THE STATE Versus SARDAR SHAH

NASIM HASAN SHAH, J.‑This judgment will dispose of Criminal Appeal No. 177/ 1966, Criminal Appeal No. 178/ 1966, Criminal Revision No. 178/1966, Criminal Revision No. 99/1966, filed on behalf of the State, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 572 of 1966 and Criminal Miscellaneous No. 573 of 1966, filed on behalf of Syed Sardar Shah flokhari, respondent in the Criminal Appeals and the Criminal Revisions, to be referred to in the sequel as the accused.

2. The facts which form the background are that the accused (Syed Sardar Shah Bokhari) was an Attorney of the. Supreme Court of Pakistan, On 4‑6-1962 one Pir Feroze Shan submitted an application (Exh. P. J.) addressed to the Chief Justice of Pakistan, to the effect that the aforemen tioned Attorney had filed a petition for special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court of Pakistan (Peshawar Bench) which due to his negligence had become time‑barred and in order to cover the delay he bad filed it by altering the date of delivery of the certified copy of the High Court's judgment from 6th March 1962 to 1st May 1962, fur which purpose he replaced the last page of the certified copy of the judgment entirely and affixed thereon a fictitious seal of the High Court Copying Branch, showing it to have been delivered on 1‑5‑1962, to place of the actual date of its delivery, which was 6‑3‑1962, On .3‑7‑1962 a formal complaint (Exh. P. Q.), was lodged by the Registrar on the direction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, with the District Magistrate, Lahore, alleging commission of offences under sections 177, 182, 199/200 read with sections 191, 197/198 and 466/471, P. P. C. The investigation of this case was entrusted by the District Magistrate to the C.I.D and Ch. Sardar Ali, D.S. P., C. I. D. was appointed as Investigating Officer. While the matter was still under investigation, the Registrar, Supreme Court, submitted on the direction of the Chief Justice a supplementary statement on 1‑7‑1962, to the effect that in order to avoid all misconception and misunderstanding that‑

(a) the complaint is not directed against any person other than Mr. Sardar Shah Bokhari, Attorney ;

(b) the references to other lawyers whether by name or otherwise are incidental to the narrative, and are not to be understood as imputing any connection with any of the offences alleged ; the complaint may be amended by deleting the names of the other Advocates whose names had incidentally appeared in the complaint.

3. On 2‑10‑1962 Sardar Ali, D. P. S., C.1. D. submitted the challan in the Court of the District Magistrate, Lahore, against the accused, for offences under sections 466/471, 177, 182, 197, 198, 199/200, P. P. C. The District Magistrate entrusted the case to the A. D. M., Lahore but the latter returned it, with the result that the case was then sent to the City Magistrate. The learned City Magistrate summoned the accused for 18‑10‑1962 for which date evidence was to be called. The accused appeared in Court on 18‑10-1962 but the case was adjourned to 10‑11-1962. 1n the meanwhile it was discovered in the Registry of the Supreme Court that the accused had in another petition, namely, Allah Ditta v. Mian Muhammad Saeed, apparently committed a similar fabrication, in that the copy attached with the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal was not a copy ordinarily issued by the Copying Branch of the High Court, but that it was fabricated and falsely stamped, in order to cover long delay in the filing of the said petition. A complaint (Exh. P. C. C.) again under the direction of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Count, under section 195 of the Cr. P. C. for offences under sections 177, 182, 199/200 read with sections 191, 197/198 and 466/471, P. P. C. was lodged with the District Magistrate, Lahore. The complaint was also investigated by the C. I. D., Lahore. After the completion of the investigation the challan in this case was submitted in the Court of the A. D. M. on 9‑11‑1962 who forwarded it to the District Magistrate on the same day. The District Magistrate marked it to the City Magistrate, Lahore, who was already seized of the connected case.

4. On 10‑11‑1962, before the commencement of the trial, an application dated 9‑11‑1962 was submitted by the Assistant Advocate‑General (West Pakistan) before the City Magistrate under section 234, Cr. P. C. stating that the two separate complaints filed by the Registrar of the Supreme Court against the accused be tried jointly because the offences committed by the accessed in both the cases were of the same kind, within the space of twelve months. Hence he may be charged and tried at one trial. The City Magistrate accepted the above prayer vide his order passed on 10‑11‑1962 and ordered that both the cases be tried together. Aggrieved by this order, the accused submitted an application under section 233, Cr. P. C. praying for re‑consideration of the said order, submitting that the joint trial was likely to prejudice his defence ; that the two cases involved two distinct transactions and the offences had no relation with each other and, therefore, the joint trial would he illegal and that the applicant might have to be subjected to retrial eventually in case the joint trial was proceeded with. He also, inter alia, pointed out that the nature of offence in each of the two cases was different and the witnesses were also different. Therefore, inconvenience would be caused in the joint trial. 'The learned Magistrate, after hearing the parties, was not persuaded to reconsider his earlier order on the ground that the offences alleged in both the cases were of tile same kind. The application was accordingly rejected on 14‑11‑1962

5. Thereafter, the cases were tossed from one Court to the other and eventually came up for trial before Mr. Saleem Akhtar, A. D. M., Lahore who recorded evidence of 39 F‑ Ws. These statements were recorded in the file in which Pir Feroze Shah was the complainant. On 18‑4‑1964 seven charge‑sheets were prepared by the learned trial Court. One charge‑sheet was for three offences under section 406, P. P. C., one charge‑sheet was for three offences under section 466/1.09, P. P. C., one charge‑sheet was for three offences under section 471/109. P. P. C., one charge‑sheet was for three offences under section 182. P. P. C., one charge sheet was for three offences under section 177, P P. C. and one charge‑sheet was for three offences under section 199/191, P. P. C. On the same date the prosecutor gave up all the remaining P Ws. and closed the prosecution evidence. The accused in his statement prayed for resummoning of the P. Ws. for further cross‑examination, but this prayer was refused on the ground that after the amendment made in the Cr. P C. by the Code of Criminal Procedure (West Pakistan Amendment) Act, 1964 (XVII of 1960 the Court was not obliged to summon all the P. Ws. who had already been examined. The accused was asked to give the list of D.Ws. and the case was fixed for 9‑5‑1964. Thereafter the accused submitted two applications, one for summoning seven D.Ws‑ and the second for summoning four P.Ws. for re‑cross‑examina tion. The application to cross‑examine four P. Ws. was accepted.

6. On 15‑5‑1964 the Prosecuting counsel submitted an application under section 232/233/234, Cr. P. C. praying for separate trials. The relevant part of the order of the learned trial Magistrate, which was passed on this application on 20‑5‑1964 is as follows :‑‑

"In ail seven charge‑sheets were prepared . . . . . . The request of the prosecution is that seven separate trials should be commenced in respect of seven different charge‑sheets.

There cannot be two opinions on the point that as there had been two separate transactions, one pertaining to the case of Feroze Shah and the other to the case of Allah Ditta, there should have been two separate trials of these offences committed in distinctly separate transactions, and the accused should have been charged separately for two cases, although one charge (under section 235(1), Cr. P. C.) could include all the offences committed in one transaction. The initial mistake appears to have been committed when the learned Assistant Advocate‑General applied before the City Magistrate on 10‑11‑1962 with the request that both the complaints be tried together at one trial and the learned City Magistrate acceded to his request. On hearing both sides I am convinced that there is no need of splitting up this one case into seven different cases according to the charge‑sheets framed, but it is necessary that unless the offences pertaining to two different transactions are tried separately, the accused would be prejudiced, for as the position now is the charge -sheets are quite confusing and the accused may say that he did not know where he stood.

I, therefore, order that from the stage of the charges the two cases should be split up, one in which the aggrieved person is Feroze Shah and the other in which the aggrieved person is Allah Ditta . . . . . .

In view of this position it is necessary that the charges be also amended in this case. I, therefore, order that as a prima facie case under sections 471. 471/109, 466, 466/109, 199, 177 and 182, P. P. C. is made out against the accused in case State through Feroze Shah v. Sardar Shah Bukhari, a charge under the said sections be framed against the said accused. Further I order that as a prima facie case under sections 471, 471/109, 466, 466/109, 199, 177, 182, P. P. C. is made out against the accused in case State through Allah Ditta v. Sardar Shah Bokhari a charge under the said sections be framed against the accused. Further I order that both cases shall be tried separately from the stage of the charges."

7. After the charges were amended, Sardar Shah Bokhari submitted another application, on 21‑5‑1964, summoning all the P. Ws. for further cross‑examination, but this application was rejected on 26‑5‑1964 excepting that one Fazal Elahi was allowed to be called. However, charges were framed in both the cases and the accused was asked to explain his position with respect to the allegations against him. So far as the case Slate through Allah Ditta was concerned, the position of the accused was that as no statement of any P. Ws. was recorded in that. case and that the evidence of the case State through Feroze Shah could not be read as evidence in that case, he was not in a position to say anything with regard to the allegations being put to him in the case State through Allah Ditta. However, so far as the case State through Feroze Shah is concerned, the accused clarified his position with regard to the allegations appearing against him and professed innocence. He also examined two witnesses in defence, in this case.

8. The learned A. D. M. by his order dated 26‑9‑1964 acquitted the accused of the charges under sections 177, 18,. 466 and 471 / s 09. P. P. C., but found him guilty under sections, 199, 466/109 and 471, P. P. C. in each case and convicted him on these counts. He was sentenced, under' section 199, P. P. C., to undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000. or in default of payment of tine to undergo nine months' R. I. The sentence under section 466/109, P. P. C. was simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 3,000 or in default of the payment of tine to undergo R. I. for one and six months. The sentence under section 471, P. P. C. was to undergo simple imprisonment till the rising of the Court and a fine of Rs. 1,000 or iii default of payment to undergo R. I. for six months.

9. Two separate appeals to challenge the above convictions and sentences were filed by the accused. These appeals came up for hearing. before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Lahore. The learned Additional Sessions Judge did not go into the merits of the case, because of his view that the complaints had not been competently lodged and that the procedure of joint trial adopted, while trying the two cases, was not in accordance with law. In respect to the first point he observed that according to clauses (b) and (c) of subsection (1) of section 195, no Court can take cognizance of offences punishable under sections 199/200 and 471, P. P. C. when such offences arc alleged to have been committed in or in relation to any proceedings in any Court except on the complaint in writing of such Court or some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. According to; section 476, Cr. P. C. when a Court wants to make a complaint under clause (b) or (c) the complaint has to be made in writing under the signatures. of the Presiding Officer of the Court. The offences under consideration were alleged to have been committed by the appellant in relation to the Petition for Special Leave to appeal. Taking note of these provisions the learned Additional Sessions Judge observed that so far as the offences punishably under sections 199, 200 and 471, P. P. C. were concerned, the complaint should have been made by tire Supreme Court (vide clauses (b) and (c) to subsection (d) of section 195. Cr. P. C.. duly signed by the Presiding Officer of the said Court, (vide section 476, Cr. P. C.). As the Presiding Officers of the Court were the Judges of the Supreme Court and not the Registrar and neither of the complaints having been signed by any of the Judges of the Supreme Court, the complaint against the accused in relation to offences punishable under sections 199, 200 and 471, P. P. C. were not complaints as envisaged by section 195 read with section 476, Cr. P. C., therefore, the learned trial Court could not take cognizance of the said offence. Consequently the learned trial Court had no cognizance to try the accused of the offences under sections 1149 and 471, P. P. C.

10. So far as the second point is concerned the learned Additional' Sessions Judge pointed out that the two cases related to two different transactions. There were two sets of witnesses and the two sets of offences had taken place on two different places and times. These two cases were tried‑‑by the A. D. M. who recorded evidence of both the cases in the case of State through Feroze Shah and did not record any evidence in the case of State through Allah Ditta. In the first instance he framed joint charges for both cases on 181‑1964 but it was only on 20‑5‑1964 that at the request of the prosecution he separated the trial‑, but then he did not record evidence afresh. The number of offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant in each case was eight and, therefore, he could not be tried for all these offences at one trial under section 234, Cr. P. C. It was also observed that the accused could be tried for any number of offences at one trial only if those offences were committed in one transaction, but the two cases against' the accused arose out of two different transactions and, therefore, under section 235, Cr. P. C. as well he could not be tried at one trial for all the offences alleged to have been committed by him in the two cases.

11. As a result of these findings it was held that the trial against tile' appellant was illegal. In the result, the appeals were accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge vide his judgment dated 28‑10‑1,965. the orders passed by the learned trial Court were set aside and the case remanded to the. Court of A. D , M., Lahore with the direction that he should try and decide the case afresh in the light of the above observations, according to law.

12. Aggrieved by this judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge the State has preferred two appeals and two revisions before this Court. Criminal Appeal No. 177 of 1966 is directed against the acquittal of the accused of the offences under sections 199 and 471, P. P C. in the case of State through Feroze Shah while Criminal Appeal No. 176 of 1966 is directed against the acquittal of the accused of the offences under sections 199 and 471, P. P. C. in the case of State through Allah Ditta. Criminal Revision No. 98 of 1966 has been preferred against the order of retrial with regard to the offences under section 4;,6/109, P. P. C. in the case of State through Feroze Shah while Criminal Revision No. 99 of 1966 has been preferred against the remand of the case State through Allah Ditta for retrial with regard to charges under section 466/109, P. P. C. The accused. Syed Sardar Shah Bokhari, has filed Criminal Miscellaneous No. 572 of 1966 under section 561‑A, Cr. P. C. read with section 439, Cr. P. C. for quashment of the proceedings fixed by the trial Court in connection with the retrial for the offences under section 466/109, P. P. C. in the case of State through Feroze Shah while the other petition, namely, Criminal Miscellaneous No. 573 of 1966 seeks quashment for proceedings pertaining. to retrial in the case State through Allah Dirta. All these matters have been heard together at full length and are being disposed of by this judgment.

13. The learned counsel appearing for the State has contended that the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the joint trial was bad in law is erroneous and further that the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the complaints against the accused in the two cases, so far as offences under sections 199 and 471, P. P. C. for which he was convicted are not proper complaints, as envisaged by section 195/476, Cr. P. C., was not tenable in law.

14. So far as the contention regarding the validity of the joint trial concerned, there is no doubt that the provisions of sections 234 and 235 Cr. P. C were not complied with in so far as the number of offences for which the accused was being tried was more than three in number and the two cases arose, not out of one transaction, but out of two different transactions so that he could not be tried for all the offences at one trial There was accordingly misjoinder of charges and the mode of trial was also not correct. The Privy Council in the well known case of Subrahmania Ayyar v. King‑Emperor (I L R 25 Mad. 6) has held that the disregard of an express provision law as the mode of trial was not a were irregularity such as could be remedied by section 537 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The Board was of the opinion that the trial having been conducted in a manner, prohibited by law it would be altogether illegal and accordingly set aside the conviction. The rule laid down in the said case has been followed by the Courts in Pakistan. See Imtiaz Rubbani v. Crown (P L D 1952 Lah. 657). Alvi v. Crown (P L D 1954 Lah. 183), Qadar Dad v. Sultan Bibi ere. (PLD 1956 FC 129), Mohammad Mosaddar v. The State (P L D 1958 S C (Pak.) 131) and Ghulam Rosool v. State (P L D 1965 Kar. 189). The finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the trial was illegal was. therefore, based on eminent authority. However. due note was not taken of the amendment introduced in the Criminal Procedure Code by the Code of Criminal Procedure (West Pakistan Amendment) Act (XVII of 1964). Section 23 thereof, inter alia, introduced the following amendment in section 53' of the. Code of Criminal Procedure ;‑

(a) .

(b) The following shall be inserted in clause (b) ‑ "of any error, omission or irregularity in the charge or mode of trial including any misjoinder of charges, or."

(Underlining* is ours).

The amendment made above shows that any error, omission or irregularity in the charge or mode of trial is not sufficient for reversal of a finding or a sentence recorded by the trial Court. The aforesaid amendment came into operation with effect from 1st April 1964, while the order of conviction was passed by the learned A. D. M. on 26‑9‑1964. The Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Abdullah v. Imdad Ali (1972 S C M R 173), has held that the amendment introduced in section 537 of the Cr. P. C. by Act XVIII of 1964 is retrospective and is applicable to the pending proceedings. Since a conviction would not be illegal for irregularity in the charge or the mode of trial under the amended law, the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the trial was illegal because there was misjoinder of the charges and the irregularity in the mode of trial cannot be sustained.

15. However, the contention raised on behalf of the State that the learned appellate Court fell into an error in holding that the complaint filed by the Registrar of the Supreme Court in relation to the offences punishable under sections 199 and 471, P. P. C. was not a complaint as envisaged by section 195 read with section 476, Cr. P. C., cannot be accepted.

16.‑Section 195, Cr. P. C., to the extent relevant, is in the following germs :‑

"S. 195.‑No Court shall take cognizance‑

(a)

(b) of any offence punishable under any of the following sections of the same Code, namely, sections 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211 and 228, when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court except, on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate ; or

(c) of any offence described in section 463 or punishable under section 471, section 475 or section 476 of the same Code, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any proceeding in any Court in respect of a document produced or given in evidence in such proceeding, except on the complaint in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate."

Section 476 which lays down procedure to be followed in the cases mentioned in section 195 is‑

476.‑(1) When any civil, revenue or criminal Court is, whether on application made to it in this behalf or otherwise, of opinion that it is expedient in the interests of justice that an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to in section 195, subsection (1), clause (b) or clause (c), which appears to have been committed in or in relation to a proceeding in that Court, such Court may, after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary, record a finding to that effect and make complaint thereof in writing signed by the Presiding Officer of the Court and shall forward the same to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction . . . . .

Provided that, where the Court making the complaint is a High Court, the complaint may be signed by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint."

So far as the offence punishable under section 199, Cr. P. C. is alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to any proceeding in any Court is concerned, no Court shall take cognizance thereof except on the complain in writing of such Court or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate. Similarly, so far as the offence punishable under sections 463 or 471, P. P. C. is concerned, when such offence is alleged to have been committed by a party to any Court in respect of a document. no Court shall take cognizance except on the complaint in writing of such Court, or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate and the procedure which the Court concerned has to follow is by making a complaint thereof in writing signed by the Presiding Officer and to forward if to a Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction. No doubt, if the Court making the complaint is a High Court, the complaint may be signed by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint. It is, however, significant that the proviso to subsection (1) to section 476 allows a complaint to be signed by the officer of the Court only where the Court making the complaint is a High Court. No such provision exists so far as Supreme Court is concerned. The evidence of Mr. A. A. Mirza, Registrar, Supreme Court, is to the effect that the complaints in both the cases were filed on the oral direction of the! Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. It is in these circumstances that it is to be seen whether the complaints were valid ?

17. It is manifest that the complaints in the present cases were made by the Registrar of the Supreme Court and these complaints were lodged on the oral direction of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The following part of the statement of Mr. A. A. Mirza makes this position amply clear :

"On the basis of these reports His Lordship the Chief Justice directed to file a complaint before District Magistrate under section 195 of the Cr. P. C. and to request that further investigations be made under section 155 of the Cr. P. C. The complaint is Exh. P. Q. It bears my signatures and is correct. I personally handed over this complaint to the D. M. on 13th July 1962 under orders of the Chief Justice."

The above complaint relates to the case State through Feroze Shah v. Sardar Shah Bokhari.

So far as the other case, namely, State through Allah Ditta v. Sardar Shah Bokhari is concerned, Mr. A. A. Mirza stated :‑

"The Chief Justice directed me that as the case is similar to the earlier case of Pir Feroze Shah the same course should be followed, namely by presenting a formal complaint under section 19i of the Cr. P. C. and requesting for further inquiry under section 155, Cr. P. C. I accordingly under the direction of his Lordship the Chief Justice presented a complaint Exh. P. C. C. on 18‑10‑1962."

'He further stated that there is no procedure specifically laid down in any Act regarding complaints to be instituted on behalf of the Supreme Court. He added that there were two rules in Order IV of the Supreme Court Rules, which laid down the procedure for action against the Advocates and the Attorneys for misconduct. The powers given under Order V, rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 1956 are the delegated powers of the Court to the Registrar in the manner of conduct of business of the Court.

18. Before us reliance was placed on Order V, rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, the relevant part of Order V, rule 1 may be reproduced as follows

"Business in Chambers.‑The powers of the Court in relation to the following matters may be exercised by the Registrar‑

(1) to (6) . . . . . . . . .

(7) Registration of petitions, appeals, suits and other matters."

A careful perusal of the above provisions shows that the Registrar has been delegated the powers of the Court in relation to certain proceedings that can be taken in connection with the business to be conducted by the Supreme Court in relation to cases instituted before it, such an application for revival or substitution, applications for leave to appeal or defend as pauper applications for discovery and inspection, applications for delivery of interrogation applications for substituted service etc. These rules do not authorise the Registrar to deal with matters to be decided by other Courts, so as to enable him to lodge complaints on behalf of the Supreme Court before another Court. Therefore, reliance on Order V of the Supreme Court Rules does not advance the case of the prosecution. As the law requires, the Presiding Officer of the Court to make the complaint himself, which in the instant case, would be a learned Judge of the Supreme Court. the complaint made in writing by the Registrar cannot be deemed to be a complaint contemplated by sections 195 and 476, Cr. P. C. It is well settled that a person cannot delegate to another the right to file a complaint. See LadhSingh v. Emperor (A I R 1915 Lah. 259) and Keshab Chander v. Emperor (A I R 1930 Lah. 225). Hence the oral direction by the learned Chief Justice to the Registrar to lodge the complaint before the D. M. cannot make the complaint so lodged a valid and legal complaint.

19. To overcome this hurdle the learned counsel for the State argued Shat the provisions of section 195(l)(b) and section 476, Cr. P. C. were not attracted, as the offence punishable under section 199, P. P. C. had not been committed "in, or in relation to any proceedings in any Court".

20. There is no force in this submission. An offence is alleged to have been committed in relation to any proceedings if it in some manner affects the proceedings in Court or is designed to affect them. In this case the petitions filed by the accused were for leave to appeal against the judgments of the High Court and the payer was that the Supreme Court should entertain them, These petitions were barred by time and if the false declaration was not made that they were not time‑barred, they were liable to be dismissed by the Supreme Court on the ground of limitation. The act committed was designed to affect the proceedings to be held in the Supreme Court and the alleged offence committed was clearly in relation to the proceedings of the Supreme Court. The expression "in relation to proceedings in any Court" is very general and it is wide enough to cover the acts allegedly done by the accused in the cases under consideration.

21. It is next argued that the offence under section 471, P. P. C. was not committed by the accused as a party and also not in proceedings in a Court, because he put in an application for leave to appeal before the Registrar of the Supreme Court. The argument is fallacious. The proceedings were instituted in the Supreme Court and the officer actually receiving the petition for special leave to appeal is not very material, because, the proceedings were meant to be taken up by the Supreme Court.

22. The word "party" is not defined in the Criminal Procedure Code, but it is defined in the Supreme Court Rules of 1956. The definition of this term, as the Rules stood at the relevant time is as follows :‑‑

"'Patty' and all words descriptive of parties to proceedings before the Court (as "appellant", "respondent", "plaintiff", "defendant" and the like) include, in respect of all acts proper to be done by an Attorney, the Attorney of the party in question, when he is represented by an Attorney."

In the Supreme Court an Attorney acts for and on behalf of a party in relation to the proceedings before it. The litigant by himself cannot deal with any part of the litigation which is conducted in the Supreme Court which must he handed by his Attorney and, therefore, the word "party" in section 195(1) ( c) would include an Attorney. Consequently in order to confer jurisdiction on a Court to try a complaint alleging commission of an offence under section 471. P. P. C.. it is necessary that it should have been made by the Presiding Officer of the Court himself.

23. The learned counsel for the State also argued that according to the proviso to subsection (I) of section 448, Cr. P. C. where the Court making) the complaint is a High Court the complaint may be signed by such officer of the Court as the Court may appoint. In the instant case the Registrar was designated by the Chief Justice of Pakistan to file the complaints and if the High Court can authorize an officer of the Court to make a complaint under his signatures. the Supreme Court, which was the highest Court in the country, must also possess a similar power.

24. On its face this argument seems to be attractive, but it cannot be accepted because where the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, the matter cannot be decided simply upon analogies. The fact is that there is an unfortunate omission in the relevant law. However, such a lacunal cannot be filled up by the Court and the only remedy for correcting it is, through legislation by the appropriate Legislature.

25. In the end, it was argued that in any event any error or omission in the complaint was curable under section 537, Cr. P. C. as no failure of justice was occasioned by the omission to file a proper complaint.

26. This argument too cannot be accepted. Section 195, Cr. P. C. relates to the competency of the Court and bars its jurisdiction in cases where compliance with its provision is not made. The question of prejudice contemplated by section 537, Cr. P. C. is quite apart from the question of jurisdiction. Where there is complete lack of jurisdiction the whole proceedings are vitiated and the defect is not curable under section 537, j Cr. P. C. See Zabtey Khan v. The State (P L D 1972 Lah. 196). As the Court cannot assume jurisdiction to try a case where it is necessary that a complaint in writing signed by the Presiding Officer of the Court (in terms of sections 195 and 476, Cr. P. C.) is forwarded to the Magistrate concerned, all proceedings taken in pursuance of a complaint which is not submitted in the manner aforesaid are without jurisdiction and void. The conclusion of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the complaints against the accused, so far as the offences punishable under sections 199 and 471, P. P. C. were concerned, are not complaints as envisaged by section 195 read with section 476, Cr. P. C. and, therefore, the trial Court could not take cognizance of the said offences, is correct and we are in agreement with it. Criminal Appeals Nos. 177 of 1966 and 178 of 1966, directed against the acquittal of the accused, of the offences under sections 199 arid 471, P. P. C. must, therefore, fail.

27. This brings us to the question whether the findings of the learned Sessions Judge that the accused should be retried in connection with the offences under section 466/109, P. P. C. are correct.

28. We have already observed that the combined effect of sections 476 and 195, Cr. P. C. is that no Court shall take cognizance of the offence alleged to have been committed in relation to a proceeding of the Court unless there was a complaint by the Court concerned to the relevant Magistrate. Section 195(1)(c) requires such a complaint in respect of the offence under section 563, P. P. C. The question is whether the absence of the mention of section 466, P. P. C. in section 195(l)(c) implies that no such complaint is necessary for the offence punishable under section 466. The consensus of judicial opinion appears to be that the expression "any offence described in section 463", which provision defines "forgery", is us in a general sense and that section 463, P. P. C. is referred to in a comprehensive sense, in section 195(1)(c) of the Cr. P. C. In so far as section 463, P. P. C. is mentioned in that section, this would include a case falling under section 466, P. P. C. See in this connection Ram Samujh v. King‑Emperor (A I R 1926 Oudh 485) and Mohammad Ihsan v. State (P L D 1968 Lah. 451) wherein it was observed that the words "any offence described in section 463" cover all kinds of forgery. In the last‑mentioned case offence under section 468, P. P. C. was held to be nothing but one form of forgery, as defined in section 463, P. P. C. and as such sections 468 and 109, P. P. C. were held to be covered by section 195(l)(G).

29. The conclusion is that the accused could not be tried for the offence under section 466, P. P. C. without a valid complaint. In this case the accused was convicted of the offence under section 466 read with section 109, P. P. C. and was acquitted of the offence under section 466, P. P. C. Where a person has been acquitted of the substantive offence, he cannot be convicted of its abetment. In Amena Khatun v. Munshi Miaja (PLD 1960 Dacca 723) it was held that where the principal offence was not made out, the charge of abetment also fails. For all these reasons the order of retrial of the accused for the offence under section 466/ 109, P. P. C. cannot be sustained and the order of retrial must be set aside.

30. In conclusion we may remark that some argument was addressed before us as to whether the finding of the learned Additional Sessions Judge that the trial of the accused for the offences under sections 199 and 471, P. P. C. amounted to an acquittal or not. In the appeals filed by the State, namely, Criminal Appeal No. 177/1966 and Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 1966 the finding aforesaid has been termed as "acquittal". It is for the said reason that in the statement of facts in this judgment we have also referred to the said finding as an order of acquittal. It is unnecessary in these proceedings to determine the exact status of the said order except for observing that the trial held in connection with the offences under sections 199 and 471, P. P. C., without a valid complaint, was without jurisdiction and void. Counsel for the accused, however, prayed that if it was considered that a fresh trial upon a valid complaint was possible, the accused should not be imposed the burden of afresh trial after this length of time of the commission of the alleged offences. We consider that this is a matter for the learned Judges of the Supreme Court to consider. We may, however, observe that the alleged offences took place in 1962 and the accused:, has been under mental anguish for the last thirteen years. His licence to practise was also suspended for sometime in connection with the alleged offences and the said alleged offences were committed not so much for personal gain, but to obviate the loss to his clients which they were likely to suffer on account of his negligence in not filing the petitions for special leave to appeal in time and making them time‑barred.

31. The result is that Criminal Appeal No. 177 of 1966 and Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 1966 as well as Criminal Revision No. 98 of 1966 and Criminal Revision No. 99 of 1966, filed by the State, shall stand dismissed. However, Criminal Miscellaneous 572 of 1966 and Criminal Miscellane ous 573 of 1966, filed by the accused against the order of remand for retrial. with regard to the charges under sections 466/109, P. P. C. are accepted.

S. A. H. Order accordingly.