Asadullah Khan and others vs Abdul Ghafoor Khan and others
This matter concerns two appeals filed before the Supreme Court of Pakistan which were found to be time-barred by 27 and 28 days respectively. The core legal question was whether the appellants could seek condonation of delay after initially filing leave petitions under Article 185(3) of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, when a direct appeal under Article 185(2)(d) was the competent remedy, and the limitation period for such an appeal had already expired. The Court held that the practice of filing a petition for leave to appeal where a direct appeal is competent, particularly when the direct appeal is already time-barred, constitutes an attempt to circumvent the law. Relying on the principle established in Mst. Gul Jan and others v. Naik Muhammad and others (PLD 2012 SC 1), the Court dismissed the applications for condonation of delay and consequently dismissed the appeals as time-barred, emphasizing that such procedural maneuvers to bypass limitation periods will not be entertained.
- Does filing a petition for leave to appeal instead of a competent direct appeal justify condonation of delay when the direct appeal is already time-barred?
- Is the practice of filing a petition for leave to appeal where a direct appeal is competent considered an attempt to circumvent the law?
- Article 185(2)(d), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973
- Article 185(3), Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973
ORDER
MUSHIR ALAM, J.---These appeals are hopelessly barred by 27 and 28 days respectively . It appears that the appellant, instead of filing direct appeals within contemplation of Article 185(2)(d) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, preferred leave petitions, considering the limitation to be 60 days though in the case of direct appeal, the limitation is 30 days. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, office raised objection and returned the leave petitions on such count. Though the same were filed on the next day as Direct Appeals but unfortunately the instant appeals ran out limitation within contemplation of 185(2) d) ( supra ),
2. Heard. When confronted that in view of the judgment of this Court reported as Mst. Gul Jan and others v. Naik Muhammad and others (PLD 2012 SC 1), wherein this Court held that the practic e of filing a C.P.L.A. under Article 185(3) of the Constitution where an appeal is competent under 185(2) of the Constitution or under the statute but has become barred by time amounts to hoodwinking the spirit of the law and such practice must be brought to an end, the learned counsel was unable to persuade us otherwise. Consequently , both the applications for condonation of delay (C.M.As. Nos.246-K and 248-K of 2021) are dismissed with the consequence that these appeals are dismissed as barred by time.