BASHIR AHMAD vs MUHAMMAD UMAR
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against an ejectment order passed in favor of a landlord regarding a commercial shop. The core legal question was whether a subsequent consent decree obtained by the tenant in a separate civil suit, declaring him the owner of a shop, could override and nullify an existing ejectment order concerning the premises in dispute. The Supreme Court held that the ejectment order specifically pertained to a shop identified by its survey number and boundaries, which were distinct from the property involved in the tenant's separate civil suit. The Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the executing court possesses the competency to determine the identity of the property subject to the ejectment order. The key principle laid down is that where there is a dispute regarding the identity of premises subject to an ejectment order versus a subsequent civil decree, the executing court is empowered under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 to resolve such issues concerning the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree.
- Can an executing court determine the identity of property subject to an ejectment order when a subsequent civil decree creates confusion regarding the premises?
- Does a consent decree obtained in a separate civil suit automatically nullify an existing ejectment order concerning different premises?
- Is the question of property identity in an ejectment matter considered germane to the execution, discharge, or satisfaction of a decree under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908?
- Section 30, Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act 1958
- Section 47, Code of Civil Procedure 1908
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD GUL, J.-The respondent landlord is transferee of shop No. 22 (now re-numbered as shop No. 21) situate in Grain Market in Jhelum City. A P. T. D. Was also issued in his favour. The petitioner who is a local is alleged to have occupied the shop as tenant and executed rent note dated 28-8-1962 in favour of the respondent. The latter sought the petitioner's ejectment from the shop on the ground of bona fide personal requirement. The petitioner contested the application on a number of grounds. The application was dismissed by the Rent Controller on the ground, inter alia, that it was not proved that the respondent required the shop for bona fide personal use. The learned Rent Controller also took the view that the protection of section 30 of Act 28 of 1958 was also available to the petitioner.
2. On appeal by respondent the above findings were reversed by the learned District Judge who took the view that the petitioner having entered into possession of the suit premises under the rent note referred to above, after the transfer of the premises in favour of the respondent, section 30 of the Act was unavailing to the respondent. On the main issue in the case, namely, whether the premises were required by the respondent for his bona fide personal use, the learned District Judge also reversed the finding of the Rent Controller and ordered the ejectment of the petitioner. The petitioner's second appeal to the High Court having failed, he now seeks leave to appeal.
3. There is some confusion as to the exact identity of the suit premises with reference to its survey number. The petitioner, it appears, is also a transferee of shop No. 18 situate in the Grain Market for which he also holds P. T. D. The position taken by the petitioner in the High Court was that on a representation by the respondent that the petitioner was in occupation of shop No. 22, he was duped into executing the rent note in favour of the respondent in respect of shop No. 22 while in fact he had throughout remained in possession of shop No. 18 of which he himself was the transferee and for which he had also secured the P. T. D.
4. It appears that during the pendency of the appeal in the High Court the petitioner also instituted for a declaration that he is a transferee and lawful owner of shop No. 18 and also sought permanent injunction to restrain the respondent from interfering with his possession of the shop. It also appears that the respondent made a statement. In that suit on 27-3-1971 that the petitioner was a transferee of shop bearing No. 18 and confessed judgment in the suit.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner being himself on the consent decree in the civil suit stressed that it must be given overriding effect so as to nullify the order of the petitioner's ejectment from the premises in dispute. We regret we cannot agree. The ejectment order is in respect of shop No. 22 (which has now been renumbered as 21). Besides being described by its survey number it was also described by its boundaries. So also the shop in respect of which the petitioner had obtained a declaration of title. That being so, it will be for the executing Court to give effect to the ejectment order against the petitioner. 1t will be open to the petitioner to resist his ejectment if he is able to satisfy the Court that the subsequent consent decree obtained by him concerns the very premises which was subject---matter of the ejectment proceedings against him. The executing Court will be competent to fix the identity of the property with regard to which ejectment was secured by the respondent, the matter being germane to the "execution discharge or satisfaction of the decree" within the meaning of section 47, C. P. C. With the above observation, we dismiss the petition.