KHALIL ASGHAR AND Another vs Sh. SANA ULLAH AND Another
This petition for special leave to appeal arises from a decision of the Lahore High Court upholding concurrent decrees in favor of the respondents for the specific performance of an agreement to sell a plot of land with structures in Rawalpindi. The core legal question was whether the underlying document constituted a completed sale-deed requiring compulsory registration or merely an agreement to sell. The Supreme Court held that the document was an agreement to sell rather than a sale-deed, noting that the petitioners had not yet acquired ownership rights from the Settlement Department at the time of execution, rendering a direct transfer impossible, and that the parties intended for a regular sale-deed to be executed subsequently. The petition was accordingly dismissed.
- Whether a document reciting the receipt of full consideration and delivery of possession constitutes a completed sale-deed or an agreement to sell?
- Is a document inadmissible in evidence for lack of registration if it is construed as an agreement to sell rather than a sale-deed?
- Can a person transfer ownership rights in property which they do not yet possess at the time of the transaction?
1. SAJJAD AHMAD, J-This petition for special leave is directed against the decision of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, made in Second Appeal, concurring with the two Courts below in decreeing the respondents' suit against the petitioners for specific performance of an agreement to sell a plot of land measuring 3 kanals 10 marlas together with the structures built thereon, situated on Mayo Road, Rawalpindi.
2. The document, which was the basis of the suit, recited that the petitioners had sold the land for a sum of Rs. 18,000 to the respondents, who were also put into possession. However, due to some technical difficulties, the land for the time being was being mortgaged with the vendees. The document further stated that as the total sale consideration had been paid, as soon as the technical difficulties are removed, the petitioners will execute a sale-deed in favour of the vendees.
3. The petitioners resisted the respondents' suit, firstly, on the ground that the document in question was spurious, having been surreptitiously prepared on a blank stamp paper, and that the petitioners had only executed a mortgage deed in favour of the respondents in lieu of Rs. 18,000.
4. Secondly, it was urged that the document in question being a sale-deed and not merely an agreement to sell, required compulsory registration, and was inadmissible in evidence for want of it. All the Courts below have rejected the petitioners' plea about the spuriousness of the document, holding that it was genuine. They have further held that the document was merely an agreement to sell and not a sale---deed, as contended by the petitioners.
5. The learned counsel for the petitioners has read the document, before us, and contended that it is a complete sale-deed, where under the petitioners had conveyed their rights in the property, and that it was, therefore, inadmissible in evidence for lack of registration. He has relied on the rule laid down by the Privy Council in the case of Skinner v. Skinner (AIR1929PC269). We have examined the document in question, and we are in agreement with the learned Judges of the High Court that the document was an agreement to sell, which provided for the subsequent execution, completion and registration of a regular sale-deed. It is apparent that at the time of the execution of the document in question, the property had not been transferred to the petitioners by the Settlement Department, and, therefore, they could not have transferred the rights of owner--ship therein, which they did not themselves possess at that time. It was for this reason that the device was adopted to mortgage the property with the respondents in the first instance. Since they had received the entire sale price, the petitioners undertook to execute a regular sale-deed and get it registered after the technical difficulties for transferring the property were removed.
6. We consider that no exception can be taken to the view of the Courts below on their interpretation of the document in question. This petition in dismissed.