MUZAFFAR SHAH vs ABDUL KHALIQ
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the judgment of the Peshawar High Court, which dismissed the appellant-tenant's second appeal and upheld the concurrent orders of ejectment passed by three lower forums on the ground of personal requirement of the respondent-landlord for his son's marriage accommodation. The core legal question was whether the requirement of the house for the landlord's son ceased to be a valid personal requirement due to an alleged statement in evidence that the house might be given to the daughter-in-law in lieu of dower. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, holding that concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide personal requirement for accommodating the newly wedded son remained unaffected, and the purported contradiction was neither supported by the record nor violative of the statute. The key principle laid down is that concurrent findings of fact on the bona fide personal requirement of a landlord for family accommodation will not be disturbed in second appeal or leave to appeal unless shown to be perverse or contrary to law.
- Whether concurrent findings of fact regarding personal requirement for a son's marriage can be interfered with when supported by evidence?
- Does an intention to accommodate a newly wedded couple constitute a valid personal requirement under tenancy laws?
- Is a petition for leave to appeal liable to dismissal when mandatory copies of evidence are not filed in accordance with court rules?
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal has been sought from the judgment dated 31-10- 1981 of the Peshawar High Court whereby a second appeal filed by the appellant (tenant) arising out of an order of his ejectment on the ground of personal requirement of the respondent-landlord for the use of his house in question by his son, was dismissed. There are concurrent findings of the three learned Courts that the respondent's. Son was going to be married and that the house in question was needed o accommodate the newly wedded couple. The learned counsel when faced with this difficulty, in support of this petition, contended that it was admitted in the evidence adduced by the landlord that if and when the house was vacated by the petitioner, it would be given by the respondent to the would-be daughter-in-l--aw, in lieu of her dower. The copies of the evidence regarding this aspect --of the case have not been filed with this petition notwithstanding the require--ment in that behalf contained in the rules of the Supreme Court. It is therefore, not possible to hold, as argued by the learned counsel that the requirement for the use of the respondent's son is contradictory to the alleged requirement for giving the house as dower and further that the latter requirement is not covered by the statute. It appears, however, from the finding of the Courts below that the landlord primarily requires the house for the house of his son so that the latter could be accommodated therein after his marriage. That being so, the impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity, legal or otherwise. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.
2. Petitioner is allowed one month's time on undertaking to surrender possession voluntarily and also to pay rent for this period.