 1109) and. Al-Jehad Trust and another v. Federation of Pakistan and others (PLD 2011 SC 811). It had clearly been laid down by this Court in the case of Director, Directorate-General of Intelligence and Investigation and others v. Messrs Al-Fait Industries (Pvt.) Limited and others (2006 SCM R 129) that an appeal can be filed only by the authority or the officer designated or prescribed for the purpose by a statute and such filing of an appeal cannot be undertaken by any other officer or authority. It is trite that when the law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner then that thing must be done in that manner alone or not at all. In this view of the matter we have found the High Court of Sindh, Karachi to be entirely justified in holding that the appeals filed by the National Accountability Bureau before it in the present cases had not been competently filed.

4. Be that as it may the fact remains that an appeal to be filed against the judgment of an Accountability Court can be filed within a prescribed period of time and if during that period of time the officers mentioned in section 32(a) of the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 are not holding the said offices or those offices are vacant for any cause then such cause surely falls beyond the control of the National Accountability Bureau. There could be a situation, like in the present cases, where the right of the National Accountability Bureau to file an appeal against a judgment of an Accountability Court may be frustrated because of an inaction on the part of the authorities which are empowered to appoint a Chairman of the National Accountability Bureau or a Prosecutor-General Accountability and in such a situation it would be unjust to deprive the National Accountability Bureau of its right of appeal. In the cases in hand it appears that most of the appeals in the present cases had been filed by the National Accountability Bureau before the High Court of Sindh, Karachi within the stipulated period of limitation and, thus, apparently the National Accountability Bureau had not slept over the matter. It is also obvious that the vacancies in the offices of the Chairman, National Accountability Bureau or the Prosecutor-General Accountability at the relevant time were circumstances beyond the control of the National Accountability Bureau. It is also apparent from the record that not only before the High Court but also before this Court the National Accountability Bureau has been pursuing these matters with seriousness. In these peculiar circumstances the learned Special Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the National Accountability Bureau wishes to withdraw these appeals so that the National Accountability Bureau may file fresh appeals before the High Court against the impugned judgments passed by the Accountability Court in favour of the private respondents along with applications seeking condonation of the delay because throughout this period the National Accountability Bureau, according to him, has been pursing the matters diligently. These appeals are, therefore, disposed of as having been withdrawn. It goes without saying that if the National Accountability Bureau prefers fresh and competent appeals in these matters before the High Court of Sindh, Karachi, and also seeks condonation of the delay in filing of the appeals then in view of the peculiar circumstances referred to above the High Court would consider the issue of limitation in the proper context. These appeals are disposed of in the terms noted above. The bail bonds and sureties of the respondents, if any, shall stand discharged.