Mst. Jamti Khatoon Mastoi vs The State
This revision application challenged an order by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jacobabad, which imposed a penalty of one-fourth of the surety bond amount on the applicant for failing to produce an accused. The core legal question was whether a surety remains liable for forfeiture of a bond under Section 514, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, when the accused was initially detained in another jurisdiction and was subsequently produced by the surety before the trial court. The High Court held that the impugned order was unjustified. The Court reasoned that the surety had fulfilled her obligation by informing the trial court of the accused's detention and later producing the accused, who surrendered to the court's jurisdiction. Furthermore, the subsequent acquittal of the accused in the main case rendered the imposition of the penalty unwarranted. The Court established that once an accused is produced and submits to the court's jurisdiction, the surety is absolved of the legal liability to produce the accused, rendering the forfeiture of the bond unnecessary and legally unsustainable.
- Does a surety remain liable for bond forfeiture under Section 514, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, if the accused is eventually produced before the trial court?
- Is a surety absolved of the liability to produce an accused if the accused surrenders to the jurisdiction of the court?
- Can a trial court impose a penalty on a surety for non-production when the accused was in custody in another jurisdiction?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 337-H(2), Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 148, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 149, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 514, Code of Criminal Procedure 1898
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD SALEEM JESSAR, J. Through this revision application, applicant/surety Mst. Jamti Khatoon Mastoi has assailed order dated 12.11.2019, passed by learned 1st Additional Sessions Judge, Jacobabad (vide Sessions Case No.386/2015 re; State v. Din Muhammad Khoso and others, being outcome of Crime No. 59 of 2014, Police Station Moula-Dad, under Sections 302, 337- H(2), 148, 149 P.P.C.). by which the applicant/surety was imposed 1/4th (one-fourth) of the surety amount/bond executed by her in respect of the accused Ali Raza Khoso, on the pretext that she failed to produce him before the trial Court.
2. Learned counsel submits that the applicant stood surety on behalf of accused Ali Raza purely on humanitarian ground and without any monetary benefit. He further submits that when applicant was served with notice under section 514, Cr.P.C. issued by the trial Court against her, she traced out the accused and submitted application before the trial Court intimating that the accused Ali Raza was confined in District Jail, Dera Murad Jamali (Balochistan) and on her application/intimation, the trial Court had also issued production order: however, the accused was not produced by the jail authorities i.e. Superintendent, District Jail, Dera Murad Jamali. Per available record, the accused' remained confined in District Jail Dera Murad Jamali w.e.f. 26.4.2018 to 04.3.2019. After his release from Dera Murad Jamali Jail, the accused did not appear before the trial Court however, on 25.9.2019 the applicant/ surety appeared before the trial Court together with accused Ali Raza and filed two separate applications, one by accused for his surrender before the trial court and the other by the applicant/surety seeking time to submit reply to notice tinder section 514, Cr.P.C. Ultimately, the applicant/surety submitted her reply through her counsel on 30.9.2019. Therefore, learned counsel submits that when the applicant produced the accused before the trial Court, then imposition of 1/4th surety amount upon her was unjustified. He lastly submits that after full-dressed trial, accused Ali Raza Khoso, for whom applicant stood surety, was acquitted of the charge along with co-accused by way of judgment dated 14.11.2019. Copy of such judgment has also been placed on record through statement dated 29.3.2022; hence, learned Counsel submits that the applicant fulfilled her obligation of producing the accused before the trial Court and thus the impugned order suffers from illegality and is not sustainable. Hence, she has maintained instant revision application praying for setting aside the impugned order. In support of, his contentions, he places reliance on the cases reported as Ghulam Rasool v. The State (1984 PCr.LJ 2652), Mukhtar Ali v. The State (1991 PCr.LJ 1625), Muhammad Sohail Nawaz Khan v. The State (1999 YLR 2153), Islam Badshah v. The State (2014 MLD 1806) and Janat Wali v. The State (2019 MLD 54).
3. Learned Addl. P G, when confronted with the above factual-cum-legal position on record, does not support the impugned order and has no objection for allowing the prayer of the applicant.
4. Since the applicant/surety upon receipt of the notice under section 514, Cr.P.C. submitted her reply, whereby she had specifically denied the allegations of the notice and had intimated the trial Court that the accused was confined in District Prison, Dera Murad Jama Balochistan, hence she was unable to produce him from the custody. However, despite issuance or production orders, the custody of accused Ali Raza Khoso was not produced before the trial Court. Subsequently, after his acquittal in that case and -release from District Jail, Dera Murad Jamali on 04.3.2019, the applicant / surety Mst. Jamti Khatoon produced accused Ali Raza Khoso before the trial Court through application dated 25.9.2019, whereby the applicant fulfilled her liability, therefore, the imposition of 1/4th of the surety amount upon the her was unwarranted by the law, particularly, when the accused Ali Raza Khoso, on whose behalf she had stood surety, has been acquitted of the charge in the subject case by way of judgment, dated 14.11.2019 rendered by the trial Court. In the case of Mukhtar Ali (supra), a learned single Bench of Lahore High Court while dealing with the identical issue has observed in para-4 of the judgment as under:- "4. Therefore, in view of what has been stated above, as the accused Talib had put in appearance before the Cowl and thus surrendered himself to the jurisdiction of the said Court and as the said Court after having heard the said accused had allowed him interim bail before arrest, therefore, in present petitioner stood absolved of his legal liability to produce the said accused before the Court."
5. In instant case, the accused was not only produced by the applicant/ surety, but he also himself surrendered through his application and then was taken into custody by the trial Court. Hence, the applicant/surety stood absolved of her legal liability to produce the said accused before the trial Court. Accordingly, the impugned order in view of above legal-cum-factual position, seems to be unjustified and cannot be maintained.
6. The upshot of the above discussion is that the revision application merits consideration.
7. Consequently, it is hereby allowed. Resultantly, impugned order dated 12.11.2019, passed by the trial Court is hereby set aside.
Cited by 1 case
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