Federation Of Pakistan through Secretary, Ministry of Energy (Power Division), Islamabad and others vs Shafiq Ul Hassan and others
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an interim order passed by the Lahore High Court, which suspended the transfer of a temporary Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of FESCO. The core legal questions were whether a writ petition is maintainable by an employee of a company governed by non-statutory service rules, and whether the Federal Government possesses the authority to remove a temporary appointee under the Companies Act, 2017. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court's interim order, which effectively granted permanent relief without hearing the Federal Government or concerned authorities, violated established judicial principles regarding the grant of interim relief. The Court held that while it generally avoids interfering with interim orders, such intervention is warranted in cases of serious legal violations or wrongful exercise of jurisdiction. The Court emphasized that granting interim relief with the effect of permanence without hearing the opposing party is contrary to settled law. Consequently, the Court directed the High Court to expedite the final decision of the pending writ petition, ensuring the matter is heard by the appropriate bench.
- Is a writ petition maintainable by an employee of a company where the service rules are non-statutory in character?
- Does the Federal Government have the power to remove a temporary Chief Executive Officer of a company under the Companies Act, 2017?
- Is it permissible for a court to grant interim relief that has the effect of permanence without hearing the opposing party?
- Section 187, Companies Act 2017
- Section 190(2), Companies Act 2017
ORDER
UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J.---The learned Additional Attorney General has challenged an interim order dated 09.09.2020 passed in writ petition filed by the respondent No.1, a temporary stopgap appointee to the post of. CEO, FESCO whereby his transfer order dated 28.08.2020 has been suspended. It appears this was done without obtaining the response of the Federal Government or the concerned authorities namely, FESCO and PEPCO. The said order also admitted the writ petition by the respondent No.1 to regular hearing. The first ground is the violation of FESCO's transfer policy. FESCO is a limited company and does not have any statutory rules governing the terms and conditions of service of its employees. The learned Additional Attorney General accordingly states that the writ petition is not maintainable as the said transfer policy is non-statutory in character. The second ground noted in the impugned order is that respondent No.2, Federal Secretary, Ministry of Energy (Power) Division was incompetent to pass the order dated 28.08.2020. It is submitted by the Additional Attorney General that the FESCO is a wholly owned company of the Federal Government. That under sections 187 and 190(2) of the Companies Act, 2017 the Federal Government has power to remove the appointed Chief Executive of a company, In the present case the respondent was a temporary stopgap appointee without any legal entitlement to retain the office. As such the intervention by the Federal Government was perfectly valid. On the aforesaid two questions the writ petition was admitted to hearing and the impugned order was suspended ad infinitum. The learned Additional Attorney General submits that the impugned order suffers from legal defects on merits and even otherwise a writ petition filed at the instance of an employee of the company with non-statutory rules of service was not maintainable.
2. We notice that the suspension of the respondent's transfer order has created an anomalous situation because as shown by the learned Additional Attorney General, a successor temporary appointee to the post of CEO, FESCO was notified on 4.9.2020 and was approved by the Board of Directors of the Company on 5.9.2020. This aspect was not noticed by the learned Single Bench while suspending the impugned order.
3. Be that as it may, the grant of interim relief which has the effect of permanence is violative of the rule laid down by this Court in the case of Islamic Republic of Pakistan v. Muhammad Zaman Khan (1997 SCMR 1508). The constitutional jurisdiction by Superior Courts must be exercised according to the settled principles of law. Granting longevity to a suspensory order without hearing the other side is, if at all, done exceptionally. These are words of caution that are necessary for ensuring the majesty of the law and preserving public trust in the courts of law. Having said that, it is also the policy of this Court to interfere with interim orders passed by the High Court only exceptionally.
This would be in cases of serious violation of the law or wrongful exercise of jurisdiction.
4. Regardless of the weight of the objections by the petitioner, we consider that the learned Single Judge/the honburable Chief Justice of the Lahore High Court would be gracious enough to take the aforementioned observation into consideration for deciding the pending petition finally in the week commencing 05.10.2020: If he is preoccupied with other matters then the writ petition shall be fixed for hearing before the Companies Bench of the Lahore High Court in the said week for decision of the matter. Disposed of.
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