MESSRS DADA LTD. vs MADRASA MAZHARUL ULOOM ASSOCIATION
This petition for leave to appeal arose from a judgment of the Sind High Court, which dismissed a second appeal filed by the petitioner against an eviction order issued under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. The core legal question concerned whether the respondents' claim of bona fide requirement for the rented premises was valid, specifically challenging the lower courts' concurrent findings of fact. The petitioner argued that the respondents owned another property, an Eidgah, which could potentially be utilized for the same purpose, thereby negating the bona fide requirement for the disputed premises. The Supreme Court observed that the property in dispute was distinct from the Eidgah property. Consequently, the Court declined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement, holding that there was no justification to re-open the matter. The petition was dismissed, affirming the principle that concurrent findings of fact regarding bona fide requirement in rent matters, when based on relevant circumstances, are generally not subject to interference in further appeal.
- Can the Supreme Court interfere with concurrent findings of fact regarding the bona fide requirement of a landlord in a rent eviction case?
- Does the existence of an alternative property owned by a landlord necessarily negate the bona fide requirement for the disputed premises?
- West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.--Leave to Appeal has been sought from Judgment dated. 5-11-1980 of the Sind High Court whereby a second appeal arising out of order of eviction of the petitioner under the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1.959, was dismissed.
2. The learned Rent Controller found the ground of bona fide require--ment as established. On confirmation of this finding, the petitioner's first appeal was dismissed. The contention raised from the petitioner's side was that the requirement of the Respondents/landlords was not bona fide. One of the grounds urged on behalf the Petitioner before the High Court was that the Respondents/landlords had mentioned the property in dispute as the only premises owned by them which was required for their use. But, during the trial it transpired that another plot of land which was being utilized as an Eidgah could also be utilized by the Respondent/landlords for the same purpose which was made the basis of the eviction application. It was also argued that the Eidgah could be used otherwise than as an Eidgah because there was nothing in the relevant law to prohibit such a use of the Eidgah by the Respon--dents.
3. The learned Single Judge in the High Court considered the point regarding bona fides of the respondents/landlords- and took into account all the relevant circumstances in this behalf. It was not necessary to decide the other wider question with regard to the possible uses of an Eidgah because the property in dispute in this case is separate from the property which is being utilized as an Eidgah. After hearing the lear--ned counsel, we do not find any justification for re-opening the question of the bona fide requirement of the Respondents as it stands concluded by unexceptionable concurrent findings of fact. This petition is accord--ingly dismissed.