HAKIM KHAN Versus AURANGZEB

JUDGMENT.

The facts of the case are that Dost Mohammad Khan son of the appellant, Malik Hakim Khan was killed in 1948/49 allegedly, by one of the maternal uncles of the respondents Nos. 1 and 2. According to respondent No. 1 he was about 8/9 years old at that time while the other respondent was three years younger to him. According to the appellant, respondent No. 1 was about 12/13 years of age at the time when his father was killed. The difference of three years in the age of the two brothers is however, admitted to be correct by the appellant, It is thus clear that both the respondents were minors when their father was killed. According to the respondents as well as P. W. 1, they were brought up and taken care of, by the appellant being their grand‑father, who on account of his love and affection for his real grand‑sons who had been deprived of the paternal affection, gifted away 702 kanals of land in question in their favour vide Exh. D. 1 on i‑2‑1952, while appearing before the Revenue Officer concerned. According to the said document, after making his statement in this regard he signed the same on the same date before the Revenue Officer. The mutation in regard to the gift was sanctioned on 15‑2‑1952 vide the same document. A copy of the Jamabandi for the year 1963‑64 produced by the appellant shows the names of the respondents as amongst the owners of the joint khata on account of the gift made in their favour by the appellant. It is significant to notice that during the same time, gift of some portion of his property was also made by the appellant in favour of his other grand‑sons, namely Muhammad Aslam, Ata Mohammad and Mohammad Afzal sons of Mohammad Hussain. Their names also appear amongst the owners of the joint khata. The appellant has also produced documents Exhs. P. 1 and P. 3, copies of Khasra Girdawari for the period 1962 to 1966 and revenue receipts for the same period, respectively, in order to show that in spite of the gift having been made in favour of the respondents, possession was never delivered to them and he continued to be in possession thereof.

2. The present suit was filed on 3‑2‑1966 for declaration to the effect that appellant was the complete owner of the land in question measuring 702 kanals and the gift mutation, as mentioned above, was illegal, void and ineffective, so far as his right of ownership in the land in dispute was con cerned. The suit was resisted by the respondents on the ground that the gift being complete, its validity cannot be challenged at this late stage after the expiry of about 14 years. The relevant issues framed by the learned trial Court on the basis of the pleadings of tl a parties for the decision of the present appeal are as follows:‑---

(1) Whether the suit is barred by time?

(2) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from bringing the present suit by his conduct?

(3) Whether the suit property belongs to the defendants, if so what is its effect on the present suit?

(4) Whether the mutation of Tamlik was got attested by the plaintiff himself, if so what is its effect?

(5) Whether the Tamlik is legal?

(6) Whether Tamlik was executed under coercion and undue influence ?

(7) Relief.

3. Almost all the issues were decided against the appellant and in favour of the respondents and consequently the suit was dismissed.

4. In order to have the complete picture and background of the case certain facts are necessary to be mentioned. It is admitted on record that after the land in question was gifted in favour of the respondents their mother married their uncle Muhammad Khan who after 4/5 years of the marriage died. According to the appellant after the murder of their father, the res pondents started living separately from him with their mother and when she married Muhammad Khan they all started living with him in his house. This fact is however, controverted by the respondents, as mentioned above. According to them they were brought up by the appellant himself and they lived with him throughout. In the year 1961‑62 respondent No. 1, abducted the widow of his uncle Amir and took her to the house of his maternal uncle, Sher Muhammad, who was allegedly responsible for the murder of his father. According to the appellant, respondent No. 2 as well as his sister and mother they all went alongwith respondent No. 1 and started living in the house of their maternal uncle. Respondent No. 1 there married the widow of his uncle, Amir and also performed the marriage ceremony of his sister with the son of his maternal uncle. According to the appellant since then they all have been living there and not in the village where he resides. So far as the abduction of Amir's widow and the marriage of his sister with the son of his maternal uncle is concerned the same is admitted by the respondents. It has been admitted by the appellant in his statement, as P. W. 5, that on account of the abduction of Amir's widow and the marriage of his grand‑daughter with the son of maternal uncle of the respondents who was allegedly responsible for the murder of his son Dost Mohammad, he has become annoyed with the respondents and they have not been on visiting and speaking terms since then. It is also admitted that after the murder of his son Dost Mohammad, appellant contracted the second marriage and he has issues from his second wife.

5. Learned counsel in addition to the points involved in the issues, as referred to above, has vehemently argued ,that since the documents placed on record have not been duly initialled and signed while exhibiting the same, therefore, the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is not valid and as such is liable to be set aside, on this ground alone. It is not denied that this objection has not been raised in the memorandum of appeal. However, it is urged that since it is a law point, therefore, the same can be raised during the arguments even at this stage. I am afraid this contention has no force in the circumstances of the case. I have carefully examined the documents produced by the parties and every one of them after having been exhibited bears endorsement'as required by Order XIII, rule 4, C. P. C., as to number and title of the suit, the name of the person producing the document, the date on which it was produced and statement of its having been so admitted and the endorsement having been signed or initialled by the Judge. The numbers of the exhibits have been given in hand while the remaining particulars have been given in the stamp axed on each and every document and duly initialled by the learned trial Court. In this view of the matter the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant has no force.

6. Even otherwise, according to law the mere non‑endorsement by the Judge concerned, of the document, does not render it inadmissible. Reliance in this respect can be made on Sultan Ahmad Chaudhry v. Mustafiz‑ur‑Rehman (P L D 1967 Dacca 216). The points, which the appellant wanted to bring home by the production of his documents have been discussed in detail by the learned trial Court while deciding issues 1 and 7. The main purport of the document was to prove that since the possession was not delivered to the respondents, therefore, the gift made by the appellant was not valid. ' This aspect of the case has been discussed and adjudicated upon by the learned trial Court under the said issues. If the documents in question had not even been initialled or the provision as contained in Order XIII, rule 4, C. P. C. had not been followed so strictly it would never have advanced the cause of the appellant so far as the admissibility or otherwise of the documents in evidence or tile adjudication of the points involved by the trial Court are concerned, as such an omission would not have caused any prejudice against his interest. The learned counsel while arguing this objection has relied upon Sadik Hussain Khan v. Hasham All Khan and others (AIR 1916 P C 27‑) and Imamuddin and another v. Sri Ram Perbhu Dial (A I R 1928 Lah. 142). In the former case their Lordships of the Privy Council, no doubt, deprecated the practice of not making endorsement on the document brought on record and made adverse remarks against the Court concerned in not following the relevant provision of law but they did not set aside the judgment in question on that ground. However, they observed that in case such practice was found to have not been followed in future then their Lordships would refuse to read or permit to be used any document not endorsed in the manner, required by law. It means that the Privy Council gave a sort of warning to the trial Courts for observing the procedure as laid down in the provision of law as referred to above. The circumstances of the case as discussed in A I R 1928 Lah. 142 do not exist in the present case. It was found impossible by the High Court as to which of the documents or portions thereof had been relied upon by the trial Court and for that reason the case was remanded. In the present case this is not the position. As mentioned above, the points which were likely to be brought to the notice of the Court by the production of the documents have been discussed in detail by the trial Court in its judgment. According to law in spite' of an omission on the part of the trial Court in strictly following the procedure as laid down in Order XIII, rule 4, C. P. C. the documents placed on record can be looked into and considered while deciding the case. Moreover if any such omission has been committed by the Court then it is not due to the fault of the party concerned. In the circumstances there is no reason as to why such party should be penalized for the omission of the Court. Reliance in this respect can be placed upon Mohammad Yousuf Khan Khattak v. S. M. Ayub (P L D 1972 Pesh. 175).

7. It is also settled law that if objection to the formal proof of the document has not been taken at the earliest time, it cannot be taken subsequently and certainly not at the appellate stage. The impugned judgment before this Court does not show that any such objection was raised by the appellant before the trial Court during the arguments, nor the same was raised even in the memorandum of appeal before this Court. As such it can be deemed under the law that the documents were duly admitted in evidence. There is nothing in law to prevent this Court from looking into and consider ing the documents even if they are not exhibited provided they have been placed on record by the parties concerned. This is the first appeal against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial .Court and if the documents had been merely placed on record though not duly endorsed in accordance with law, I don't feel any hesitation to say that this Court certainly could go into and examine them, so far as the merits of the case were concerned. The omission to mark the documents, produced by the parties in accordance with the relevant provision of law is merely an irregularity which is otherwise' curable. Reliance in this respect‑can be placed upon A I R 1933 Sind 379. In that case the documents as relied upon by the trial Court as referred to during the arguments by the parties had not been marked as exhibits. It was held that it was an irregularity which was not incurable. Since the documents had been referred to and relied upon by the trial Court, therefore, it was found that an omission on the part of the Court to exhibit them had not prejudiced the case of the appellant. In the present case as mentioned above, the points which were required by the appellant to be brought to the notice of the Court by the production of the documents were duly argued and consider ed by the trial Court. In this view of the matter the objection raised by the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to admissibility or otherwise of the documents as referred to above has no substance. The same is hereby repelled.

8. It has been argued while relying upon Paras. 160, 161 and 167 of Mohammadan Law by Mulla with reference to issues 1 and 7 that since the gift in question was of an undivided share (Mush'aa) in the property which was capable of division and further since the possession of the same was never delivered to the respondents, therefore, the same was void as if it was never made. It is contended that the gift being void, question of limitation does not arise in the present case and the suit is quite competent in this regard. According to Mulla in his book Mohammadan Law (Seventeenth Edition) gift of undivided share (Mush'aa) though it may be a share in the property capable of division is valid from the moment the gift is made even if the share is not divided off and delivered to the donee, in the following cases. (1) Where the gift is made by one co‑heir to another; (2) where the gift is of a share in a Zemindari or Taluka; (3) where the gift is of a share in free‑hold property in a large commercial town; (4) where the gift is of shares in a land company. Mr. Tayyabji, famous jurist in his book Mohammadan Law, 3rd Edition has discussed, gift of Mush'aa in paras. 374 to 382 of the same. He says that according to Hanafi Law the gift of Mush'aa for undivided part of a thing capable of division is not complete and valid unless the part of which the gift is made is divided off and separated from the rest and possession of the separated part given to the donee, provided that a gift of undivided property is valid where one of the donees is a minor son of the donor. The subject of gift may be validly delivered to the donee contained in a thing belonging to the donor and not forming part of the gift but under Hanafi Law delivery of possession is not valid where the subject of the gift is delivered containing something that does not form part of the gift. An undivided part of property capable of division may form the subject‑matter of a gift where donor and donee are joint owners of the said property. A gift to two or more persons jointly is valid notwithstanding that the donor has not divided the shares of the donees nor given separate possession of his respective shares provided that the interest of each donee is defined in the declaration of gift. It has been further stated that a gift is not invalidated by its subject becoming Mush'aa after the gift has been completed. A gift though invalid in its in ception because of its subject not being divided off may be validated by its subject being subsequently divided off from the rest of the property, and by possession being given to the donee of the divided part. Mr. Tayyabji is also of the view, that the doctrine relating to the invalidity of gifts of Mush'aa is unadapted to a progressive state of society and will be confined within the strictest limits and devices to avoid its operation are not looked upon with disfavour.

9. Baillie in his Digest of Mohammadan Law has dealt with the gift of Mush'aa at page 523, 1957 Edition. It has been stated that the gift of Mush'aa or undivided part of the property which is capable of division is not lawful. According to him it is irregular and the irregularity can be cured by delivery of possession of the defined part of the property. It is, however, mentioned there that according to two disciples of Imam Abu Haneefa, the gift of a Mush'aa in property which is capable of division to two men or to a group is valid.

10. Hamilton in Hedaya at page 486 has expressed the similar view with regard to gift of Mush'aa. However, according to Imam Shafe'i gift of Mush'aa or otherwise is valid because it is in relation to a property as it cannot be said that an undivided part does not constitute a property.

11. It has been held in Mohammad Ibrahim and others v. Muhammad Shah (P L D 1963 B J 1) that the gift of an undivided share in the property capable of division is invalid but if subsequently the property so gifted is specifically ear‑marked or partitioned and handed over to the donees and they remain in actual physical possession of the same the gift becomes valid. Mr. Justice M. R. Kayani has held in Aurangzeb and others v. Daud Khan and others (P L D 1957 Posh. 85) that "it is true that delivery of possession is one of the three essentials of a valid gift but it is now an established law that no transfer of possession is required in the case of a gift by a father to his minor child or by a guardian to his ward. All that is necessary is to establish a bona fide intention to give, Similarly no change of possession is necessary in the case of a gift by a grand father to his minor grand‑son if his father is dead, for the grand‑father is then the person to take delivery on behalf of his grand‑son as his guardian. This t view has been accepted by the Supreme Court in Ghulam Hassan v. Sarfraz Khan (P L D 1956 S C (Pak.) 309)". In that Peshawar case the father of the three minor donees died during the lifetime of his father who consequently made a gift of 726 kanals 8 marlas in favour of the minors. The mutation of gift was recorded on the statement of the donor. In an appeal by one of the sons of the donor against the order of mutation the donor retracted his consent but retraction was not accepted. He, therefore, brought a suit for declaration to the effect that the gift was not binding on him as he had not delivered the possession of the property and he was victim of fraud and undue influence practised upon him by his grand‑son. It was held that in order that retraction of a valid gift should become impossible two conditions are necessary. (1) The donee must be prohibited in marriage, secondly he must be related by blood. The terms of prohibited relationship make no distinction as to sex and it is only rational that if two parties, the donor and the donee, belong to the same sex, the sex of one of them should be altered so as to ascertain whether the relationship becomes forbidden in marriage. It was further observed that if the grand‑father was changed to grand‑mother or the grand‑son to grand‑daughter the prohibition became apparent. According to the learned Judge this seemed to be elementary that it was impossible to conceive of marriage between a male and a male and between the female and female. It was held that the term of prohibited relationship is used in respect of gifts merely to describe a relationship conveniently. The same view has been taken by Mr. Justice Waheeduddin Ahmad in Bahadur v. Jan Mohammad (P L D 1960 Kar. 745). It has been held at page 751 of the report that "this being the position it is not possible for me to give the words "relationship within the prohibited degree" a restricted meaning. In my view both Shafi, J., in P L D 1960 Lah. 130 and Kidwai, J., in A I R 1952 All. 614 have correctly exposed the principles of Muslim Law on this question and have rightly held that the words "prohibited degree" must be given artificial meaning as des cribing the decree of relationship which should be such as to exclude the legality of marriage between the two, if such a marriage was physically possible." It has also been held that "on this view of the matter it appears to me that a nephew stands to his uncle in relationship of prohibited degree and the respondent is not entitled under the Muslim Law to revoke the gift in favour of his nephew as he had already parted possession of the property in dispute." The facts of the case are that Jan Mohammad respondent gifted his 1/2 share out of his two annas share consisting of 16 acres of agricultural land situated in district Tharparkar, to the appellant, Bahadur, his nephew, on the condition that he would reside, serve and look after him. At the time of the gift the respondent had no issue but about 8/9 years before the institution of the suit he got a male issue. Thereafter relations between the two became strained. Consequently the respondent filed a suit for declaration and injunction that the gift had been revoked and the appel lant had no interest left in the property in dispute. The learned trial Court decreed the suit holding that the suit was not time‑barred and the gift being conditional was revocable. The case was, however, remanded for fresh decision by the lower appellate Court on the ground, that the plaint filed by the respondent was liable to be amended. Both the judgments were challenged by the appellant before the High Court which accepted his appeal and held that the respondent was not entitled to revoke the gift as the appellant was in relationship of blood within the prohibited degree with the respondent.

12. It has been held in Nazeer Dih and others v. Mohammad Shafi and others (A I R 1936 Lah. 9:) the judgment having been followed in Shafi Ullah v. Ghularn Jab6ar (P L D 1955 Lah. 191) that Muslim Law does not contemplate actual delivery of posses sion by the donor to his grand‑sons for the gift to be valid nor prohibits gifts of 1/2 share out of 576 acres of land and 3/4th share in the house with regard to Hiba‑bibmush'aa. It has been held that in case the donor and donees are related to each other in the manner they are related in that case it is un necessary that the donor should physically part with the possession of the property as mere intention on his part to treat the property as that of the donee and to divest himself of his own ownership is sufficient to constitute a valid gift. It has also been held as under:‑----

"It, was manifest from these authorities that the original rigidity of the rule of Mush'aa has been considerably relaxed in its application to British‑India and in almost all cases, which have come up before the Courts, an effort has been made to adopt the rule to its environments and to interpret it so as to make it consistent with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The Courts in this country have given effect rather to the spirit of the rule than to its letter and have upheld gifts in all cases in which the intention to give on the part of the donor had been expressed in most unequivocal terms, and had further been attended by all honest efforts on his part to complete the gift by divesting himself of the control over the property in such a manner as would clearly imply his divestitute in the eye of the law of the land. The raison d'etre of this rule was the avoidance of gifts that were vague, indefinite or incomplete, and the only test that should be applied in such cases is whether the gift in question is open to any of these objections, or in other words, whether the donor has still reserved to himself a loop‑hole of escape or not. If this is not so and if the donor has done all that the law of the land requires to be done to separate himself from the property, a gift of Mush'aa will be as valid as that of property which can be physically handed over to the donee. Transfer of possession is no doubt the main thing in the whole affair, and in every case this is the only thing to be seen."

The subject of gift in Hamid Ullah v. Ahmad Ullah (A I R 1936 All. 473) were parcels of land being undivided share of 7/32 in six houses of which the donor was not in physical possession though the property was capable of division. It was held that the gift was valid as the donor had done practically all that she was able to do in the way of divesting herself of possession and giving to the donee the possession which she herself had. In Ebrahim Alibhai Akuji v. Bai' Asi and others (A I R 1934 Bom. 21), the donor had gifted his land to his two daughters and directed the tenants to pay rent to them. This was followed by a regular deed of gift. It was held that although the possession had not been given to the two donees after the division of the property, the gift was valid, in view 'of the conduct of the donor and the donee after the time when the gift was completed. In Bibi Kanij Fatima v. Jai Narain Ram and others (A I R 1944 Pat. 334) the subject of gift was one anna share in the land as heir of first husband and also one anna share as heir of second husband. It was observed that a donee of Mush'aa wbo had taken joint possession of the subject of gift and who finds it convenient and practicable to continue to hold that property without partition, should be allowed to do so. All that the law is concerned is that before the validity of such a gift is declared, the donor must have parted with complete possession in favour of the donee, and then it is for the donee to see as to whether he wants partition or not.

13. In the present case as the facts of the case show that the donees were minors at the time when the property in question was gifted in their favour. As such according to law there was no need of formal delivery of possession to them by the donor being their real grand‑father. Possession on behalf of a donee who is a minor or of unsound mind must normally be taken by the guardian of the donee's property. Reliance in this respect can be made on the observations made at page 484 of Hedaya. Even if it is con ceded for arguments sake though it is not borne out from the record that the donees were living separately with their mother from the donor after the murder of their father, the fact remains and the same has not been denied that they were living under the care and supervision of the appellant. It was the grand‑father as their guardian who was to take delivery of possession on their behalf. The relevant law in this regard has been discussed above. In addition to that reliance can be placed upon Sh. Mohammad Mumtaz v. Zubaida (I L R 1911 All. 466) where it has been held that after a. gift has been completed its validity is not affected by a subsequent change of possession or by the fact that the donee does not continue to be in possession of the subject of the gift. It is, however, significant to mention here that according to P. W. 1 Ghous Mohammad the donees were putting up with the appellant in 1953 after the mutation of gift was sanctioned. According to law the possession as such passed on to the donees through their grand‑father and the gift became complete and effective. The contention of the appellant that the donees were living separately from him and quite independently cannot be accepted in the circumstances of .the case. It has come on record that they were living with their‑ mother in the same Haveli where the appellant used to reside. Their mother contracted second marriage after about 10/12 years of the murder of her first husband, according to the statement of the appellant, himself. If it is so then obviously they were living under his supervision and care as guardian after the death of their father. The donees have been shown as owners of the land in question in the revenue record and if certain revenue record such as Girdawaries show the land in question under the cultivation of the appellant that does not mean that its possession was with him. Since he was holding the land on behalf of his grand‑sons, therefore, be was cultivating the land on their behalf. As such the documents produced by him in order to show that he had been in possession of the land do not help him at all. The gift being complete and effective with effect from the time when it was made the suit for declaration was liable to be filed within a period of six years, and the learned trial Court has rightly decided the issues 1 and 7 in this regard.

14. According to law a gift cannot be revoked after the delivery of possession when the donee is related to the donor within the prohibited degrees. This aspect of the case has been discussed above and it has been found that the donees being grand‑sons of the donor are related to him within the prohibited degrees.

15. Further the gift in the present case is of a share in a Zamindari and according to exception No. 2 of Para. 160 of Mohammadan Law by Mulla, Seventeenth Edition, it is valid in spite of the fact that it is Hiba‑bil‑mush'aa. The relevant authority in this respect has been cited above being Bahadur v. Jan Mohammad (P L D 1960 Kar. 745). In that case the subject of the gift was 1/2 share out of two annas share consisting of 16 acres of agricultural land belonging to the donor. It was argued in that case that two annas share was separated from the other co‑sharers and at the time of gift 16 acres of land were in his possession. It was found that it was out of those 16 acres of land that the donor gifted the 1/2 share to the donee. Thus the gifted property was not a gift of an undivided property and could not be considered to fall within the four corners of the doctrine of Mush'aa recognised under the Muslim Law. It was further held that a gift of undivided share in the property which is capable of being partitioned was irregular, and not void. If possession is once taken the gift was validated. The doctrine of Mush'aa was not applicable to those cases where the gift was of a share in Zemindari or Taluka. It was held that admittedly the property which was gifted by the donor to the donee was of a share in a Zemindari land and was not hit by a doctrine of Mush'aa. In section 160 of Mulla's principles of Muhammadan Law, it has been clearly stated that a gift of an undivided share (Mush'aa) though a share in property capable of division, is valid from the moment of the gift, even if the share is not divided off and delivered to the donee amongst others in a case where the gift is of a share in a Zemindari or Taluka. It was found that this being the position the contention of the donor had no substance.

16. In the present case it is admitted that the appellant is a big Zemin dar of the locality and in the khata where the land in question is situated he owns about 1800 kanals of land out of which he gifted 702 kanals of land. The property subject‑matter of the gift is admittedly a share in Zemindari which is jointly held by the co‑owners. As such .the gift made in favour of the donees is not hit by the principle of Mush'aa.

17. While discussing Mush'aa it is to be seen as to what is the purpose thereof and in what cases it can be made applicable. Literal meaning of the word Mush'aa is undivided/common and the aim of the principle is to remove the confusion and ambiguity with regard to the subject of gift so that the donee may have a clear title to the property gifted to him. This principle has to be applied in its letter and spirit otherwise there is likelihood of con fusion belt; created in the present society. It has to keep pace with the changing times.

18. In the case of an undivided share of property which is capable of division, gift of the same cannot be hit by the principle of Mush'aa when the said share can be separated subsequently at the instance of the donee. If an omission has been made by the donor in not getting the said share separated while making the gift, the same can be rectified by the donee himself by getting it separated from the other co‑onwners. Even otherwise if the donee conveniently takes benefit out of the undivided share then the gift in respect thereof cannot be held to be invalid. It means that the donee does not feel any difficulty in his way in handling the property gifted to him, and taking benefit out of that. The purpose behind the principle of Mush'aa is that the donee should not be put to inconvenience or difficulty in the case of an un divided share of the property. If that difficulty or inconvenience is not felt by the donee then the question of invalidity of the gift on that basis would not arise. In the present case I am of the view that the land measuring 702 kanals out of the joint khata of 1800 kanals can be easily got separated from the rest of the land by the donees. The subject of gift is definite being a specific portion of the khata. Since the possession of the gifted land passed on to the donees as discussed above, and the gift being complete and effective the same cannot be revoked by the donor at this stage.

19. The facts of the case further show and as admitted by the appellant in his own statement that he was satisfied with regard to the validity of the gift right from the beginning and felt annoyed with the donees when respon dent No. 1 Aurangzeb abducted the widow of Amir deceased son of the appellant and when Aurangzeb further married his sister with the son of his maternal uncle Sher Muhammad who was involved in the murder of his father, son of the appellant. If such incident had not taken place then the appellant would not have taken exception to the gift made by him. Other wise his conduct throughout shows that he on his own accord gifted the proper ty in question in favour of the respondents so that they may not be deprived of the share which their father was to inherit from the property. It was due to his love and affection for the grand‑sons after the murder of their father that he gifted the land in their favour. There is nothing on record to show that after the gift made in 1952 the appellant ever raised any objection with regard to its validity till he filed the present suit after lapse of about 14 years.

'The story of undue pressure or coercion brought upon the appellant for making the gift in question also does not find support from the record as well .as the circumstances of the case. Even if it is conceded for arguments sake that any such pressure was brought upon him then it was open to the appel lant to revoke the gift within reasonable time on account of that pressure. It 9s established on record that he never took any step in this regard. He is therefore, estopped now by his conduct to file the present suit for declaring the gift as null and void.

20. For the aforesaid reasons, there is no force in the appeal which is hereby dismissed with costs.

K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.