Syed SHAUKAT ABBAS vs Mst. BUSHRA RANI AND ANOTHER

A suit for recovery of dower has been filed by the respondent No. 1, Mst. Busbra Rani, hereinafter referred to as respondent, against the petitioner, Syed Shaukat Abbas, who happens to be her husband. During the pendency of the suit, an application was made by the petitioner for framing of an additional issue but it was dismissed by the learned Family Court by its order, dated the 21st February, 1980 (copy Annexure "C"). Another applica--tion was made by the petitioner for summoning of some witnesses but that application was also dismissed by the learned Family Court by its order, dated the 21st February, 1980 (copy Annexure "F"). Another order made by the learned Family Court against the petitioner was of 7th May, 1980 (copy Annexure "H") by which it had closed the petitioner's evidence, This order was passed by the Family Court due to the reason that the petitioner had failed to lead his evidence on the above date which was fixed for the production of evidence by him. All the three orders have been challenged by the petitioner by means of the Constitutional petition in hand.

2. A preliminary objection was raised by learned counsel for the res--pondent that the writ petition was not competent as it was directed against certain interlocutory orders by the learned Family Court. It was maintained by him that if the suit is decided against the petitioner, he will be able to file an appeal before the District Judge and assail the legality or validity of the orders under challenge, if so advised.

3. In reply, it was urged by learned counsel for the petitioner that since the orders under review would have far reaching consequences qua the fate of the suit, the petitioner felt constrained to invoke the Constitutional jurisdic--tion of this Court as no other remedy was open to him. It was also submitted by him that the order by which the petitioner's evidence was closed was without jurisdiction inasmuch as there was, no provision in the Punjab Family Courts Act, 1964, hereinafter referred to as the said Act, authorising the Family Court to close the evidence of a party before it.

4. As regards the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that the order regarding the closure of evidence was without jurisdiction, I agree with him that there is no express provision in the said Act authorising a Family Court to close the evidence of a party. . There is also no provision to the effect that a party's evidence shall not be closed even if that party fails to produce evidence, without sufficient cause, despite having availed of several opportunities to do so. When I asked learned. Counsel for the peti--tioner that if a Family Court adjourns a case for hundred times, with a view to enabling a party to lead evidence but even then that party does not produce evidence, without any reason whatsoever, will the Family Court not be able to refuse any more opportunity to the party at fault and proceed to decide the case on the basis of material before it, the reply of the learned counsel was that the Family Court would certainly be justified in refusing any more accommodation to such a defaulting party and closing his evidence. Thus, it was conceded by the learned counsel that the Family Court has the power to close the evidence of a party if, in the opinion' of the Court, that r party is not producing evidence without any rhyme or reason. Whether or not in the circumstances of the present case, the Family Court was justified in closing the evidence of the petitioner is a question touching the merits of the case and not the jurisdiction of the Court. On the question of jurisdiction. I am clear in my mind that the Family Court can close the evidence of a party who fails to adduce evidence without sufficient cause. I say so due to the aforesaid concession of the learned counsel and for the reason that in the said Act, which is a brief enactment aimed at securing expeditious disposal of matrimonial disputes, there is no provision to the effect that the evidence of a party shall not be closed in any case.

5. Now, I advert to the plea of learned counsel for the petitioner that since the orders impugned herein are of far reaching consequences they can be challenged by means of a Constitutional petition. Assuming for the sake of argument that these orders would have lot of bearing on the fate of the case, ,a they are nevertheless interlocutory orders in the sense that they do not dispose of the whole gamut of dispute between the parties. Final decision on the suit would be open to appeal by virtue of section 14 of the said Act and, therefore, if the petitioner fails before the learned Family Court, he will be able to assail, before the Appellate Court, the orders now being challenged by him.

Thus, he has a remedy qua the orders in question although he will have to wait for some time to .Have recourse to that remedy if at all there arises a need for his so doing. He will not have to worry about those orders if the respondent's suit is dismissed by the learned Family Court. If orders like those under challenge are allowed to be taken exception to in writ jurisdiction, it will not be possible to achieve the object for which the law embodied in the said Act was framed because writ petitions relating to such orders would obviously consume a lot of time and that would result in inordinate delay in the finalization of matrimonial disputes. Like the aforesaid law, the law incorporated in the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959, has been made for the speedy disposal of rent cases. In Rashid Ahmed v. Soofi Muhammad Saleem and others PLD 1976 Lah.

1450,it was held the interlocutary orders made under the said Ordinance cannot be challenged by invoking writ jurisdiction. To my mind, therefore, the orders which have been attacked by means of the Constitutional petition in hand, being orders of interlocutory nature, can not be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its Constitutional jurisdiction.

6. In this view of 'the matter, I hold that the instant petition is not competent. It is, therefore, dismissed with costs.