D.H.A. Quetta vs Quetta Residencia Housing Scheme, Quetta and others
This civil petition for leave to appeal arises from an impugned judgment dated 16.12.2020 which struck down certain provisions of the Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015 as violative of Articles 23, 24, and 142 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973, and misconstrued the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 along with the definition of a Specified Area. The core legal questions involve whether the statutory provisions governing land acquisition and development restrictions encroach upon legislative fields, violate fundamental property rights, or permit conflicts of interest, and whether a High Court can continue proceedings after a writ petitioner seeks withdrawal. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to examine these contentions, holding that pending the appeal, the petitioner may develop its schemes under the Act subject to certain safeguards and a cooperative approach, while keeping the impugned judgment in abeyance to that extent. The key principle laid down is that acquiring agencies must exercise powers within statutory definitions of specified areas and that courts must exercise caution regarding potential conflicts of interest in land acquisition.
- Whether the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 and the Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015 are provincial laws that do not violate Article 142 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973?
- Do the restrictions on owning and holding land under Section 6(b)(14) and Section 14(b) of the Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015 apply exclusively to land in which the authority has a legal interest as owner or lessee?
- Can a High Court continue proceedings in a writ petition filed under Article 199 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 after the aggrieved party seeks to withdraw the same?
- Whether an acquiring agency can conduct acquisition proceedings for itself without a conflict of interest?
- Section 6(b)(1), Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015
- Section 6(b)(14), Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015
- Section 14(b), Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015
- Section 3(q), Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015
- Section 6(b), Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015
- Section 14, Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015
- Land Acquisition Act, 1894
- Article 142, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973
- Article 23, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973
- Article 24, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973
- Article 199, Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973
ORDER
UMAR ATA BANDIAL, J.--- Submits. that the impugned judgment dated 16.12.2020, wrongly presumes the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('LAA 1894' ) to be a Federal law and holds Section 6(b)(1) of the Defence Housing Authority Quetta Act, 2015 ('Act') which allows the petitioner to acquire land in accordance with the LAA, 1894, to be violative of Article 142 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (`Constitution '). In fact both the Act and the LAA. 1894 are provincial- laws and there is no encroachment by the Act into the Federal Legislative field. The impugned judgment also strikes down Section 6(b)(14) and Section 14(b) of the Act as these impose restrictions on owning and holding land that are violative of Articles 23 & 24 of the Constitution. This finding holds that restrictions with respect to a Specified Area' in the Act apply to land that is intended to be purchased, procured, acquired or leased by the petitioner . In other words. The restrictions govern such land in which the DHA has no legal interest as owner or lessee. On the other hand, Section 3(q) of the Act defines `Specified Area' to mean land that is already purchased, acquired, leased or procured by the petitioner . The constraints placed on a Specified Area in terms of the Act relate only to such land in which the petitioner has a legal interest and not to land that belongs to a third party . Therefore, the impugned judgment has taken an erroneous view of law on this point.
2. On Court's query , as to the purpose and effect of the constraints envisaged in the Act for land falling in a Specified Area, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Section 6(b)(14) and Section 14(b) of the Act.
These provisions restrain a local author ity or a private person from starting its own development scheme in a Specified Area without a NOC issued by the petitioner . This requirement is meant to ensure harmony between the development schemes prepared for land in a Specified Area by the petitioner on the one hand and by a local authority/private person on the other hand. In any event, he reiterates that this condition is imposed on land (in a Specified Area) which belongs to the petitioner .
3. Learned counsel has finally submitted that the writ petition filed by respondent No.1 in C.P. No.468/2021 was in fact sought to be, withdrawn by the respondent (writ petitioner) but permission to do so was declined by the learned High Court. That a writ petition is maintainable before a learned High Court under Article 199 of the Constitution at the instance of an aggrieved party . After the aggrieved petitioner party seeks withdrawal of his writ petition then any further proceedings therein are in the nature of suo motu proceedings. Relies upon Dr. Imran Khattak and another versus Ms. Sofia Waqar Khattak, PSO to Chief Justice and others (2014 SCMR 122) and Raja Muhammad Nadeem versus The State and another (PLD 2020 SC 282) to add that a High Court lacks jurisdiction to hold suo motu proceedings. Finally submits that the controversy decided by the learned High Court is academic in nature because no notification declaring a Specified Area has yet been notified under the Act.
4. The concerns expressed about the Act by the learned High Court may not have been precisely formulated, however , these do invite caution. How can an acquiring agency conduct acquisition proceedings for itself without indulging in conflict of interest? Also such a power is lacking in the sister organizations of the petitioner established in other urban areas of the country . In order to examine, inter alia, the aforesaid question and the validity of the points raised by the learned counsel, we grant leave to appeal.
5. In the meanwhile, the petitioner may develop its schemes in accordance with the provisions of the Act whilst ensuring that the petitioner exercises no power in relation to land that is outside the scope of a Specified Area as defined in Section 3(q) of the Act. Furthermore, the petitioner , whilst exercising powers under Section 6(b) and Section 14 of the Act shall adopt a cooperative approach in consulting with the concerned local authorities or provincial government for formulating its development schemes. The impugned judgment shall remain in abeyance for the exercise of powers to the above extent by the petitioner/authority .