NISAR AHMAD Versus PRESIDING OFFICER, PUNJAB LABOUR COURT

The petitioner challenges the oral order passed by the respondent No. 1 whereby he accepted the appeal of the respondent No. 2 and set aside the order of the Junior Labour Court re‑instating the petitioner to his post.

2. The facts necessary for the purpose of decision of this case are that the petitioner, who had been working as a mechancial helper (employee of respondent No. 2) since 1971, was charged, with allegations of theft of ball bearings, before a criminal Court. He was later dismissed from service on a domestic inquiry held by respondent No. 2. The petitioner challenged that order of dismissal before the Junior Labour Court under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. That application was accepted and the order dismissing the petitioner was set aside, with the direction that the petitioner be re‑instated in service with all the back benefits that accrued to him during that period. Respondent No. 2 assailed that order in an appeal before the Labour Court, which was accepted by respondent No. 1 on 15th July, 1975, and judgment announced orally without writing or signing it. The peti tioner now challenges that order of respondent No. l through this petition.

3. The only short point that arises in the matter is whether respondent No. 1 is obliged to write a judgment before it can be announced and signed or if an oral pronouncement of an order, which is not yet written and signed is sufficient in the eye of law to be operative. The learned counsel for the petitioner referred to section 36‑B (2) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance which lays down:‑

"36‑B.‑(2) A Junior Labour Court shall, after holding such enquiry as it may deem fit, pass an order, in writing, and announce it within seven days from the date of the matter brought before it."

It is contended that as the appeal is a rehearing of the same matter the same provision of law would apply and the pronouncement of an order, without writing it, will be void. The proposition pressed into service is well established. Reference may however be made to The Province of East Pakistan v. Muhammad Hossain Mian ( PLD1965SC 1 ) and Syed Sajid Ali v. Sayed Wajid All ( PLD1975BJ29 ). The learned counsel also referred to section 36 (2) of the same Ordinance which reads as under:‑

"36.‑(2) A Labour Court shall, for the purpose of adjudication and determining any industrial dispute, be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) including the powers of Labour Court is thus a civil Court for the purposes of adjudicating and deter mining any industrial dispute and would be bound by the procedure as laid down therein. The provisions as contained in Order XX; rulas 1 and 2 and Order XLI, rule 31, C. P. C. which deal with the judgments, are therefore, applicable and may be reproduced below to facilitate understanding their true import:‑ '

"O. XX, rule l.‑The Court, after the case has been heard, shall pro nounce judgment in open Court, either at once or on some future day of which due notice shall be given to the parties of their pleaders.

Rule 2.‑A Judge may pronounce a judgment written but not pronounced by his predecessor.

O. XLI, rule 31.‑The judgment of the appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state‑

(a) the points for determination ;

(b) the decision thereon t

(c) the reason for the decision 1 and

(d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled ; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be singed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein."

The provision of O. XLI, rule 31 thus leave no doubt that the judgment of the appellate Court shall be in writing and shall include various matters as mentioned therein. It has to be pronounced and signed at the same time and has to be dated. The Labour Court is also an appellate Court and therefore, it must conform to these requisites before it can import validity to its judgments. The word "judgment" is defined in S. 2 (9), C. P. C. which reads:

"Judgment" means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds of a decree or order."

4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the conditions as laid down in the provisions referred to above; are mandatory and a failure to comply with any of the same renders a judgment a nullity. A look at these provisions would show that in order to be operative a judgment‑

(a) must be in writing;

(b) must be a statement given by the Judge of the grounds of the decree or order;

(c) should state points for determination and decision thereon with reasons;

(d) must be announced in open Court after notice to the parties, signed and dated by the Judge at the time of pronouncement.

5. This point has already been dealt with in a number of cases by various Courts and therefore, it will be advantageous to consider those views. In Rukan Din and others v. Hafiz‑ud‑Din and another ( P L D 1962 Lah. 161), a judgment pro nounced by the High Court orally without any note being signed of pronounce ment was held to be not a final judgment. In Chowaram Bachan v. Thasen Ram etc. (A I R 1960 Madh. Pra. 163), it was held that an oral announcement by a Judge is only an intention or a declaration alike a judgment, but is not a judgment in the eye of law, until the intention has been crystallized into a formal shape and pronouncement and signed in open Court as final expression of the mind. It was further held in this case that C. P. C. does not envisage writing a judgment after deciding a case by an oral judgment and that such a procedure should not be resorted to. In Saru Smelting & Refining Corporation v. The State ( A I R 1951 All. 709 ), it was held that though a judgment dictated in open Court can be altered by the Judge before it is signed nevertheless it cannot be said that such a judgment is not vaild until signed. Similarly, in State `of Bombay v. Geffory Manners & Company ( A I R 1951 Bom. 49), it was held that an oral order of the High Court received its finality only after it was written and signed. In the case of British‑India Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. ( A I R 1921 Mad. 691 ), a Division Bench of the Madras High Court held that the case shall be deemed to be undecided if judgment was not delivered in the open Court and that the Court has the jurisdiction to receive petition for compromise. Reference may also be made to a judg ment of Indian Supreme Court in Surendra Singh and athers v. State of Uttar Pradesh ( AIR 1954 S C 194). It was held that a judgment delivered and made effective by a Judge who later died would be valid. The distinction made in this case was that judgment which had been written out, validly delivered and made effective stands on a different footing from the one which was delivered orally but not made effective. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as under:‑

"As soon as the judgment is delivered, that becomes the operative pronouncement of the Court. The law then provides for the manner in which it is to be authenticated and made certain. The rules regard ing this differ but they do not form the essence of the matter and if there is irregularity in carrying them out it is curable. Thus, if a judgment happens not to be signed and is inadvertently acted on and executed, the proceedings consequent on it would be valid because the judgment, if it can be shown to have been validly delivered would stand good despite defects in the mode of its subsequent authentication."

6. Chapter XXVI of Cr. P. C. deals with judgments. Sections 367 and 369, Cr. P. C. which are relevant may be reproduced below before the views expressed by the Courts on their interpretation are referred to and discus sion:‑

"367. Language of judgment‑Content of judgment.‑(1) Every such judgment shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code, be written by the presiding officer of the Court (or from the dictation of such presiding officer) in the language of the Court, or in English; and shall contain the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for the decision; shall be dated and signed by the presiding officer in open Court at the time of pronouncing it (and with his own hand, every page of such judgment shall be signed by him).

(2) It shall specify the offence (if any of which and the section of the Pakistan Penal Code or other law under which the accused is convicted, and the punishment to which he is sentenced.

(3) Judgment in alternative.‑When the conviction is under the Pakistan Penal Code and it is doubtful under which of two sections. or under which of two parts of the same section of that Code the offence falls, the Court shall distinctly express the same, and pass judgment in the alternative.

(4) If it be a judgment of acquittal, it shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty.

(5) If the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, and the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall in its judgment state the reason why sentence of death was not passed

Provided that, in trials by jury, the Court need not write a judgment, but the Court of Session shall record the heads of the charge to the jury.

(6) For the purpose of this section, an order under section 118 or sec tion 123, subsection (3), shall be deemed to be a judgment.

"369. Court not to alter judgment.‑Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, or in case of a High Court (. . . by the Letters Patent of such High Court, no Court), when it has signed its judgment, shall alter or review the same except . . . . to correct a clerical error."

These provisions also fell for determination in number of cases. In Rahim Bakhsh v. The State ( P L D 1956 Kar. 475 ), Division Bench of Karachi High Court held that a Court is not tarred from altering its judgment under section 369, Cr. P. C. before signing it.' In that case judgment announced orally without having been dictated or signed was later altered at the time of its dictation to bring it in accord with principle laid dawn by the Supreme Court on the same point earlier. It was held that a judgment not written and signed, could be altered by the High Court. In Mohan Singh v. Emperor (A I R 1944 Pat. 209), a Division Bench of that Court held that a judgment delivered under section 369, Cr. P. C. which was not signed, was no judgment in the eye of law and the case could be heard and decided afresh. While interpreting section 369, Cr. P. C. a Single Judge of the Madras Court in Arumuga Padayachi and others v. Crown ( A I R 1926 Mad. 420 ), also found that a judgment could be final only when it is announced and signed. A Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Matheran Steam Light Tramway v. B. N. Lang ( A I R 1927 Bom. ), held that short notes dictated by a Judge while hearing the case could not be considered to be a part of his actual judgment as the same was never approved by him. In Union of the India v. Manke Chand (A I R 1957 Mad. Pra. 215), it was held that an oral order made under section 369, Cr. P. C. could be altered or reviewed before a judgment was written and signed. In Anwar Ahmad v. Abdullah Ahmad and others (P L D 1963 Kar. 313), it was held that a judgment is final only when it has been signed though it can be announced by another Judge.

7. Similarly in the case of Abdul Ghani v. Saleh Muhammad (P L D 1960 Kar. 594) it was remarked that there should be a statement of grounds of decision in a judgment. Governor‑ General of Pakistan v. Asofia Construction Ltd (P L D 1964 Kar. 614), also a judgment was considered to be an expression of the opinion of the Court under section 2 (9) of the C. P. C. which again means that it must be in writing and in accordance with law. In Rahim Shah v. Ishaque ( P L D 1954 Pesh. 92 ), a learned Single Judge of that Court held that a judgment which did not comply with the requirements of Order XLI, rule 31 was bad and illegal. In Tota Singh v. Labhoo Singh and another ( A I R 1933 Lah. 332 ), this Court held that a judgment not complying with the provisions of Order XLI, rule 31, is not judgment in the eye of law. Amin Ashraf's case (9), which pertains to section 369 of the Criminal Proce dure Code a judgment which was duly written but not publicly announced was held to be ineffective and further proceedings taken by the same Court were held to be valid. In the case of Abdul Mannan ( P L D 1955 Dacca 9 ), two contradictory judg ments had been written and signed but only one announced. It was held that the one annouced is the only valid judgment.

‑8. In Lachmandas v. Central Government of Pakistan ( P L D 1973 S C 379 ), our Supreme Court held that the civil and criminal Courts as well as such tribunals, which were required by law to do so must make and announce their orders in accor dance with law and publicly. The relevant portion reads as under:‑

"We are inclined to agree with the vie v taken by the High Court in this behalf. It has to b.‑ borne in mind that the requirement that orders of Courts ought to be publicly made and announced is not only a matter of accepted judicial pricedure, but is invariably a requirement of law regulating the functioning of civil and criminal Courts. The Tribunal constituted under Act XII of 1957 was admittedly neither a civil nor a criminal Court (See PLD 1964 SC 236) and there was apparently no statutory or legal requirement as to the mode in which its orders were to be promulgated. In the absence of such requirement it is difficult to hold that the order, which was duly made, signed and dated by the members of the Tribunal before the expiry of its term, would stand invalidated, or would be rendered ineffective simply for the reasons that it could not be publicly announced on a Sunday. The High Court has rightly remarked that no doubt was expressed as to the genuineness or the authenticity of the order of the Tribunal." The ratio decidendi of the above judgments appears to be that if law requires that the judgment should be in writing, be announced publicly and signed, then an oral order may be merely an intention of the Court as to what judg ment is going to be, but that certainly is not a valid, operative and a final judgment in the eye of law. That judgment can be altered at any time before it is announced and signed and even fresh proceedings can be started.

9. Mr. Bokhari, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 submitted that what is necessary is that the order should be pronounced in open Court and that the sequence whether it should be written before or after its pronouncement is neither mandatory nor necessary. In his view, therefore, an oral pronouncement without writing an order is sufficient to make it effec tive and operative. He relied on Abdul Rahim v. Taj Muhammad ( P L D 1970 Lah. 294 ). I n that case, a Settlement Commissioner had recorded a short order and signed it stating that he accepted the revision petition as per English order. The English order with all the reasons had been written out, but the Settlement Commissioner died before signing it. It was held by a Division Bench of this Court that the order was not a nullity. It may be noted that there is no express requirement of law under the Settlement Laws about orders and judgments. The rule laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Lachmandas referred to above would thus be applicable supporting rather petitioner's plea. It, however, could not be applied to a case where the law required a judgment to be in writing and to be announced and signed in public after notice to the parties. It is of interest to notice that in the present case, there was not even a short written order on the record but only an oral announcement. None of the pre‑requisites of a valid judgment as laid down in the C. P. C. were thus fulfilled.

10. An examination of the above provisions of law and the judgments would go to show that where a law provides for writing, announcing and signing a judgment, all that must be done in that way, in order to give validity to the judgment. All official acts are to be done in writing and more so in case of judgments and orders of Courts and Tribunals, particularly when there are specific provisions as to how they are to be written and delivered. There are separate provisions for altering or amending judgment after it has been signed. These provisions make it absolutely clear that after a judgment has been announced and signed, a Judge cannot alter or review it except in accordance with law. The Court is then functus ofcio as the previous proceedings stand concluded. These restrictions, however cannot apply to an oral announcement as it is not in a crystallized form. It is to be written out and it can be changed, amended or modified any number of times bofore it is actually finalized.

11. The next contention raised by the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 was that as, in any case. the Labour Court did sign or did write and sign a judgment fulfilling all the requirements, the same can now be made operative and effective. The subsequent act of the Labour Court, however, would also suffer from the same shortcoming, as the written judgment was neither publicly announced nor a notice of the same given to the parties.

12. For the reasons given above, it is declared that neither the oral announcement of the decision mad;, by the Labour Court nor the subsequently written order which was never publicly announced, are valid and effective ;judgments in the eye of law and are, therefore, without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The appeal filed by the respondent shall, therefore, be deemed to be still pending and may be decided afresh in accordance with law. As the question involved was quite difficult and of general public importance, I would leave the parties to bear their own costs.

'E' Q' Order accordingly.