HABIBURRAHMAN vs FAQIR MUHAMMAD

' This second appeal is directed against the appellate order of a learned. Additional District Judge, Faisalabad dated 23rd November, 4976 in a rent matter.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the appellant-landlord filed the ejectment petition on the grounds of default and personal need of his son. It is admitted position of the case that Faqir Muhammad respondent is the tenant of the shop in dispute being Shop No, P-16311, Munshi Mohallah, Faisalabad which was on rent with him at a monthly rental of Rs,

100. The eviction application was resisted. The learned Rent Controller framed three issues on merits whereas the fourth related to relief. After recording of the evidence of the parties, the learned Rent Controller held that the tenant was not a defaulter but as regards the other issue he gave the finding that the shop was bona fide and in good faith required by the landlord for his son. The tenant's eviction was accordingly ordered. This was vide order dated 30-4-1976.

3. There was an appeal which was taken up by a learned Additional District Judge, Faisalabad, who concurred with the view of the Rent Controller and the finding that the tenant was not a defaulter was upheld. In so far as the issue regarding personal requirement was concerned, the finding was reversed and it was held that the landlord had failed to substantiate his bona fide personal requirement for the shop in dispute. In order to reach this conclusion, the appellate Court was influenced by the consideration that the landlord in his ejectment application and in his statement did not disclose that there were two other shops in his possession at the time of the institution of the case. He also did not prove that the shops which were already in his possession were not suitable for his need. The first appellate Court was influenced by the circumstance that only when the question of additional evidence came up that he came out with the explanation that one of the other shops which were in his possession was being used for preparation of articles while the other was used for selling the goods. The manner in which this disclosure was made led the first appellate Court to believe that he was guilty of 'suppression of important facts and thus had not approached the Court with clean hands. It was also noticed that the landlord's son was already working with him and he had already two shops with him which appeared to be sufficient and suitable for his needs as well as for his son.. It was accordingly held that the personal requirement of the landlord did not appear to be bona fide. The tenant's appeal was, therefore, allowed.

4. The learned counsel appearing in support of this appeal has sought to assail the finding of the first appellate Court on the reasoning that the learned Additional District Judge has misdirected himself in law inasmuch as the mere fact that a landlord possessed more than one business premises in the same locality was no circumstances to be construed against him as the choice was with the landlord as to which of those, premises were required by him for his personal use. He further supplemented this argument by submitting that if a person was in possession of more than one premises in the same urban area, it was not for the Rent Controller to determine as to which of the premises should be occupied by him.

5. The argument is not well-based. In this case, what the learned Additional District Judge has done is not that he has tried to interfere with the choice of the landlord as to which premises he wishes to occupy but in order to construe whether the need of the landlord was bona fide and in goodfaith, he has takan into consideration the circumstance that in the eviction application as well as his evidence he had suppressed the fact that he was also in occupation of other business premises and had also not tried to establish that such other premises were not suitable for his needs. I think the view of the first appellate Court is sound. Inasmuch as if the conduct of the landlord is such that he does not take the Court into confidence no approaches it with clean hands and is guilty of suppression of facts, then this conduct of the landlord will reflect and recoil on his bona fides and good faith for establishing his personal need or need of his son. This is what has precisely happened in this case.

5. The learned counsel seems to be arguing the appeal on the assumption that the rent tribunals are to act as a matter of coleus on a landlord merely filing a petition for eviction of the tenant on the ground of personal need. Indeed, a mere desire of a landlord to evict his tenant on this ground has never been considered to be sufficient for the purpose. A landlord is B required to discharge his onus and to satisfy the conscience of the Rent Controller as well as the appellate authority that his requirement was based on good faith and was bona fide. I have not felt persuaded to interfere with the finding of the learned Additional District Judge which appears to proceed on correct appreciation of the material before him.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant was unable to show that case falls under clause (a), (b) or

(c) of section 100 of the C. P. C. The appeal, C therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall however be no order as to costs.