GHULAM HAIDER SHAH AND Another vs THE PROVINCE OF PUNJAB AND 4
The petitioners challenged the dismissal of their writ petition regarding a disputed piece of land within the municipal limits of Faisalabad Town, which they occupied on a Tehbazari basis and sought to purchase. The Board of Revenue had previously refused the sale, noting the land was part of a public park under a sanctioned scheme and directed its public auction, while the High Court additionally ordered the Municipal Committee to dispossess the petitioners and restore the site. The core legal question was whether the petitioners had acquired a right to the sale of the land and whether the High Court acted beyond its competence in issuing further directions regarding the public park. The Supreme Court held that intra-departmental correspondence does not confer any legal right or entitlement to the petitioners, and declined to interfere with the High Court's directions since they accorded with public policy and the law relating to public amenities. The key principle laid down is that internal administrative correspondence does not constitute an adjudication or create enforceable rights for private parties over state land reserved for public amenities.
- Whether intra-departmental correspondence can constitute an adjudication creating a legal right to the sale of state land?
- Can a municipal committee lawfully issue licences of encroachment on land reserved for a public park in a sanctioned scheme?
- Whether the High Court can direct the dispossession of encroachers and the restoration of a public park when dismissing a writ petition filed by such encroachers?
ORDER
M. S. H. QURAISHI, J:-The dispute relates to an area measuring 3 marlas 5 1/2 sarsais within the municipal limits of Faisalabad Town, which the petitioners have been occupying on Tehbazari basis. They applied to the Board of Revenue for sale of the area in their favour but the plea was refused by the Board of Revenue vide order dated 2f-4-1976. The Board observed that the land which belongs to the State was under the management of the District Council and as such the Municipal Committee had no right to lease it out to the petitioners on Tehbazari basis and directed that the same be sold by open auction in which the petitioners could also participate if they so liked.
2. The petitioners challenged the order by a writ petition which was dismissed by the impugned order announced on 6-2-1980. Hence this petition.
3. The High Court after a detailed examination of the nature of the property held: "Admittedly the site was encroached upon by the petitioners in the year 1968 and then for the use of the site they procured the licence of encroachment from the Municipal Officer in the year 1969, who acted in granting the licence without lawful authority as the site was the part of the public park reserved in the Scheme sanctioned by the Government and the Municipal Committee was given authority for the purposes of maintenance of the Scheme."
From a plan of the Scheme, produced by the petitioners themselves, the High Court found that the site formed part of a public park reserved in the Scheme for the benefit of the persons settled under the Scheme and that there was no authority given by the controlling agency to the Municipal Committee for issuing licences for encroachment and that, therefore, the petitioners could lay no claim on the strength of such licences. The High Court, therefore, not only dismissed the petitioners writ petition as being devoid of merit but also held that the order of the Board of Revenue to the extent of the direction to put the property to public auction was without lawful authority and of legal effect. The High Court further observed that: "The Municipal Committee, who has encouraged the petitioners by issuance of licence of encroachment unauthorizedly is under legal duty to dispossess the petitioners if not already dispossessed, and restore the site as part of the public park after demolishing the superstructure raised thereon."
4. The contention is that suo motu power not being available to the High Court for the exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, it was not competent in the petitioners' petition to have declared against the Board's direction to sell the property by public auction or to enjoin upon the Municipal Committee to dispossess the petitioners. The High Court could have stopped at the dismissal of the petitioners writ petition but since the High Court found that the policy of the Scheme was being frustrated by allowing encroachments on the park land and later on disposing of the same by sale, had made the further order. Though the legality of that further order is assailed before us but we are not inclined tointerfere with the same because it otherwise accords with the general public policy and law relating to public amenities. It is also asserted that a decision had in fact been taken in favour of the petitioners on 29-8-1974 by the Member', Board of Revenue, who had observed that the petitioners' request was "reasonable" and directed the Commissioner to forward a regular proposal for the sale of the land by private treaty. From this it is urged that the petitioners had acquired a right to sale of the land in their favour. We do not see how the petitioners can base any right or entitlement upon the letter of the Board of Revenue dated 29-8-1974 because the same forms part of intra-departmental correspondence and does not constitute an adjudication of the petitioners' request. Moreover, no copy of the letter, on the face of it, appears to have been endorsed to the petitioners.
5. The petition is, therefore, dismissed.