Malik AFZAL ALI vs Malik ASHRAF ALI
This petition for leave to appeal arose from ejectment proceedings initiated by the respondent against his brother, the petitioner, on the ground of personal requirement. Although the Rent Controller initially dismissed the ejectment petition, the Additional District Judge allowed the appeal and ordered eviction. The High Court subsequently dismissed the petitioner's writ petition in limine. During the pendency of the matter, no stay was granted and the petitioner was evicted from the premises on 17-01-1982. The core question before the Supreme Court was whether the petition survived or had become infructuous following the execution of the eviction order. The Supreme Court held that since the petitioner had already been ejected from the shop, the petition had become infructuous. Addressing the petitioner's contention that the respondent subsequently sold the property in violation of statutory provisions, the Court observed that the petitioner could seek appropriate remedies under the law for any such post-eviction violation.
- Does a petition challenging an eviction order become infructuous once the tenant has been actually ejected in execution of the order?
- Can a post-eviction sale of the property in alleged violation of statutory provisions be determined in an appeal against the eviction order when the tenant has already been ejected?
- Section 13(4), West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance 1959
ORDER
M. S. H. QURAISHI, J.-The respondent, who is real brother of the petitioner, instituted proceeding for ejectment of the petitioner on the ground of personal use. The petition was dismissed by the Rent Controller but it succeeded in appeal before the Additional District Judge, and his ejectment was ordered. Against this he filed a writ petition but the same was dismissed in limine by a learned Single Judge of the Lahore High Court on 28-6-1981 which is now impugned in the present petition for leave to appeal.
2. It is conceded that no stay having been granted, the petitioner was ejected from the shop on 17- 1-1982. That being so, the petition has become infructuous. Learned counsel, however, submits that the respon--dent has in violation of section 13(4) of the Rent Restriction Ordinance sold the shop to a third party on 29-4-1982 which, according to learned counsel, showed that his requirement for personal use was not bona fide. This is a matter for which the petitioner, if so advised, may take his remedy under the law.
3. - No other point having been argued, the petition is dismissed: M. Z. M,