GHULAM MUHAMMAD vs Ties ADDITIONAL SETTLEMENT COMMISSIONER AND Ors
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a Lahore High Court order that dismissed a constitutional petition regarding the division of urban evacuee property. The petitioner, a claimant, challenged the vertical division of the property ordered by the Additional Settlement Commissioner following a remand from the High Court. The core legal questions were whether the division of the property was arbitrary and whether the Settlement Commissioner possessed the legal authority to remand the matter to the Additional Settlement Commissioner rather than deciding the revision petition personally. The Supreme Court held that the division of the property was not arbitrary, as it was based on a factual inspection confirming the property could be conveniently divided. Furthermore, the Court affirmed that the Settlement Commissioner acted within their competence and discretion in remanding the case to the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The key principle laid down is that the division of urban evacuee property, when based on factual findings of convenience, is not subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction, and a Settlement Commissioner has the authority to remand matters to subordinate officers during revisional proceedings.
- Can a Settlement Commissioner remand a matter to an Additional Settlement Commissioner while exercising revisional jurisdiction?
- Is the vertical division of urban evacuee property subject to interference in constitutional jurisdiction when based on factual findings of convenience?
- Does a Settlement Commissioner have the discretion to delegate the decision-making process to an Additional Settlement Commissioner upon remand from the High Court?
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.-Leave to appeal has been sought from order dated 22-9-1976 of the Lahore High Court ; whereby a constitutional petition arising out of an urban settlement matter, was dismissed.
2. The petitioner claiming to be a displaced person (claimant) had sought transfer of an evacuee property on the basis of his possession. Muhammad Din predecessor-in-interest of respondents Nos. 2 to 9 also was an applicant 'but failed. Ultimately on a constitutional petition filed by the respondents side, the High Court remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner for fresh decision of Muhammad Din's settlement revision. The Settlement Commissioner instead of deciding it himself further- remanded the case to the Additional Settlement Commissioner, who by his order dated 19-3-1976 divided the property vertically and transferred, thus created two units, to the aforementioned contestants. Aggrieved by the order of division, this time the petitioner filed a constitutional petition in the High Court and the same having been dismissed in limine, on 22-9- 1976 leave to appeal has been sought from the order of the High Court.
3. Learned counsel while conceding that the division of an urban evacuee property under the S6ttlcaieat laws ordinarily, cannot be interfered with in constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court, maintained that in the peculiar circumstances of this case the division could be held to be arbitrary, therefore, the same was liable to be set aside. He has also contended that although the High Court, in the earlier round of litigation, had remanded the case to the Settlement Commissioner, he instead of deciding it himself further I remanded the matter to the Additional Settlement Commissioner, without an justification.
4. Learned Judge in the High Court after scrutiny of the relevant facto in connection with the vertical division of the property held that it was not arbitrary. We having done the same exercise have not reached any different conclusion. The first contention of the learned counsel essentially being one relatable to the facts of the case, has accordingly no force.
5. The second contention also is without any substance as it is not denied that while hearing the revision petition on remand from the High Court the Settlement Commissioner bad the power, instead of deciding the case revisional jurisdiction, to remand the matter to the Additional Settlement Commissioner. It was not only within the competence of the Settlement Commissioner but in the circumstances of the case was also, it appears, a proper order ; because after the remand to the Additional Settlement Commissioner the property in dispute was inspected by him, as a result o which he found as a fact that the same could be conveniently divided. None of the arguments of the learned counsel has any force. This petition is, therefore, dismissed.