NUR AHMAD vs ELECTION TRIBUNAL/ADDITIONAL DISTRICT JUDGE, SAHIWAL

ORDER

1. SHAFI-UR-REHMAN, J.--The petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court dated 17-10-1981 whereby his Constitu--tional Petition challenging the order of the Election Tribunal, Sahiwal, dated 5-10-1980 was dismissed.

2. The petitioner successfully contested the election from Ward No. 12, Town Committee, Renala Khurd. A petition under section 24 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 (hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance) was filed by a rival candidate on the ground of disqualification pressed against him was the one prescribed under section 21 clause (h) of the Ordinance. It was contended that he had taken a lease for the disposal of sullage water from the same Town Committee, Renala Khurd for the period from 1-7-1979 to 30-6-1980. After a contest by the petitioner the Election Tribunal by its order dated 5-10-1980 upheld the petition with regard to the disqualification of the petitioner and gave effect to it. The efforts of the petitioner to challenge the decision of the Election Authority by a Constitu--tional Petition fatted.

3. It is not denied that the petitioner had participated in an auction and on the terms stated acquired rights in the sullage water disposal of which he was to ensure in accordance with the conditions of the auction. The period of the contract was extended from 1-7-1979 to 30-6-1980.

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that as the considera--tion for the contract had come entirely from the side of the petitioner, it was not one of those contracts which could disqualify him. Further, it is contended that the disqualifying clause applied to the petitioner as the necessary requirement of "work to be done" and the petitioner had not entered any such contract by which he was required to do any work. Here the learned counsel would like to give a restricted meaning to the, expression `work to be done' with a view to include within its ambit building construction and other such construction work including roads, etc. And no other. He has also referred to the other provisions disqualifying a candidate for such election in order to canvass that a very restricted meaning should be given to clause (h) of section 21 of the Ordinance.

5. An examination of the conditions reproduced at page 4 of the petition shows the mutual rights and obligations arising under the contract. A contract in ordinary parlance is an agreement between two or more persons which creates an obligation to do or not to do a particular thing. Its essentials have been spelt out to be competent parties, subject-matter, a legal considera--tion, mutuality of agreement and mutuality of obligation. The word `work' in its ordinary meaning would include to be engaged in the performance of a task, duty or the like. In the context of the statutory rights and duties, it has to be noted that the Local Body itself was under a local duty to ensure the performance and safety of the locality and the residents by making proper arrangements for the disposal of sullage water. In execution of that public duty it had by means of public auction entered into a contract which provided the accomplishment of the duty in an efficient and satisfactory manner. Mutuality of the obligation was created, penalties were prescribed and liabilities were indicated. This contract was to run for the whole year from 1-7-1979 to 30-6-1980.

6. The examination of the conditions itself indicates that provision was made for keeping out unwanted interference of the contractor in the functioning and working of the affairs of the Local Body itself were considered. This will only point out the close contract between the two parties, the nature of their relationship and what has to be taken care of. The object of the litigation under consideration and the disqualification prescribed is indeed the same or similar. It cannot, therefore, be urged with any success that such a contract and dealing should by a strict interpretation of words of the statute which do not justify any such restriction be excluded from its purview. We find that there is no merit in the petition and the leave to appeal is refused.