ABDUR RAZZAQ AND OthersABDUR RAZZAQ AND Others vs THE STATETHE
This matter arises from an application filed by convicts undergoing sentences of imprisonment for life seeking suspension of their sentences and release on bail pending their criminal appeal before the Supreme Court, based on the ground of delay in the hearing of the appeal. The core legal question is whether the provisions of section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure regarding mandatory or discretionary release on bail due to appellate delay apply to appeals before the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Supreme Court held that section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure applies strictly to appellate courts established under that Code and does not control proceedings before the Supreme Court. However, inordinate delay may be considered as a factor by the Supreme Court when assessing bail during a pending appeal, but it does not create an automatic right to bail. The court laid down the principle that statutory delay periods prescribed for High Courts or lower appellate courts under the Code of Criminal Procedure do not automatically entitle an appellant to bail in the Supreme Court, and each case must be evaluated on its own circumstances.
- Does section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure control the question of bail in criminal appeals pending before the Supreme Court?
- Does inordinate delay in the decision of an appeal before the Supreme Court create an automatic right to bail under the prevailing law?
- Can the principles underlying section 426 of the Code of Criminal Procedure be invoked as a matter of right for release on bail in the Supreme Court?
- Section 426, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
- Section 426(4-A)(c), Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal was granted in a murder case on 15-7-1979. This application has been filed by convicts/ appellants who are serving sentences of imprisonment for life, for suspension of their sentence on the ground of delay in the hearing of appeal.
2. Learned counsel has relied on the amended provision of section 426, Cr. P. C. Which requires the appellate Court in some circumstances to release the convicts/appellants before it; provided it does not record reasons otherwise to refuse such a relief. According to the learned counsel this case would be covered by section 426(4-A)(c), Cr. P. C. Where under bail can be granted in cases of sentence of imprisonment for life when the appeal has not been decided within two years of the conviction. As the applicants were convicted on 1-6-1978, two years having elapsed, they are entitled to bail.
3. It is not denied that the question of bail in criminal appeal pending before this Court is not controlled by section 426 of Code of Criminal Procedure, which applied to the appellate Courts established under the said Code. But the learned counsel prayed that the principle underlying the said provision should be followed by this Court.
4. Subsection (1-A) of section 426, Cr. P. C. Prescribes various periods sentence, which an appellate Court functioning under the Criminal Procedure) Code, has to keep in mind. In many cases when the matter is brought to this Court either as direct appeal or as a petition for special leave to appeal, those periods, on account of hierarchy of the appellate and revisional forum on the criminal sides, would have already passed. The argument, if, accepted would imply automatic release on bail in all such cases. This could not be the intention underlying the law.
5. Inordinate delay, can be kept in mind by this Court when dealing with the question of bail during the pendency of appeal, before it ; but it does not create any right to bail, under the prevailing law.
6. Keeping in view the dates of the filing of the petition for leave to appeal, the grant of the leave and the pendency of other cases, it is not a fit case for grant of bail on ground of delay. This application is, therefore, dismissed.