GHISAUDDIN Versus IQBAL AHMAD

This writ petition is directed against the order dated 5th November 1973, passed by the Settlement Commissioner, Multan and Bahawalpur Divisions whereby he held the respondents Iqbal Ahmad etc., were transfers of a por tion of house No. 1339, Ward No. 8/H, in their possession.

2. The facts leading to this petition are that House No. 1339 Ward No. 8/H, Multan, was in possession of Bundu Khan, the predecessor‑in -interest of the present petitioner, respondents Nos. 1 to 3 and others. According to the petitioner, this house as a whole was transferred to his late father Bundu Khan by the order dated 12th December 1959, of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. He paid its transfer price in full and got the P. T. D. issued on 28th December 1966.

3. On learning about the P. T. D. having been issued for the entire house in favour of Bundu Khan the respondents Nos. 1 to 3, who claimed to .be transferees of a portion of the same house, filed an appeal before the Additional Settlement Commissioner. They complained that Bundu Khan who was an influential man, had managed to remove the transfer papers in favour of respondents Nos. 1 to 3 from the relevant file and got the P. T. D. issued for the entire property fraudulently and by misrepresentation. It was further submitted that the transfer of the portion of the property in their names had never been cancelled and stood intact throughout. They, therefore, prayed that the P. T. D. issued in the name of Bundu Khan be amended so as to exclude the portion already transferred to them.

4. The appeal was heard and ultimately dismissed on 4th October 1967, by the Additional Settlement Commissioner on the ground that the same did not lie in the absence of a specific order being challenged. The Additional Settlement Commissioner advised the respondents Nos. 1 to 3 to approach the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to hold an inquiry and to refer the case to the competent authority for suo motu revision of the order passed in favour of Bundu Khan. Respondents Nos. I to 3 then did move a miscel laneous petition before the Deputy Settlement Commissioner but he, vide his order dated 28th December 1968, refused to refer the case for suo motu revision to the Settlement Commissioner, for according to him, the entire pro perty stood transferred to Bundu Khan, vide order dated 25th September 1965, of the Additional Settlement Commissioner. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner further said that the P. T. O. produced by the respondents was not genuine. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner respondents Nos. 1 to 3 filed an appeal which, due to change in law, was treated as a revision petition and accepted by the Settlement Commissioner vide his impugned order dated 5th November 1973. The result was that respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were allowed the portion in their possession, hence this petition.

5. The learned counsel for the petitioner mainly concentrated on the contention that after the issuance of the P. T. D. in favour of his client, the Settlement authorities had become functus officio as the property was no longer a part of the compensation pool. To support this contention he relied on the judgments of the Supreme Court in Malik Khushi Mohammad v. Ghullm Mohi‑ud‑Din and another P L D 1971 S C 669, Aminuddin v. Settlement Commissioner and another 1973 S C M R 624 and Syed Murid Hussain Shah v. Mufti Muhammad Yousaf Ali and another 1974 S C M R 8.

6. The second point raised was that no appeal, revision or review can lie against the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner refusing to refer the case for suo motu revision. Thirdly, it was submitted that as the entire house stood transferred to Bundu Khan, the Settlement Commissioner could not pass the impugned order without holding the property to be divisible. Finally, it was contended that the appeal was barred by time.

7. According to the learned counsel for respondents Nos. 1 to 3 the P. T. D. upon which the petitioner relied, was not a legal document for it was obtained fraudulently, through misrepresentation and in contravention of the record of the Settlement Department. To support this plea it was contended that the order dated 12th December 1959 under which the petitioner claimed transfer was according to the P. T. D. in favour of one Muhammad Umar and not Bundu Khan. The other two orders dated 25th September 1965 and 19th May 1966, of the Additional Settlement Commissioner and the Settlement Commissioner respectively, as mentioned in the P. T. D., also do not independently, purport to transfer the house in question to Bundu Khan but only refer to a previous order for the purpose. What had been said in the order dated 25th September 1965 of the Additional Settlement Commissioner about the property in question is reproduced below :‑

"The appellants in Appeal No. 321 are transferees of Shop No. 2072, Ward No. 8/H, Multan, while Bundu Khan has been transferred resi dential house bearing No. 1339, Ward No. 8/H, Multan."

The order dated 19th May 1966, carries the following statement :‑

"The case has already been decided by the Additional Settlement Com missioner upholding three shops to the occupants, and house No. 1339 to Bundu."

The statement in the latter order apparently is incorrect as the Additional Settlement Commissioner did not uphold the transfer of the house to Bundu Khan. In fact neither the house No. 1.339 was a subject‑matter of dispute before him nor did he give any finding about the entitlement of any party. He only said that Bundu Khan had been transferred the residential house without disclosing the source of his information. These orders are, therefore, of no help to the case of the petitioner.

8. The parties agree that the only order passed before the two orders dated 25th September 1.965, and the 19th May 1966, was that of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner and it is that order only which can resolve the dispute. Unfortunately, that order is not available and one is left to rely on the other collateral documentary evidence for guidance.

9. According to the P. T. D. issued in favour of Bundu Khan the house was transferred to Muhammad Umar etc. under the order dated 12th December 1959. Obviously if by that order the entice house had been transferred to Bundu Khan, name of Muhammad Umar would not have been there at all. But, if Bundu Khan had been transferred a portion of the house In question then his name must have been mentioned at the very beginning in the P. T. D. issued to him. To resolve this confusion Mr. Minto heavily relied on Annex. 'R/1' which is a certificate issued by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner to his clients. According to this certificate the names of Iqbal Ahmad, Mushtaq Ahmad, Shamshadi Begum and Muhammad Umar were shown as transferees at page 447 of the C. S. C. V register. The other particulars of that entry have also been reproduced. The entries at page 328 of the C. S. C. IV register show that respondents Nos. 1 to 3 were the occupants of the house. It is also stated that Iqbal Ahmad etc. submitted form No. CH‑2856, Mst. Shamshadi Begum form No. NCH‑3138, Muhammad Umar form No. CH‑2917 and Bundu Khan form No. CS‑1722. The names of the transferees, dates of the order of transfer, apportionment of rent and number of P. T. Os. are also given. It is important to note that name of Bundu Khan does not appear as one of the transferees in any of the above. mentioned registers which are maintained under the provisions of Settlement Scheme No. I. From the above undisputed record it can be easily inferred that Bundu Khan was not the transferee of any portion of the property and the P. T. D. showing him as transferee is either fake or forged. The finding of the Settlement Commissioner which is a finding of fact and conclusive is also to the same effect arid cannot be said to be arbitrary or based on no evidence.

10. Now, the important question that falls for determination is whether la such a situation the Settlement Commissioner acted with jurisdiction in adjudicating upon this dispute after the issuance of the P. T. D. It is impor tant to note that this controversy has been going on for quite sometime and here are now a number of decisions to guide one to deduct a reasonable conclusion. To appreciate the problem well it would be very important to survey briefly the relevant provisions of law. According to Settlement Scheme No. I, which is relevant in this case, it is the Deputy Settlement Commissioner who as charged with the duty of ascertaining the entitlement of the various applicants before him. The P. T. O. is issued after the entitlement is determined. An appeal lies from the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner within 15 days to the Additional Settlement Com missioner. Sections 5 and 12 of the Limitation Act are also applicable to these proceedings. There are provided revisional powers under which a Settlement Commissioner, specially empowered in this behalf by the Chief Settlement Commissioner, can at any time call for the record of any case in which an Additional Settlement Commissioner or a Deputy Settlement Commissioner has passed an order for the purposes of satisfying himself as to the legality, propriety or correctness of the order. After a final order is passed under these provisions and after the transferee has paid the entire transfer price and the settlement fee etc, he can be granted the P. T. D. in accordance with the Permanent Transfer Rules, 1961, framed under section 35 of the Act. Under these Rules, the transferee has to satisfy that (i) there is a provisional transfer order in his favour ; (ii) the transfer order is final and no appeal or revision or other judicial proceeding is pending ; (iii) he has paid the entire transfer price, Settlement fee and the public dues, if any before a P. T. D. can be issued to him. At the time when rules 6 and 7 had not yet been deleted it was held by the Supreme Court that the Settlement Authority would have the jurisdiction to reopen the case even after the issuance of the P. T. D. in case of fraud etc. Reference is made to the judg ments in the case of Anwar Hussain Sani P L D 1971 S C 669 and Nisar Ahmad v. Chief Settle ment Commissioner 1973 S C M R 147. The principle enunciated in these judgments is that issuance of the P. T. D. will be no bar to reopening the case if the rules so permit. Thus the violation of the rules as held in the above‑mentioned cases would also permit reopening of a case after the issuance of the P. T. D. even though the rules 6 and 7 have been deleted.

11. One of the pre‑requisites, under rule 3 of the Permanent Transfer Rules for the issuance of the P. T. D., is, that the order of entitlement should be final. `Final order' is defined in Rule 2(6) which says that no appeal, revision or other judicial proceedings should be pending against that order. So if the P. T. D. had been issued before the order of transfer become final then it will be in violation of Rule 3 and on the analogy of the Supreme ‑Court cases noted above, the Settlement authority could reopen the case. These provisions ;teem to have been made to avoid perpetuations of fraud, illegalities and are more in accord with the established principles of law and equity. Suppose A, against whom an order had been passed, applied for a copy of the order to file an appeal but for any reason the copy is not supplied for months. Meanwhile, the transferee pays all the price, files an affidavit that no appeal/revision is pending and obtains the P. T. D. A is supplied with a copy subsequently. Can in such a situation it be successfully argued that the right of appeal has been lost due to issuance of the P. T. D.? The answer will be in the negative for a right of appeal cannot be taken away by /the rules or by the operation of rules. Holding otherwise might perpetuate fraud, mechination and the like. Again, suppose A obtains P. T. D. either on the bases of fake or forged orders or gets it fraudulently, cab the right of the other applicants to file appeal or revision be taken away? The settled law on the point is that fraud vitiates all solemn transactions and confers no right on any one. The deletion of rules 6 and 7 also in such cases may not be construed to giving protection to such acts. The question, however, is where lies the remedy?

12. There are a number of judgments on the point and some of these may prima facie appear to conflicting. As the facts of each case were different one has to find out the underlying principle for its application to other cases. The leading case on the point is that of Anwar Hussain Sani. In this case the property had been transferred to two persons separately who were not contesting the orders about their entitlement. The dispute was with regard to the extent of the property in each case for which demarcation had to be made. It was held by the Supreme Court that after the issue of the P. T. D., the Settlement Authority had no jurisdiction as those properties were no longer in the compensation pool. It was further held that in view of rules 6 and 7 of .the Permanent Transfer Deed Rules the Settlement Authority may have jurisdiction only if fraud or misrepresentation was alleged in the procurement of the P. T. D. The second case is that of Nisar Ahmad v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner. In this case the Chief Settlement Commissioner had disposed of the property without disposing of the forms submitted by two applicants. P. T. D. was also issued in favour of the transferees. The High Court in writ petition declared the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner to be without lawful authority on the ground that the procedure adopted was unusual and extraordinary. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for special leave to appeal after observing that the order of the Chief Settlement Commissioner on which P. T. D. was based, was without lawful authority and that the High Court did have the jurisdic tion to quash the same. It was also remarked that according to Anwar Hussain Sani's case undoubtedly the Settlement Authorities had no jurisdiction after the issuance of the P. T. D. but the High Court could interfere. It may be noted here that final order in this case was that of the Chief Settle ment Commissioner himself and only the High Court could annul it and no other Settlement Authority. The third case on the point is of Amin‑ud‑Din v. The' Settlement Commissioner and others where properties had been dis posed of under numbers assigned to them by the Custodain. In the P. T. D. the corresponding civil survey numbers were also included some of which happened to be common between the two transferees. On‑ a dispute it was held that after the issuance of the P. T. D. the Settlement Authority bad no jurisdiction. The fourth case on the point is that of Syed Murid Hussain Shah v. Mufti Muhammad Yousaf Ali and another. In this case also the transfer in favour of the respondent had been upheld by the Supreme Court in a previous litigation and P. T. D. granted. Later, the case was reopened by the Settlement Commissioner under his suo motu revisional jurisdiction. It was held that the order of the Settlement Commissioner was wholly devoid of validity. There is yet another case Civil Appeal No. 39 of 1972 (Mst. Jahan Ara Begum v. Bashir Ahmad and others) decided by the Supreme Court on 28th March 1974. In that case also the dispute was between the associating claimants and the transferees but the original order of transfer was not being challenged. The Supreme Court followed their view in the cases mentioned as Nos. I and 4 above.

The important thing to be noted in all the five cases cited above is that the original order determining entitlement was not being challenged by any party Worn the Settlement authority. The litigation ensued on the basis of some developments which were not connected with the entitlement of a parti cular person under the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958. Consequently, the orders about entitlement had become final under that Act and after the issue of the P. T. D. the same could not be challenged except before a civil Court or the High Court.

13. The decision with regard to the other set of cases proceeds on the assumption that tae Settlement authority had the power to interfere in appeal and revision even after the P. T. D. had been issued. The reference is made to Muhammad Ismail and another v. Settlement Commissioner and another 1973 S C M R 407 . In that case the Supreme Court upheld the order of the High Court refusing to set aside the order of the Settlement Commissioner who interfered after the issuance of the P. T. D. The facts of this case were that M submitted a CS form for the transfer of two shops and residential portion above them although he was in possession of only one shop and the residential portion. An order of transfer was passed by the Assistant Settlement Commissioner and confirmed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. This order, however, did not clearly mention anything about the other shop. M went up in revision before the Additional Settlement Commissioner who treated both the shops and the residential portions as one unit and ordered their transfer. Mean while, a P. T. O. had been issued with regard to the same shop in favour of R who on coming to know of the order in favour of M applied under sec tion 21(3) of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 for review of the order. The Additional Settlement Commissioner held the other shop as independent and ordered its transfer by public auction. Later, the shop was put to auction and M being the highest bidder it was transferred to him. In the meanwhile, R had gone up in revision but before a notice of the same could be served on M, a Permanent Transfer Deed was issued in his favour. The Settlement Commissioner set aside the auction in favour of M and direct ed that the same be transferred to R. The High Court refused to interfere and its order was upheld by the Supreme Court as well. The issuance of the P. T. D. was of no avail to the petitioner. In Syed Ahmad Abbas Zaidi v. Settlement Commissioner P L D 1968 Lah. 166 my learned brother K. E. Chauhan, J., while differing with Abdul Karim v. 5h. Mohammad Rafiq and others P L D 1966 Lah 33 and follow ing the Supreme Court judgment in Mohammad Ismad and another v. Shamasun‑Nisa and another (Civil Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. K‑104 of 1965) and Khamisani, J. in W. P. 500/05 (Mst. Heijlani Sughra v. Mr. Tilok Chand, Advocate etc. approved by the L. P. A. Bench discussed the issue as follows :‑

" (c) That Permanent Transfer Rules (1961) were framed under section 35 of the Act. The said section stated that, "the Central Government may by notification in the official Gazette make rules to carry out the purposes of this Act". The preamble of the Permanent Transfer Rules states that the Central Government was framing them‑ 'in order to enable the Chief Settlement Commissioner to transfer or dis. pose of property under section 10 of the said Act.'

Now it is quite clear that the orders of the Settlement Authorities under section 10 are as well appealable and revisable as orders under any other relevant provisions of the Act. This is evident from 'a perusal of sections 10, 20 and 31(2) as now amended, which all point out that every order of transfer or determining entitlement of a person is appealable and revisable in the higher hierarchy of officers under the Act. Merely because an order' for the purposes of the Permanent Transfer Rules was considered at a particular time as final within the meaning of Rule 2(b) of the aforesaid Rules, it will not mean that the power given by the Parent Act, itself of revising that order goes away. Rules cannot take away that jurisdiction, which the Parent Act, under which the Rules are framed, gives. Again, if there is any inconsistency between the Rules and the Parent Act, then it is obvious that what is to prevail is the Act and not the Rules. This was so laid down by Lord Herschell L. C., Institute of Patent Agents and others v. Joseph Lockwood 1891 A C 347 at page 360 where the actual passage is as follows:‑

'No doubt there might be some conflict between a rule and a provision of the Act. Well, there is a conflict sometimes between two sections to be found in the same Act. You have to try and reconcile them as best you say. . If you cannot, you have to determine which is the leading provision and which the subordinate provision, and which must give way to the other. That would be so with regard to the enactment and with regard to rules which are to be treated as if within, the enactment. In that case probably the enactment itself would be treated as the governing consideration and the rule as subordinate to W."

Similarly in Minister of Health v. The Ring 1931 A C 193 on the prosecution of Yaffe the Privy Council at page 503, held as follows :‑

"What that comes to is this : The confirmation makes the scheme speak as if it was contained in an Act of Parliament, but the Act of Parliament in which it is contained is the Act which provides for the framing of the scheme, not a subsequent Act. If therefore the scheme, as made, conflicts with the Act, it will have to give way to the Act. The mere confirmation will not save it. It would be otherwise if the scheme had been, per se, embodied in a subsequent Act, for then the maxim to be applied would have been 'Fosteriora derogant prioribus'. But as it is, if one can find that the scheme is inconsistent with the pro visions of the Act which authorises the scheme, the scheme will be bad, and that only can be gone into by way of proceedings in certiorari". If an order fulfil the requirement of being a "final order" under rule 2(b), then it is final for the limited purpose for which further action on the basis of that order is permissible or contemplated in these Rules, and is not final for all purposes. If that was an order under the Act, it would remain amenable to the other incidents and provisions of the Act and cannot go out of its reach and as far as its amenability to appeal or revision is concerned, that is to be seen from the Parent Act itself and not the Rules. The Parent Act in section 22 makes, "every order made by any officer appointed under this Act", as final, "save as otherwise expressly provided in this act" itself. The "otherwise pro vision" is contained in sections 19 and 20 which contemplate its being, for instance revised at any time. It was laid down by Inamullah, J. (as then he was) in Sikandar Jehan Begum v. Mian Abdul Hameed and others P L D 1963 Kar, 219, with reference to the facts of that case, that

"The admitted position is that the respondent No. 1 did not file any appeal against the order, dated the 31st October 1959, transferring the house in dispute to the petitioner. In order to appreciate the conten tion of the learned Advocate for the petitioner that the order of 31st October 1959, became final it would be useful to reproduce section 22 of the Act. It runs as under

`Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act every order made by any officer appointed under this Act shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court.'

It is clear from the above that finality attached to the order passed on 31‑10‑1959, in favour of the petitioner was subject to the provisions of the Act. The said order was been to suo motu revision. It would appear from the order of the Additional Settlement Commissioner dated 25th April 1960, reproduced below that the learned Additional Settlement Commissioner had suo motu set aside the order of the 31st October 1959.

The relevant portion of the older runs as under : ,

In Settlement cases the property is one and the claimants have been filing their applications at different dates and they are considered at different times. Therefore, I think that in order to have a final decision and effective one: it is within the rights of the Appellate Court to reopen the matter and if considered proper; set aside the order either in appeal or revision suo motu for the transfer of the whole property to one person because if the Court comes to the conclusion that the appellant is entitled for the ground‑floor or the first floor which has been trans ferred to another person, the order in appeal cannot be effectual unless the previous order is set aside for transferring the whole property. I, therefore, in this particular case, hold that the order passed for the transfer of the whole building to the respondent vide order 31‑10‑1959, was illegal and ultra vires.

There is, therefore, in view of the above finding no force in the con tention that the order 31st October 1959, was a final order'."

Same is the view of the Sind & Baluchistan High Court as expressed in the case Ali Muhammad v. Haji Hussain and others P L D 1974 Note 124 at p. 178 by a Division Bench of that Court. This Court also in the cases reported as Abdul Rauf v. Muhammad Shaft and others P L D 1973 Note 22 at p. 33 and Sardar Ahmad v. Mistri Muhammad Abdullah P L D 1973 Note 49 at p. 64 held that issuance of P. T. D. is subject to appeal and revision. In Sufi Mohammad Yaqub and others v. The Chief Settlement Commissioner and others P L D 1974 Note 42 at p. 80 it has been held that resumption of a property under Settlement Scheme No. VIII by the Chief Settlement Commissioner being illegal, void and without jurisdiction, all subsequent proceedings including P. T. D. would fall to the ground. Again in Shah Din v. Feroze Din and others P L D 1974 Lah. 481 it was held that rejection of form LH by the Assistant Settlement Commis sioner who had not been delegated the powers under para. 42 of Settlement Scheme No. I being without jurisdiction and hence a nullity all sub sequent orders including the auction and P. T. D. would be of no consequence. ,

14. Under the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, which is a parallel law, it has been held by the Supreme Court and this Court in quite a few judgments that the Settlement authority would have the jurisdic tion to interfere, even after absolute rights of ownership are conferred on a claimant under section 15 of that Act, by cancelling or resuming allotment obtained illegally or through fraud or misrepresentation. It was held in Abdul Ghani and others v. Mohammad Sharif and others P L D 1971 Lah. 53 by a Division Bench of this Court that permanent Settlement could only follow the lawful allotment. In this case the excess allotment taken away by the Settlement authority after the land had been absolutely settled was not interfered with. In Mohammad Iqbal and others v. The Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Com missioner and others P L D 1970 Lah. 780 it was held that what is subject to permanent Settle ment is the allotment to which the displaced person is lawfully entitled and not the excess allotment. In Mst. Bhano etc. v. Mian A. M. Saeed 1969 S C M R 299 and in Nazir Ahmad etc. v. Nizam Din etc. 1969 S C M R 943 their Lordships of the Supreme Court held that the Chief Settlement Commissioner had the power to cancel the allotments already permanently settled if they were made in excess of the entitlement or unlawfully. Again in Mst. Habib Khatoon and others v. Sardar Muhammad P L D 1970 S C 162 it was held that land can be settled permanently after the Settlement fee had been paid and that if a revision was pending then there could be no permanent Settlement. So under the Land Settlement Law also no sanctity attaches to the permanent transfer if , the allotment is in excess of entitlement or if there is a fraud a misrepresentation involved or if there is an appeal or revision pending.

15. There is a difference in the mode of conferment of rights in the two Acts mentioned above. Permanent Settlement under sections 15 and 16 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958 is automatic while under the Permanent Transfer Rules as framed under section 35 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, a positive act of issuing P. T. D. is to be done. There is another difference also. The pro visions of sections 10 and 11 of the Displaced Persons (Land Settlement) Act, do confer a separate power on the Settlement authorities to take away allot ments made unlawfully or obtained with misrepresentation or fraud whereas the rules 6 and 7 of the Permanent Transfer Deed Rules having similar process have since been deleted. However, sections 10 and 11 empower the Settlement authority to interfere with an `allotment' whereas after the con ferment of proprietary rights under sections 15 and 16, the allottee holds no longer an `allotment' bat becomes the absolute owner. The property is thus out of compensation pool and the Settlement authorities may not be permitted to interfere on the analogy of the Permanent Transfer Rules. The point of view that the Settlement authority should not be allowed to interfere after a property is permanently settled would also run counter to the already well established principle of law that fraud vitiates all solemn transactions and orders and that orders passed without lawful authority, without jurisdic tion, against principle of natural justice are void, nullity in the eye of law and confer no rights on the person in whose favour they are made. There is a chain of decisions by the Supreme Court on these points and one may just refer to the latest reported as Mohammad Swaleh and another v. Messrs United Grain and Fodder Agencies P L D 1964 S C 97, Commissioner of Income‑tax v. Fazatur Rehman PLD1964SC410, Atta Mohammad Qureshi v. Settlement Commissioner and others P L D 1971 S C 61, Mansab Ali v. Amir and others P L D 1971 S C 124 and Maj. Walayat Shah v, Muzaffar ,Khan and others P L D 1971 S C 184.

16. The cases noted above held their ground and have not been over ruled. So every effort has to be made to give effect to the principles on which they are based. All these cases can be broadly placed into two categories (i) Where the order about entitlement had become final and was not otherwise a nullity in the eye of law. The first five cases of the Supreme Court are covered by that category and it can be safely said that it is only in such cases, that the jurisdiction of the Settlement authority would be ousted. However, in the other cases where a P. T. D. bad been obtained while an appeal or revision or other judicial proceedings was pending, or a party was entitled under the law to take up such proceedings or the proceedings could not be taken up due to an act of the Court or the other party or the payment of all the dues bad not been made or that the order of entitle ment suffered from serious legal infirmity making it void or without jurisdic tion or that it was obtained by fraud or issued in contravention of the rules, the Settlement authority shall have the jurisdiction to reopen the case unless the power of appeal or revision stood already exhausted.

17. The case in band is covered by the second category and, therefore, the Settlement Commissioner was well within his powers to interfere. The petitioner has failed to show that the order of the Settlement Commissioner suffers from any other illegality or other infirmity.

18. The second point that no appeal or revision lay against the order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner refusing to refer the case for suo motu revision, is also not well founded. Section 19 of the Displaced Persons (Rehabilitation and Settlement) Act, 1958, under which appeal lies, confers a right of appeal on the aggrieved person with regard to each and every order passed by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner. In this particular case the grievance of the respondent was that he was a transferee of a portion of the property but the P. T. D. issued in favour of the petitioner erroneously and illegally showed it to be for the entire house. The Deputy Settlement Com missioner therefore, inquired into the matter and the order passed by him can not be said to be an order not governed by section 19 of the Act. The other question that the appeal was belated is also not very sound. It has not been shown anywhere that respondent No. 1 was a party to the proceedings under which the petitioner was allowed the entire house. In fact the analysis of the situation as discussed above, shows that the petitioner had at no stage been transferred any portion of the property what to speak of the entire house. Respondent No. 1, therefore, filed the application and other proceedings as and when he came to know of the same. In any case, this point does not seem to have been specifically raised before the Settlement Commissioner against respondents Nos. 1 to 3 and cannot be permitted to be raised now in these proceedings. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. However, the point involved being difficult, there will be no order as to costs.

K. B. A. Petition dismissed.