Mirza MEHBOOB BEG vs The STATE
This matter arises from a petition for leave to appeal filed against an order of the High Court in a criminal matter, which was barred by 17 days. The core legal question concerns whether sufficient cause was shown for the condonation of delay in instituting the petition for leave to appeal. The Supreme Court held that the petition was time-barred, noting that the petitioner had been duly informed of the High Court judgment by his counsel and that there was no valid explanation for the subsequent delay in filing the petition after receiving direct intimation. The key principle laid down is that negligence or failure to act diligently after receiving intimation of a judgment does not constitute sufficient ground for the condonation of delay under limitation principles.
- Whether the failure of a petitioner to act upon intimation given by counsel constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay?
- Is a petition for leave to appeal liable to be dismissed when there is no adequate explanation for the delay in its institution?
- Section 409, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
- Section 5(2), Prevention of Corruption Act 1947
ORDER
1. MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.-This petition for leave to appeal from the order of a learned Judge in the High Court in a criminal matter is barred by 17 days.
2. In the application for condonation of delay, it is alleged that the petitioner had acted bona fide as he was away for a consider--able time from Karachi where the appeal was heard and that he came to know of the order of dismissal of the appeal against conviction under section 409, P. P. C.
3. Read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 11 of 1947 only on 31-3-1970. The counsel who appeared in the High Court admittedly gave intimation to the petitioner about the judgment delivered in the case immediately. It was, therefore, the fault of the petitioner if he did not attend to the matter in time. In any case when the petitioner on his own showing received intimation of the order of the High Court on 31-3-1970 there is no explanation for delay in the institution of the petition for leave to appeal up to 14-4-1970.
4. The petition is dismissed as barred by time.