DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, EVACUEE TRUST PROPERTY BOARD, LAHORE vs A. R.
The petitioner, Deputy Administrator, Evacuee Trust Property Board, sought leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court judgment that dismissed in limine a constitutional petition challenging the Federal Government's decision to maintain a property transfer. The core legal question was whether the High Court erred in refusing to interfere with the Federal Government's finding that the disputed land was not evacuee trust property, and whether the petitioner had locus standi to challenge this. The Supreme Court held that the determination of the property's status as evacuee trust property was essentially a finding of fact, which the Federal Government had resolved. The Court affirmed that such factual findings are immune from interference under constitutional jurisdiction absent compelling reasons. Furthermore, the Court noted that the revenue record provided no evidence of the property's dedication or use as trust property. Consequently, the Supreme Court refused to grant leave to appeal, determining that the High Court's refusal to exercise its constitutional jurisdiction was appropriate and that the case did not present a substantial controversy warranting further review.
- Whether a finding of fact regarding the status of property as evacuee trust property is immune from interference in constitutional jurisdiction?
- Can the High Court decline to exercise constitutional jurisdiction when the petitioner challenges a factual determination made by the Federal Government?
- Section 8, Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Control) Act, 1975
1. SHAFIUR RAHMAN, J.-The petitioner, Deputy Administrator Evacuee Trust Property Board, Lahore, seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the Lahore High Court, dated 17-4-1979 whereby a constitutional petition filed by him was dismissed in limine.
2. A small piece of land measuring 376 square feet situate in Mohalla Mareem, Dabbi Bazar, Lahore, was treated as an evacuee property auctioned and purchased by respondent No. 1 who obtained its permanent transfer deed also on 28-1-1974. The petitioner considered the prope6Cty to be an evacuee trust property and made a reference under section 8 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Control) Act, 1975 on which the Chairman Trust Property Board declared it to be so. However, a revision petition was filed by the affected respondents against that order, and the Federal Government reversed that order and maintained the transfer. The petitioner invoked the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court for challenging the decision on numerous grounds. By the impugned order the High Court declined to interfere, inter alia, on the ground that the petitioner had no locus standi, that the Federal Government in whom the property vested had itself sustained the earlier transfer in favour of the respondents and that it was not shown to be evacuee trust property.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the findings on all these points have affected the functioning of the petitioner and concerned questions of public importance for such questions have arisen and are likely to arise in a number of similar petitions. The learned counsel does not deny to the Federal Government the authority to revise the orders as was done in this case but contends that material evidence on the record has been ignored and erroneous conclusions have been drawn and findings recorded cannot be sustained.
4. We have heard the learned counsel at length. We find that it was essentially a finding of fact which has been recorded by the Chairman an in revision by the Federal Government. Without there being compelling reasons for interference and there appear to be none on the surface to us--- it is immune from interference in the constitutional jurisdiction. The property involved was a small piece of land. In the revenue record except for a (pepple) tree, a well and a Thara no other use or dedication is shown to exist. In this background we do not consider it proper to review a finding of fact nor do we consider that the High Court's refusal to interfere was such as may require further consideration in this case. As regards the other questions raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner, they can attended to in a more appropriate case raising a substantial controversy We do not, therefore, consider it to be a fit case for grant of leave to appeal which is hereby refused.
5. M. Z. M.