RAJAB ALI SYAL vs Mst. AHMADI BEGUM AND Another
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal against the dismissal of a writ petition by the Lahore High Court, which had upheld an appellate order directing the eviction of the petitioner tenant. The core legal question was whether the First Appellate Court had the jurisdiction to order eviction for failure to deposit rent under section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, where the Rent Controller had failed to strike off the defence despite defaults in rent payment. The Supreme Court held that the appellate forum acted within its jurisdiction in setting aside the erroneous decision of the Rent Controller and directing eviction, as the tenant admittedly stopped paying rent without any operative stay order. The key principle laid down is that an appellate authority in rent matters is competent to rectify the failure of a Rent Controller by issuing necessary orders for eviction upon a tenant's default in depositing rent pursuant to statutory mandates.
- Does an appellate court have jurisdiction to order a tenant's eviction for non-deposit of rent when the Rent Controller failed to strike off the defence?
- Is a tenant justified in stopping rent payments during the pendency of a civil suit challenging the transfer of property when no stay order regarding rent exists?
- Section 13, Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal has been sought from the judgment dated 15-6- 1981 of the Lahore High Court whereby a writ a petition arising out of a rent matter, was dismissed.
2. On an application for ejectment of the petitioner, he was directed by a learned Rent Controller under section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959, to deposit the arrears and future monthly rent. The respondent landlady moved an application during pendency of the rent case before the learned Rent Controller for striking off the defence of the petitioner as he had failed to make the requisite deposits but it was not disposed of and the prayer for eviction was refused otherwise on merits. On first appeal, by the landlady, it was urged on her behalf that the petitioner having failed to obey the order of deposit of rent, it was mandatory for the learned Rent Controller to have struck off his defence with eventual order of his eviction. The petitioner's statement was recorded in this behalf. He admitting that after filing of the ejectment petition "he had stopped paying the rent and had filed a civil suit challenging transfer of the disputed house to the respondent landlady". He further admitted that there was no stay order in so far as the payment of rent was concerned though otherwise a temporary injunction was issued for the purpose of maintaining status quo regarding possession. This temporary injunction too as observed by the learned First Appellate Court "was vacated on 12-12-1979 on an application made by the respondent (landlady) and he (the petitioner) was allowed to withdraw the application for temporary injunction". In these circumstances, the learned First Appellate Court allowed the respondent's appeal and directed the petitioner's eviction. He filed a writ petition which having been dismissed, leave to appeal has now been sought through this petition.
3. The learned counsel has contended that the First Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to pass an order in connection with the failure of the petitioner to make deposit under section 13 of the Ordinance; but he has not been able to support his contention either by reference to the Ordinance or any other authority. It is not denied that the appellate forum could set aside the decision of the Rent Controller on any valid available ground. In this case, a the learned Rent Controller though he was bound under the law to strike off the defence of the petitioner and order his eviction on non- deposit of rent under section 13 of the Ordinance, he had failed to do so despite the fact an application in that behalf was moved by the respondent landlady. The order of the learned First Appellate Court was with jurisdiction.
4. On merits nothing has been urged nor any plea is available to the petitioner. There is no force in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.