MOHAMMAD DIN vs GHULAM FARID AND 2 Other
This matter concerns a petition for special leave to appeal filed against a judgment of the High Court of West Pakistan, which had acquitted one respondent and reduced the sentence of another respondent convicted under Section 302 of the Pakistan Penal Code 1860. The petition was filed with a delay of 186 days. The core legal question was whether the delay in filing the petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal or for enhancement of sentence could be condoned based on the petitioner's claim of ignorance of the High Court's judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Court held that in cases involving appeals against acquittals or petitions seeking enhancement of sentences, delay will not be condoned unless the applicant demonstrates that they were actively prevented by the acquitted persons themselves from approaching the Court within the statutory limitation period. The Court reaffirmed that a private complainant lacks a sufficient interest to justify condonation of delay in such matters, strictly adhering to established precedents regarding the limitation period for criminal appeals.
- Can delay in filing a petition for special leave to appeal against an acquittal be condoned if the petitioner claims ignorance of the judgment?
- Does the principle requiring proof that the acquitted person prevented the filing of an appeal apply to petitions seeking enhancement of sentence?
- Is a private complainant entitled to condonation of delay in a petition seeking enhancement of punishment?
- Section 302, Pakistan Penal Code 1860
1. HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.-This is a petition for special leave to appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of West Pakistan recording the acquittal of respondent Mohammad Hanif and the reduction of the sentence of respondent Ghulam Farid under section 302, P. P. C. From death to transportation for life.
2. This petition is barred by 186 days and the only reason given in the petition for the condonation of this delay is that since the petitioner was not a party to the proceedings in the High Court he came to know of the judgment of the High Court delivered on the 3rd March 1970 only on the 9th April 1970. He then applied for r the copy on the same day but the copy was made available on the 30th September 1970. This explanation does not show that the petitioner was prevented from knowing of the acquittal and the reduction of the sentence by any cause attributable to the respondents. The delay cannot, therefore, be condoned.
3. This Court has already held in several cases that in the case of an application for leave to appeal against an order of acquittal, this Court does not condone the delay unless it is shown that the applicant was prevented by the acquitted persons themselves from coming to this Court in time, vide Abdul Qayyum v. Ghulam Yasin (PLD1963SC151), Mst. Rabia Bibi v. Rasool Bakhsh (PLD1966SC531), Piran Ditta v. State (1970 SCMR 282) and Nabi Bakhsh v. Ghulam Sarwar (1968 SCMR 780). The same principle, in our opinion, applies to a case where the applicant is only seeking enhancement of the punishment in which a private complainant has no interest at all.
4. This petition is, accordingly, dismissed as being barred by time.