Muhammad Rafique and others residents of Muaza Mari Mitru, Tehsil Mailsi, District Vehari vs Manzoor Ahmad and others residents of Muaza Mari Mitru, Tehsil Mailsi, District Vehari
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell immovable property. The plaintiff filed the suit against the original vendor, who admitted the execution of the agreement to sell in his written statement. During the pendency of the proceedings, the vendor purported to gift the property to his wife, who subsequently sold it to the present petitioners. While the trial court initially dismissed the suit, the first appellate court decreed it in favor of the plaintiff, and the High Court dismissed the petitioners' subsequent appeal. The core questions before the Supreme Court were whether the agreement to sell required formal proof when its execution was not denied in pleadings, and whether specific performance ought to be withheld as a discretionary relief. The Supreme Court held that an admitted fact need not be formally proved. Finding no basis to withhold discretionary relief, the Court refused leave to appeal and dismissed the petition.
- Does an agreement to sell require formal proof in evidence if its execution is not denied by the vendor in the written statement?
- Whether a fact admitted in the pleadings needs to be formally proved by the party relying upon it?
- Can the discretionary relief of specific performance of an agreement to sell be withheld without establishing specific grounds justifying such refusal?
MUNIB AKHTAR, J.-- The facts, briefly stated, are that the present respondent No. I filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell regarding the subject property, against the vendor, one Dost Muhammad. The vendor filed his written statement and issue was joined between the parties. During the pendency of the suit Dost Muhammad purported to transfer the property to his wife by way of gift and it was then subsequently sold to the present petitioners who are therefore the real interested, and hence contesting, parties. The suit was dismissed but an appeal against the same was allowed by the learned Additional District Judge, who decreed the suit. The present petitioners filed an appeal before the learned High Court, which was dismissed by means of the impugned judgment. Hence this leave petition.
2. Before us the principal point taken for the petitioners was that the agreement to sell was not properly proved in evidence. Indeed, in the leave petition four questions of law are said to arise out of the impugned judgment, and the first two relate to this point. Now, the record and in particular the pleadings of the parties clearly show that the vendor (i.e., the original contesting defendant) did not deny execution of the agreement to sell. A fact admitted need not be formally proved. Reliance in this regard was correctly sought to be placed on Muhammad Iqbal v. Mehboob Alam 2015 SCMR 21, where (at pg. 25) this settled principle of law has been reiterated. Indeed, the cited judgment was also in relation to a suit for specific performance and the admission of the agreement to sell in the written statement. It was also sought to be argued that the relief of specific performance, being discretionary in nature, could not be claimed as of right and could be withheld in appropriate circumstances. It was submitted that such was the case at hand. With respect, we are unable to .agree. Nothing has been shown as would lead to such a conclusion on the facts and circumstances of the case, as established by the pleadings of the parties and the evidence led at the trial. In our view, the learned appellate forums have reached the correct conclusions and the impugned judgment of the learned High Court does not call for anpy interference.
3. In view of the foregoing, leave to appeal is refused and the petition stands dismissed.