Syed AZIZUDDIN vs MESSRS HASHMY CAN CO. AND Other

MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-This Appeal through Special Leave is directed against judgment dated 8-5-1972 of the Sind High Court ; whereby the appeal filed under section 12 (5) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959 by the appellant against the order dated 11-1-1968 passed by the Chairman, Industrial Court (Respondent No. 2) under section 31 of the said Ordinance, was dismissed.

2. The facts relevant for the short point involved in this appeal, briefly stated, are that the appellant, who was in the employment of the respondent-- company since 1955 as a dye-maker, was charge-sheeted on the 23rd of February, 1966 for working in a rival firm and disclosing the company's trade secrets to it. An inquiry was held, and by the letter dated the 7th March, 1966, he was dismissed from service by the Manager of the Company. The appellant continued to make representations to the higher officers of the Company, and after the rejection of the last representation on the 22nd of September, 1966 he filed an application under section 31 of the Ordinance, to the Industrial Court on 6th March, 1967. It was dismissed, on the ground: (1) that there was no contravention of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance in the appellant's case, as no dispute was pending at the time when the order terminating his service was trade by the Company, and

(2) that the appellant's application suffered from laches, as it was filed after lapse of one year. The appellant challenged the order of the Industrial Court through an appeal in the High Court, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge, confirming the findings of the Industrial Court, on the ground of laches ; although the learned Single Judge disagreed with the Industrial Court on the fast point as to the pendency of the industrial dispute at the time of the removal of the appellant from service.

3. Leave was granted to consider the question whether the appellant's application under section 31 could be dismissed on ground of laches.

4. The appellant who has argued the appeal in person has contended; (a) that there being no period of limitation for filing an application under section 31 of Ordinance the appellant was at liberty to move the same after at any time, and (b) that the appellant spent nearly a year in making several representations to various authorities for seeking redress and it was on his failure that he sought relief under section 31.

After some arguments the appellant agreed, as observed in the judgment of the High Court that although no period of limitation has been prescribes for making an application under section 31 it should have in any case been made within a reasonable time. There are decided cases where even delay of a few months was considered as unreasonable in the context of the nature of employment involved in each case. The observation of the High Court in this behalf "that a vacancy once created has normally to be filled up and the workman employed is to be confirmed after the probationary period of 3 months and therefore if the dismissed workman is to be reinstated after a substantial gap, the workman who had been employed in his place must necessarily be uprooted.

The dismissed worker is therefore to seek his remedies at the earliest possible opportunity and not sleep over the rights, if any, is unexceptional.

5. In this case the explanation offered by the appellant for delay in invoking the remedy under section 31 was not offered in the application submitted before the Industrial Court. Had he offered the explanation with regard to submission of representations the respondent-company might have disputed the same on ground available to it (including the factual position). In any case both the Courts below having held that the delay in filing the application under section 31 was unreasonable, in the circumstances of the case, we have not been able to find any justification to interfere with this finding. None of the arguments advanced by the appellant has any force.

This appeal accordingly is dismissed. There shall, however, be no order as to costs.