KHAN MUHAMMAD AYUB KHAN vs Ch. SAMI ULLAH KHAN
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal arising from ejectment proceedings initiated by a landlord against a tenant. The core legal question was whether the tenant had committed a default in the payment of rent, thereby justifying the striking off of his defence under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance. The Rent Controller had initially ordered the tenant to deposit arrears and future rent, subsequently striking out the defence for non-compliance regarding specific months. However, the Appellate Court reversed this finding, determining that previous deposits made by the tenant were sufficient to cover the alleged arrears, thus negating the claim of default. The High Court upheld this decision. The Supreme Court, upon review, affirmed the concurrent findings of the lower courts, noting that the determination of default was a question of fact. Having examined the accounts, the Court concluded that no default had occurred. Consequently, the petition for leave to appeal was dismissed, reinforcing the principle that appellate courts will generally not interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding rent deposits unless a clear error is demonstrated.
- Can an appellate court interfere with a finding of fact regarding rent default when lower courts have concurrent findings?
- Does the adjustment of previously deposited amounts against alleged rent arrears negate a finding of default under the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance?
- Section 13(6), Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance
ORDER
M. S. QURAISHI, J.-In an ejectment proceeding brought by the petitioner/ landlord, an order had been passed under section 13 (6) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance directing the respondent to deposit arrears of rent from 8-1141965 to 30-4-1969 and future rents. The respondent was found by the Controller to be guilty of non-compliance of that order in respect of rent for the months of July, 1969, February, 1971 and February, 1972 and accordingly his defence was struck out. The Appellate Court, however, found that there was no default as the amounts already deposited by the respondent could be adjusted against the rents for the months in question. The petitioner brought S. A. O. No. 247 of 1974 but same was dismissed by the impugned order dated 12-5-1976.
Aggrieved, he filed this petition for leave to appeal.
2. The question of default is one of fact and we find that both the first appellate Court and the High Court had after carefully examining the account of deposits made by the respondent, come to the conclusion that there had been no default. No case is, therefore, made out for interference. The petition is dismissed.