Muqarrab Khan vs Mazhar Khan and another
This criminal appeal challenges the judgment dated 28.10.2016 passed by the Sessions Judge, Attock, which acquitted the respondent of charges under Sections 324, 337-F(iii), 337-F(vi), 148, and 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860. The core legal question was whether the appellate court's acquittal of the respondent, based on discrepancies in the prosecution's evidence, warranted interference by the High Court. The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the impugned judgment reflected a possible view based on the evidence presented. The Court noted that the prosecution's case was fraught with doubts, including contradictions between the ocular account and medical evidence, the absence of crime scene evidence, and a significant delay in reporting the incident. The Court reaffirmed the principle that once an acquittal is granted, the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence, and exceptionally strong grounds are required to interfere with such a finding. Finding no such grounds, the Court declined to disturb the acquittal, thereby upholding the lower appellate court's decision.
- Does an appellate court's acquittal based on a 'possible view' of the evidence warrant interference by the High Court?
- What is the standard required to interfere with a judgment of acquittal?
- Does the double presumption of innocence apply to an accused who has been acquitted by an appellate court?
- Section 324, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 337-F(iii), Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 337-F(vi), Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
ORDER
Impugned herein is judgment dated 28.10.2016, by the learned Sessions Judge at Attock whereby he acquitted respondent No. 1 in a case registered against him vide FIR No. 152 dated 22.6.2008 under Sections 324, 337- F(iii), F(vi), 148 & 149 of the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 with Police Station Saddar Attock.
As per prosecution case, Mazhar Khan respondent was tried alongside Muhammad Ashraf, Gulzar Khan, Ashiq and Askat for murderous assault on Muorab Khan and Asad Khan PWs within the remit of Police Station. Saddar Attock. The learned trial Magistrate acquitted the accused barring respondent from the charge; he was convicted under Section 324 of the Code ibid to undergo 5-years RI with a fine of Rs. 30,000/- or to undergo two months SI in the event of default and for the injuries consequent upon the assault, he was additionally convicted under Section 337 Fvi of the Code ibid and directed to pay Daman in the sum of Rs. 45000/- and to further undergo 3-years RI as Tazir. It is alleged that on the eventful day at about 5:15 p.m. armed with a firearm weapon, he targeted right arm of Muqarrab PW whereas Ashraf co-accused selected back of Asad Khan PW for a fire shot in the backdrop of previous enmity operating as motive. On appeal, learned Sessions Judge Attock acquitted the respondent from the charge, on a variety of grounds that preeminently included rejection of prosecution evidence qua Asad Khan in addition to various infirmities including absence of any crime empty at the crime scene, discrepancy in ocular account with medical evidence and delay of almost six hours in recourse to law .
Learned counsel for the appellant contends that accusation against the respondent was justiciable in criminal jurisdiction and as such the learned Sessions Judge ran into error in acquitting the respondent without affording the prosecution a reasonable opportunity to drive home the charge. Contrarily , the learned counsel for the respondent maintains that view , taken by the Appellate Court being a possible view warrants no interference.
2. Heard.
3. Prosecution case is fraught with doubts and improvements; ocular account is contradicted by medical account. A vaguely formulated was also disbelieved by the learned trial Court. The impugned judgment is reflective of a possible view based upon evidence adduced before the learned trial Judge. It is by now well settled that once acquittal is granted, exceptionally strong grounds are required to recall the freedom, lacking altogether in this case in hand. In view whereof, I have not been able to find out a single reason to interfere with findings of acquittal which conferred on the respondent a double presumption of innocence, hence, this criminal appeal is dismissed .