EMPLOYEES' UNION Versus PAKISTAN INSURANCE CORPORATION

This petition under Article 199 of the Constitution challenges the validity of an order passed by the Vth Sind Labour Court. Karachi whereby pending the disposal of an application under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, the learned Presiding Officer declined to restrain the respon dents by means of an interlocutory order to maintain status quo in accordance with the terms of the settlement pending decision on the main application. The petition in effect seeks a declaration that the Labour Court has the powers, as a Court of civil jurisdiction, to maintain the status quo.

2. The petitioner is a registered Union of the employees of Life Insurance Corporation of India (L.I.C.I.) and Indian Companies Administration (I.C.A.). By agreement of settlement dated 23‑8‑1972 the respondent No. 1. Pakistan Insurance Corporation, had agreed that the posts in the higher grades will be filled from amongst the employees of LICI/ICA against the quota prescribed for outsiders, that is, to the extent of 40% in preference to other outsiders relaxing the requirements of age and educational qualifications, and all vacancies in Class IV and Junior Clerks would be filled in form amongst the members of the same class of employees working in LICI/ICA Departments of the PIC. Since this settlement which had been re‑affirmed and signed by the respondent No. 1 was not being acted upon and fully implemented, the petitioner,, Employees' Union, filed an application under section 34 of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 in the Vth Labour Court, Karachi and also filed an application under section 151, C. P. C. for a stay order to restrain the respondent No. 1 from filling in the vacancies because these posts had been advertised. The Presiding Officer of the Vth Labour Court rejected this application to restrain the respondent No. 1 from filling in the posts pending the decision on the main application under section 34 of the 1. R. O. on the ground that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to grant an ad interim stay order.

3. It has been argued by Mr. Shahenshah Hussain on behalf of the petitioner that a stay order under the circumstances was absolutely necessary as once the vacancies were filled up from amongst the outsiders, it would no longer be possible to enforce the aforesaid settlement, and any such order of enforcement will become ineffective. Mr. Shahenshah Hussain has then argued that this power to grant interim relief is ancillary or incidental to the main powers under section 34 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance for enforcement of the rights guaranteed or secured under the settlement. If the posts are all filled up, there would be no post available for recruitment from the Union to the extent of 40 % and the order of enforcement relating to the implementation of the settlement will remain ineffective.

4. Under section 36 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance a Labour Court shall, for the purposes of adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute, be deemed to be a civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Under section 141, C. P. C. the procedure provided in the Code in regard to suits shall be followed in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. This section provides that such procedure shall apply as far as it can be made applicable. As stated in Maxwell's Interpretation of Statutes, with regard to the intention attributed to the Legislature, "where an act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grants the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to its execution". Therefore where under an enactment the Labour Court has power to implement a settlement with regard to recruitment of staff, it has an implied power to take measures necessary for such implementation as may be decided by it on conclusion of the proceedings as necessary powers ancillary or incidental to the main jurisdiction. It has been recently decided by the Supreme Court in Sind Employees' Social Security Institution and another v. Adamjee Cotton Mils Ltd. (P L D 1975 S C 32 ) that "in our opinion, the power to grant interim relief by suspending wholly or partially the operation of the order appealed against is reasonably incidental or ancillary to the main appellate jurisdiction. 'It would be wrong to regard the exercise of this incidental or ancillary power do enlargement of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court . . . the power to grant interim relief is exer ciseable by the Social Security Court not because of the inherent character or the attribute of the Court itself, but only to enable it to exercise its appellate jurisdiction expressly conferred upon it more effectively and in accordance with what indisputably are requirements of justice and reason".

5. The same principle was enunciated earlier in the case of Zafar Iqbal v. The Province of Sind (P L D 1973 Kar. 383) that "where a Court has power to pass an order finally it will generally have the power to do so by way of interim measure unless such a power is either expressly or by necessary implication excluded." I am in respectful agreement with the proposition laid down in Brooke Bond's case (P L D 1973 Kar. 189) by the Division Bench of this Court that Labour Court has such powers of a civil Court as are required for the purpose of adjudication and determination of any industrial dispute. The adjudication as of necessity will involve the passing of an effective order because the Labour Court has also the power and a duty to enforce its own orders as remarked by my learned brother, Abdul Hayee Kureshi, J., while dealing with this case at an earlier stage. If a Labour Court cannot keep a cause of action itself alive, or permits a party to act in such manner that the purpose of proceeding is defeated, certainly there would be nothing left to adjudicate upon. Under such circumstances an interim order to ensure due implementation of any & final order, that may be passed, would appear to be necessary and incidental and it cannot be said that the Labour Court can have no power to pass such an order and in doing so it would be acting beyond its jurisdiction.

6. Mr. Abdur Rauf has argued on behalf of the respondent No. 1 that this Union has been wrongly registered and the Industrial Relations Ordinance does not apply to Government functionaries while the employees of Pakistan Insurance Corporation are Central Government servants and are excluded C from application of the I. R. O. Mr. Rauf can, however, agitate this point in proceedings for deregistration of the Union, if any, but so long as the Union exists the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 would remain applicable.

7. Under the circumstances it would be unnecessary to examine any other question in this case. It is accordingly directed, that since the Labour Court can pass interim orders to ensure due implementation of any final orders that may be passed to enforce a settlement, the desirability of main taining status quo and granting interim stay may be considered by that Court on merits.

8. In the circumstances of the case no order is made as to costs.

S. A. H. Petition accepted.