JAWAD BEG Versus THE STATE

DORAB PATEL, J. ‑The appellants in all these appeals have been sentenced by the Special Court constituted under the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act, 1975 (hereinafter called the said Act). As they have a right of appeal under section 7 of the said Act against the sentences passed against them, their appeals have been admitted, and the bail applications filed with these appeals have now come up for hearing. The application for the suspen sion of the sentence in Criminal Appeal No. 26 of 1975 is stated to be under section 7 of the said Act, whilst the applications in the other appeals do not specify the provision of law under which they have been filed. However, Mr. Khalid M. Ishaq and Mr. Nasiruddin, who appeared on behalf of the appellants in these appeals, also submitted that their applications for the suspension of the sentence could only be pressed under the same section 7. And, on the other hand, the learned Advocate‑General of Baluchistan and the learned Additional Advocate‑General of Sind contended that this. section 7 had expressly taken away our power to suspend the sentence or to release the appellants on bail pending the hearing of these appeals. Accord ingly, the question before us is of the proper construction of section 7 of the said Act, but, in view of the submissions advanced, it would be convenient to refer first to the provisions of the said Act.

2. The preamble to the said Act, on which with the learned counsel for the State placed very great reliance, reads as follows :‑

"Whereas it is expedient to make special provisions for the purposes of suppressing acts of sabotage, subversion and terrorism and to provide for speedy trial of offences committed in furtherance of or in connec tion with such acts ;"

Section 1 is formal and is not relevant to the arguments of the learned coun sel. Section 2 contains three definitions. The first is that the Code means the Code of Criminal Procedure, and I will follow this definition in my order. Secondly, the Special Court is defined as the Court constituted under sec tion 3. Lastly, a scheduled offence is defined as an offence specified in the Schedule to the said Act, and it is sufficient to state here that many but not all, of the scheduled offences are offences under the Penal Code, and some of the scheduled offences are bailable offences. Turning now to section 3, it prescribes that the Special Court shall consist of a person who has been or is qualified for appointment as Judge of a High Court, or a person who has exercised powers for a period of not less than three years as a Sessions Judge or as an Additional Sessions Judge. Then, as to section 4, subsection (1) prescribes : "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code, the scheduled offences shall be triable exclusively by a Special Court : Provided that this section shall not be construed to require the transfer to a Special Court of any case which may be pending in any Court immediately before the constitution of the Court." "The section further clarifies that the Special Court shall try only scheduled offences. Next, as to section 5, both this and section 8 prescribe the procedure and functioning of the Special Court. A Special Court can, under section 5, take cognizance of a scheduled offence without the accused being committed to it for trial, and it has to follow "the procedure prescribed by the Criminal Procedure Code for the trial of summons cases." As submitted by the learned Additional Advocate‑General, the section makes a departure from what might be described as the beneficial provisions of the Code, and section 8 makes a departure from one of the most cherished principles of our jurisprudence. Very roughly its effect is to place on the accused the burden of proving his innocence, and both the State Counsel placed great reliance on sections 5 and 8, because their sub mission was that the harsh provisions contained in these sections manifested the intention of the Legislature to stamp out the evils of violence and terrorism. There is some force in this submission. But, on the other hand, subsection (6) of section 5, on which the learned counsel for the appel lants relied, is also relevant and reads as follows :‑

"(6) An accused person shall not be released on bail by a Special Court, or by any other Court, if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of a scheduled offence ; nor shall an accused person be so released unless the prosecution has been given notice to show cause why he should not be so released."

Section 6 of the said Act prescribes that a Special Court may pass any sentence authorised by law and shall have all the powers conferred on a Court of Session exercising original jurisdiction under the Code. Section 7 will require a detailed examination, so I will reproduce it here, but, before doing so. I may point out that section 9 is not relevant to the arguments advanced, whilst section 10 reads as follows :‑

"10. Act to override other Laws.‑The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in the Code or in any other law for the time being in force."

Naturally the State Counsel placed great reliance on this section. Section 11 deals with the repeal of the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Court) Ordinance, 1974 (XVIII of 1974), and the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Court) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1974 (XXIV of 1974), and it is sufficient to state here that, for the purposes of the arguments advanced, there was no difference between these Ordinances and the said Act. Finally, comes the Schedule to which I have referred, and the only relevance of the Schedule to the arguments advanced is that the scheduled offences included what would otherwise have been a bailable offence.

3. I now turn to section 7, but, in order to appreciate its effect, it is necessary to refer first to sections 1, 5 and 426 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subsection (2) of section 1 of the Code is relevant and reads as follows :‑

"(2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan but, in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, nothing herein contained shall affect any special or local law now in force, or any special jurisdiction or power conferred, or any special form of procedure prescribed, by any other law for the time being in force."

Section 5 of the Code is relevant and reads as follows :‑‑

"5.‑(1) All offences, under the Pakistan Penal Code shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the provisions hereinafter contained.

(2) All offences, under any other law shall be investigated, inquired into, tried, and otherwise dealt with according to the same provisions, but subject to any enactment for the time being in force regulating the manner or place of investigating, inquiring into, trying or otherwise dealing with‑such offences."

Finally, section 426 is very relevant, because it deals with the powers of appellate Court with regard to bail. Subsection (1) of section 426 empowers any appellate Court, pending an appeal before it by a convicted person, to release that person on bail, and subsection (2) empowers the High Court to exercise similar powers even in the case of an appeal by a convicted person to a Court subordinate to the High Court. Subsection (2‑A) was inserted into the section as late as 1945 ; it empowers a Court to release an accused on bail for a sufficient period in order to enable him to present an appeal to an appellate Court, and subsection' (2‑B), which was inserted in the section in 1946, confers a similar power on the High Court when a convicted person has been granted Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court. In this back ground, I now turn to section 7, which reads as follows :‑

"7. Appeals from sentences imposed by Special Court, etc. (I) A person‑, sentenced by a Special Court shall have a right of appeal to the High Court within whose jurisdiction the sentence has been passed, but save as aforesaid and notwithstanding the provisions of the Code or of any other law for the time being in force or of anything having the force of law by whatsoever authority made or done, no Court shall have authority to revise such sentence, or to transfer any case from a Special Court or to make any order under section 426 or section 491 or sec tion 498 of the Code, or have any jurisdiction of any kind in respect of any proceedings of a Special Court.

(2) An appeal under subsection (1) shall be preferred to the High Court within thirty days of the passing of the sentence and shall be beard and decided by a Beach of not less than two Judges of the High Court.

(3) Chapter XXIX of the Code shall apply to the suspension, remission and commutation of sentences passed by a Special Court."

4. The arguments of all the learned counsel turned on the proper construc tion of subsection (1) of section 7, and this subsection falls into two parts. The first part deals with the right of appeal to the High Court, whilst the second .,.part specifies the powers which no Court can exercise with regard to any proceedings of a Special Court. Much of the controversy before us centered round the meaning of the expression "no Court" in the second part of this .subsection, and, I will, for convenience, refer to this expression "no Court" as the said expression. Similarly, as the right of appeal conferred under the first part of this subsection is to a Division Bench of a High Court, I shall refer to the Bench hearing an appeal under section 7 as the Division Bench. Now, Mr. Khalid M. Ishaq's submission was that the Division Bench, as an ,.appellate Court, had an implied power to grant interlocutory relief, which :included the power, in an appropriate case, to release an appellant on bail, pending the hearing of his appeal. And, as a corollary of this submission, Mr. Khalid M. Ishaq also contended that the said expression did not include the Division Bench, but was a reference to a Sessions Court, or to a High Court :exercising its various powers and jurisdictions under the Code. On the other hand, the learned Additional Advocate‑General of Sind and the learned Advocate‑General of Baluchistan relied on the fact that the power of an Appellate Court to grant bail during the pendency of an appeal was limited under the Code to section 426 ; therefore, as the second part of subsection (1) had expressly taken away all powers under section 426, the submission was that the Division Bench did not have any power to release ..the appellants on bail pending the hearing of the appeal before it. And, in reply to Mr. Khalid M. Ishaq's submission about the implied powers of the Division Bench as an appellate Court, the submission was that there was no .such power, and that as the said expression only referred to the Division Bench, there was no ambiguity whatever about the section.

5. I observed that subsection (1), which we have to construe, falls into two parts. The second part contains the provisions for the ouster of the .powers of the Courts and consists of three clauses divided by commas, the first of which reads "no Court shall have authority to revise such sentence,"

The submission both of the learned Advocate‑General and of the learned Additional Advocate‑General on this clause was that its object was to give relief to the appellant by taking away the power of the Division Bench to enhance the sentence of the appellant, and this clause had been enacted, because otherwise the Division Bench, being a Bench of the High Court would have been entitled to revise the sentence in the exercise of the High 'Court's revisional jurisdiction under section 5 of the Code. This is a possible construction of the said expression, but it is completely inconsistent with the submissions, of the learned counsel for the State on the objects of the said Act. Be that as it may, in view of section 5 of the Code, as the Special Court can consist of a Sessions or Additional Sessions Judge, without some pro vision such as this clause, the High Court, as distinct from the Division Bench, could, for example, have exercised suo motu revisional jurisdiction, even in the event of an appeal not being filed against the sentence of the Special Court, and so also the Sessions Court with regard to a sentence by a Magistrate passing a sentence under the proviso to subsec tion (1) of section 4 of said Act ; therefore this analysis of the clause is fatal to the submission of the State Counsel, and at the highest, with refer ence to this clause, the said expression could, perhaps, include the Division Bench.

6. I now turn to the third ouster cause, which, prescribes that "no Court shall have any jurisdiction of any kind in respect of any proceedings of a Special Court". As submitted by the learned counsel far the appellants, .if the said expression meant only the Division Bench, the effect of this clause would be that the Division Bench would be deprived of its power to hear ,the appeal admitted by it, because, no doubt, the hearing of the appeal would be an exercise of jurisdiction, which would fail within the mischief of ‑this clause. Clearly, therefore, if this clause is intended to oust the jurisdiction of a High Court, the jurisdiction thus ousted is the jurisdiction under the Code, or, perhaps, under the Letters Patent, but it is clear that the said expression, in the context of this clause, does not mean the Division' Bench.

7. The second clause prescribes that no Court can transfer any case ,from a Special Court, or make any orders under sections 426, 491 and 498 of the Code. Now, a higher Court can transfer a case only when it is :pending before a lower Court ; therefore the provision, ousting the power of transfer from a Special Court, is intended to exclude the jurisdiction of the High Court only as long as the case is before the Special Court, and, once an appeal has been admitted by the Division Bench, the question of transferring the case from the Special Court does not arise ; therefore, once again, the said expression cannot mean the Division Bench. Similarly, section 491 of the Code is totally irrelevant once the person sought to be released has been convicted ; accordingly the ouster of the power under section 491 also refers to the ordinary revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. and not the Division Bench, However, as section 426 of the Code deals with the powers of an appellate Court, both the learned Advocate‑General of Baluchistan and the learned Additional Advocate‑General of Sind submitted that the express ouster of the Court's powers under section 426 of the Code was a provision Io the contrary within the meaning of section 5 of the Code, which had been enacted in order to ensure that the Division Bench could not grant bail in an appeal before it. But as submitted by Mr. J. M. Hayat, the powers conferred on appellate Courts under section 426 of the Code are not limited to the grant .of bail by appellate Courts, pending the hearing of appeals, and the section also confers other powers on appellate Courts. And further, according to learned counsel, because, as shown herein, the said expression generally means the High Court, the further submission was that there was an ambiguity in the section, which, according to the settled principles for the construction of statutes, had to be resolved in favour of the subject. Accordingly, in this background. the submission was that even, if the ouster of the powers under section 426 referred to the Division Bench, the ouster should be limited to the ouster of the powers under subsection (2‑B), which entitles the High Court to grant bail pending the grant of special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

8. I agree with Mr. J. M. Hayat that section 7 is clumsily drafted and; is ambiguous, and our law has always leaned in favour of the liberty of the subject ; therefore the learned Additional Advocate‑General referred us to the history of the section in order to support the construction which he sought to place upon the said expression. And by the history of the section, Mr. Memon meant the Special Criminal Courts Ordinance, 1942, together with its amendment in 1943. A brief examination of the main Ordinance is instructive. The Ordinance was promulgated in January 1942, and, like the preamble of the said Act, the preamble of this Ordinance stated : "Whereas an emergency has arisen which makes it necessary to provide for the setting up of special criminal Courts." Section I further prescribed that the Ordi nance would come into force only if the Provincial Government was, satisfied "of the existence of an emergency arising from a hostile attack on: India or on a country neighbouring on India. . . " This Ordinance provided for three types of Special Courts, Special Judges, Special Magistrates and Summary Courts. In due course, being satisfied of the existence of an emergency, the Provincial Government set up these Courts, and section 8 of the Ordinance prescribed the manner in which a sentence by a Special Judge could be challenged. The section did not provide for an appeal, but for a review which would lie to a Judge of the High Court nominated by the Provincial Government. However, sections 13 and 19 of the Ordinance conferred a right of appeal against the sentences passed by Special Magistrates and Summary Courts respectively in the manner prescribed in those sections. Now, what is significant is that even section 8 did not contain any provision excluding the applicability of the Code to the review, whilst sections 13 and 19, expressly prescribed that the appellate authority shall have "the same powers as an appellate Court follows and has under the Code". Finally, section 26 of the Ordinance read as follows :

"26. Exclusion of interference of other Courts.‑Notwithstanding the, provisions of the Code, or of any other law for the time being in force,., or of anything having the force of law by whatsoever authority made or done, there shall, save as provided in this Ordinance, be no appeal from any order or sentence of a Court constituted under this Ordinance and, save as aforesaid, no Court shall have authority to revise such order or sentence, or to transfer any case from any such Court, or to make any order under section 491 of the Code or have any jurisdiction. of any kind in respect of any proceedings of any such Court."

It is obvious that the second part of section 7 (1) of the said Act is copied from this section 26. But, to complete the history of the section, this Ordinance of 1942 was amended in the next year, because some provisions of, the 1942 Ordinance had been struck down as ultra vires by the Federal Court in Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma and others (AIR1943FC36). However, as the amendments have no relevance on the construction of section 7 of the said Act, I need not: refer to them.

9. The learned Additional Advocate‑General invited us to compare section 26, which I have just quoted, with section 7, and he submitted that the difference in the two sections manifested the intention of the Legistlature to curtail the powers of the Courts. In further support of this submission, he pointed out that the Ordinance of 1942 did not have any provision even remotely comparable to section 8 of the said Act which, according to him, :had thrown the burden of proving his innocence on the accused. I agree with the learned Additional Advocate‑General that the inroads on the rights of the subject in the said Act go much farther than in the Ordinance .of 1942. But, as the main question of what was described as the re‑produc tion of section 26 with modifications, I would first point out that the heading of section 7 reads :

"Appeals from sentences imposed by Special Courts", whilst the heading .of section 26 is :

"Exclusion of interference of other Courts", and I have absolutely no doubt that section 26 of the 1942 Ordinance was ,enacted for the exclusion of interference with the convictions under the Ordinance by other Courts in the sense of Courts other than the authorities appointed to review and entertain appeals against convictions by the special Court under sections 8, 13 and 19. Turning now to the said Act, its heading has to be different from that of section 26, because the first part of subsection (1) is the provision which confers a statutory right of appeal against all sentences passed by the Special Court. But the similarity, on which the learned counsel for the State relied, is between the second part of sub section (1). of section 7 of the said Act and section 26 of the 1942 Ordinance. I would first observe that this second part is separated from the first part by the words : "but save as aforesaid and". Then, after these words, the second part of the subsection is are almost verbatim re‑production of section 26, and even the grammatical structure of the sentences in the two provisions is identical. I have deliberately used the word "almost", because, as submitted by the learned counsel for the State section 26 did not contain any express reference to sections 426 and 498 of the Code, and, according to the learned Advocate‑General and the learned Additional Advocate‑General, his express reference to sections 426 and 491 manifested, beyond any doubt, the intention of the Legislature to deprive the Division Bench of all powers of granting bail. As to this comparison of the sections, I would add that our Legislature has also dropped the reference to appeals, which preceded the words "no Court" in section 26. However, whilst dropping this reference, it has, nonetheless, copied the words "no Court" from section 26, and they create an ambiguity, because they are hardly an apt way of referring to the Division Bench. However, if the matter had rested here, in all the circumstances discussed, I would have accepted the contention of the State Counsel. But they overlooked another difference between the two provisions under comparison. Section 7 expressly excludes the power of transfer, which was not contained in section 26,. But this provision shows that the Legislature intended to curtail the powers of Courts other than the Courts .created under the first part of subsection (1), and, in these circumstances, although the matter is far from clear it seems to me that the Legislature copied the language of section 26, because it intended to follow that suction. Thus, the history of the section is fatal to the submission of the learned Advocate‑General and the learned Additional Advocate‑General.

10. I am aware that redundancy is not to be lightly attributed to the Legislature; accordingly the submission of the State counsel was that we could not construe section 7 in a manner which would render redundant the references to sections 426 and 498 of the Code. Now, the difficulty is that the section is so obscurely worded that some part or the other is redundant. I pointed out that section 7(1) is divided into two parts, separate by the words "but save as aforesaid and". Nothing turns on the first and the last of these words, which would have been sufficient to divide the section into two parts, if that had been the intention of the Legislature, as submitted by the learned counsel for the State. However, the Legislature has; also inserted the words "save as aforesaid", and these words, in my humble . opinion, have been inserted not merely to separate the two parts of the subsection, but to make it clear that the powers of the Court set up under the first part of the subsection (namely the Division Bench) shall not be curtailed by the restrictions contained in the second part of the subsection. Any other construction would render the words "save as aforesaid" redundant; so the question is really which set of the words are redundant? I agree with the learned Advocate‑General and the learned Additional Advocate‑General that. this difficult question must be decided in the light of the history of the, section, but that history is fatal to their submission, and I cannot believe that the Legislature copied almost verbatim section 26 in order to enact something totally different from what was contained in section 26. Additionally, our laws lean in favour of the liberty of the subject, and penal provisions have always been construed strictly. Accordingly, whilst I repeat that the matter is not free from doubt, in my humble opinion, section 7 has not taken away the power of the Division Bench to grant bail to an appellant in an appropriate case.

11. However, if I am wrong, even according to the learned Advocate- General and the learned Additional Advocate‑General, the curtailment in section 7 is of the powers of the Division Bench under section 426 of the Code; therefore, if the Division Bench has a power of granting interlocutory relief independently of the provisions of the Code, obviously this power would not be affected by the restrictions, or the alleged restrictions contained in section 7. The learned counsel for the State naturally submitted that the Division Bench did not have any independent or implied power of granting bail, but Mr. Khalid M. Ishaq's submission was to the contrary. I will now examine this submission, and, as this submission was based only on the judgments of the Supreme Court, I would now examine them.

12. In The Commissioner, Khairpur Division, Khairpur anal another v. Ali Sher Sarki (PLD1971SC242) the respondent had been declared a Goonda by a District Magistrate and had been directed to live in his own village. The respondent. filed an appeal against this order before the Commissioner, and pending the hearing of this appeal, he sought a relaxation of the order restricting his. movements. The Commissioner rejected this application on the ground that the West Pakistan Control of Goondas Ordinance had merely empowered him to hear and entertain an appeal, but had not empowered him to grant interlocutory relief. The respondent challenged this order in a constitutional petition in this Court, which was allowed on the ground that an appellate authority, as the appellate authority, automatically has the power, in a fit case, to suspend or modify the operation of the order appealed against. The Commissioner went in appeal to the Supreme Court against this judgment. . In dismissing the appeal, Yaqub Ali, J., who pronounced the judgment of the Court, observed at p. 245

"As proceedings against the respondent were ex parte we did not have the advantage of hearing arguments in support of the opposite view Our own analysis, however, inclines us to the view adopted by the learned Judges in the High Court. Under the monograph: "Implied Powers and Obligations", p. 350, Maxwell, 1952 Edn., the following statement appears :

`Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution. Cui jurisdictlo data est, ea quoque concesat esse videntur, sine quibus jurisdictto explicarl non potuit'." inter alia the following instances are cited under the rule

(i) The act which empowers justices to require reasons to take an oath as special constables, and give them jurisdiction to inquire into an offence, impliedly empowered them to apprehend the persons who unlawfully failed to attend before them for those purposes. Otherwise, the jurisdiction could not be effectually exercised cf. R. v. Tayford (1836) 5 A & E 430.

Then after citing an old Burma judgment, Yaqub Ali, J., observed

"It has been seen in the instant case that the movements of Pir Abdur. Rahim were restricted to Municipal area, Sukkur, for a period of one year. The Ordinance gave him the right of an appeal to the Commis sioner under section 18. On merits the Commissioner might have felt satisfied that the order passed against him was prima face not justified. He would have in that view discharged him, but what if the appeal comes up for bearing after one year. This would bring out clearly that the Dower to suspend the operation of an order passed by a Tribunal under section 13. 14 or 18 is ancillary to the power conferred upon the Commissioner by section 18 to discharge the person complained against the final adjudication."

The view taken in this judgment was rearmed by their Lordships in The Sind Employees' Social Security Institution and another v. Adamjee Cotton Mills Ltd. (PLD1975SC32) and I may further point out that, in this case, their Lordships also considered clause (2) of Article 175 of the Constitution.

13. The learned Advocate‑General as well as the learned Additional Advocate‑General sought to distinguish these authorities on the ground that they bad reference to the powers of an appellate authority, which was a. Tribunal, and not a Court. The submission is strange, because it implies that the powers of a Tribunal are wider than those of a Court of Record. When we invited the learned counsel to refer us to some authority in support of a proposition which seemed strange to us, their reply was that the powers of this Court in the matter of bail were confined to those conferred under section 426 of the Code. But, the view taken by their Lordships is that an appellate authority has an implied power to grant relief which is ancillary or incidental to the appeal before that authority, and I have not been able to find any observation in the judgments cited which could support the distinc tion sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the State. Nor, despite our request, were they able to refer us to any such observations, and. on the contrary, the passage from the judgment of Yaqub Ali, J. which I quoted, is fatal to the submission advanced. There, as I showed, Yaqub Ali, J. approved of cases cited by Maxwell, which related not to the powers of Tribunals, but of the regular Courts; therefore, in my humble opinion, the distinction sought to be drawn between Tribunals and this Court by the learned counsel for the State is contrary to the law declared by their Lord ships. But the Legislature is presumed to be aware of the judgments of the superior Courts, and, as the law declared by the Supreme Court is very clear, if the Legislature had intended to take away the ancillary or implied ,;powers of the Division Bench, it would have made an express provision in this respect, because this power is different from and in addition to that under the Code. As no such provision has been made, it is clear that the Legislature did not wish to interfere with tie discretion of the Division Bench in bail matters, because it was confident that the discretion would be exercised judicially.

14. The learned counsel for the State then submitted that, if the Division Bench granted bail pending the hearing of an appeal, it would defeat the objects of the said Act, and they drew a grim picture of the violence, which would follow, if we rejected their contentions. The submis sion is totally misconceived for more reasons than one. In the first place, the finding that the Division Bench is not deprived of the power of granting bail does not mean that it will exercise its discretion arbitrarily. Obviously, bail would be granted only in a fit case. Secondly, as the Special Court is empowered to grant bail, pending the trial, I do not see how the exercise of a similar power by the appellate Court would defeat the objects of the said Act. In any event, the question is of construing ambiguities in the said section, and sweeping departures from the settled law are not to be lightly inferred; therefore, in my humble opinion, the applications are maintainable.

15. Before parting with this order, I must refer to a submission .advanced with ability by Mr. Nasiruddin. On the assumption that we did not have the power of entertaining the applications for bail before us, in view of section 7, Mr. Nasiruddin's submission was that section 7 would be void on the ground of inconsistency with Article 25 of the Constitution in so far as it deprived us of the power of granting bail. The reply of the learned Advocate‑General was that only discriminatory laws were hit by Article 25, and that the construction, which he sought to place upon section 7, did not :render it discriminatory, because it had reference to the objects of the said Act. As I have rejected the submission of the learned Advocate‑General on other grounds, it is not necessary to examine his submission on this point or that of Mr. Nasiruddin.

16. In the view that I have taken, we would normally have examined the bail applications on merits, but the learned counsel for the State requested us to decide their legal objections to bail first. And, as we are also sitting on ‑the Motion Bench, the learned counsel for the appellants, who had to wait day after day for their cases to come up, also supported this request; accord ingly we acceded to it. And, as I hold that the applications of the appellants .are not barred by section 7 of the said Act, these applications should now be put up for hearing in due course.

JAMALUDDIN H. AHMED, J.‑I agree.

K. B. A. Order accordingly.