NASIR RAZA JAFERY Versus MACTER PHARMACEUTICAL PVT. LTD.

ORDER

This is a suit for recovery of Rs.50,000. as damages on account of malicious prosecution and defamation. Two objections were raised by the office. Firstly, that the suit is barred by Article 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 and, secondly, that the plaint which was returned earlier under Rule 119 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.) (hereinafter referred to as Sindh Chief Court Rules (OS)) was not resubmitted within the specified time and instead a fresh suit has been filed. Following are the two objections raised by the office through the aforesaid reference:--

? ? An objection was raised by the office in respect of limitation as the suit was not in time within the meaning of Article 23 of the Limitation Act. The plaint was lying under objection and on 25-1-1995 the plaintiff filed an Application under Rule 119 of the Sindh Chief Court Rules (O.S.) that in view of the objection raised, after examination of the plaint, the same may be returned to the Advocate for necessary compliance of objection. The Hon'ble Court by its order dated 12-2-1995 allowed this application for compliance in terms of Rule 119, Sindh Chief Court Rules. Accordingly the plaint was returned to the Advocate for compliance within 15 days on 28-2-1995. The Advocate for the plaintiff on 6-11-1995 presented in a second plaint alongwith original plaint in compliance of objection in respect of Limitation and also filed a photostat copy of judgment reported in 1993 Supreme Court Monthly Review page 1185 .....

It is respectfully submitted that compliance of objection is to be made in accordance with rule and within the period prescribed for the same under Rule 119 of Sindh Chief Court Rules (OS). In the present case the plaintiff filed a fresh plaint alongwith original in compliance of the objection after expiry of 8 months, without making any application for condonation of delay. The proper course for the plaintiff was to have fled an application for the amendment of the plaint or application under Order 23, rule 1, C.P.C. for with drawl of the suit with permission to file fresh one and after grant of such application such amendment can be made in the plaint or a fresh plaint/suit is filed. With regard to practice of returning the papers to the Advocate under rule 119 for compliance of the objection, it respectfully submitted that this practice has been discontinued for the last several decades on the ground that after return of the papers the objections are not complied with within time and complication of limitation arises."

2. It is contended by Mr. Akhtarul lqbal Quadri, Assistant Advocate General, that for the purpose of limitation, the time is to be reckoned from the date 6-11-1995 when the second plaint was filed as in the first plaint which was filed on 22-11-1994, present defendant No.3 Pervaiz lqbal was not a party and that several additions and amendments were made in the second plaint. He emphasized that this may be treated as fresh suit and not continuation of the previous plaint. It was contended by Mr. K.M. Nadeem that even if the date is reckoned from 6-11-1995, suit is still within time as provided under Article 120. Before proceeding further, it would be advantageous if rule 119 of Sindh Chief Court Rule (O.S,) is reproduced:--

" 119. (1) The officer concerned shall examine the proceedings in the order in which they are presented.

(2) ??????? If any proceeding is not on proper form, is not properly stamped or is otherwise defective, he shall endorse the objections thereon and return it to the person presenting it for compliance therewith within a time to be prescribed by him. "

3. It was argued by Mr. Iqbal Quadri that on the basis of principles laid down under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. where a plaint is returned for presentation to a Court having proper jurisdiction, time for limitation purpose, is to be reckoned from the date when for the second time plaint is filed in the Court having jurisdiction. Both these plaints are on record. I have examined contents of these plaints. Except para. 15 of the second plaint all other contents of these plaints are similar. However, the defendant No.3 in previous plaint was Muhammad Yousuf while in the present suit, it is Pervaiz Iqbal. Rule 119 of Sindh Chief Court Rules (OS) provides that after- presentation of plaint and/or Execution application the concerned officer shall examine them and if it is found that it is not in proper form or properly stamped or other wise defective, he shall endorse the objection thereon and will return to the person presenting it for compliance within a time to be prescribed by such officer. In the first plaint, the office has raised objection on the question of limitation in addition to other technical objections. On 12-2-1995, it was returned to the plaintiff for compliance within 15 days. But after a lapse of nearly 7 months the second plaint was filed which was admitted and registered as the instant suit. Rule 120 of Sindh Chief Court Rules (OS) provides that in case a plaint is filed and it is found in order and/or if resubmitted after compliance of the objections as mentioned in Rule 119, the same shall be admitted. In the instant case no satisfactory reason has been shown by the plaintiff as to why after a lapse of more than a year the second plaint was filed. In the case of Mst. Hawabai and 6 others v. Abdus Shakoor and 8 others PLD 1981 Karachi 277 a learned Division Bench of this Court comprising of Zafar Hussain Mirza and Saiduzzaman Siddiqui, JJ., (as their Lordships then were) .while discussing point of limitation arising as a result of presentation of second plaint after return of the first as provided under Order VII, Rule 10, C.P.C. considered the question as to when the time will start running. It was held, inter alia, that the presentation of second plaint to the Court having jurisdiction after return of the same under Order VII, Rule 10 C.P.C. by earlier Court having no jurisdiction, is not to be treated as continuance of the old proceedings and that its presentation to the Court of proper jurisdiction should be considered to be a fresh proceeding for all intent and purposes. In the instant case, the first plaint was returned to the plaintiff under Rule 119 of Sindh Chief Court Rules (OS) for a period of 15 days to remove the defects as pointed out by the office. But the sane was not presented within the time given by the office. The plaintiff neither pleaded in this suit nor at the relevant time had made any request to the concerned officer for extension of time. It is pertinent to note that on the earlier plaint, office had noted objection of delay in filing the suit which was not answered in the subsequent plaint. Thus, the same objection was repeated by the office of this Court. Keeping in view the above circumstances and conduct of the plaintiff, I am inclined to hold that the plaint filed on 6-11-1995 is a fresh suit and cannot be treated a continuation of the previous plaint filed on 22-11-1994.

4. The other objection which the office has raised and is also raised by the learned Assistant Advocate-General is that the suit is barred by Article 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908. This came up for hearing on 22-12-1996 and 15-12-1997 when the Assistant Advocate-General prayed for rejection of plaint on the said ground. It is settled law that it is the duty of Court to determine the question of I limitation irrespective of the fact whether such plea was raised or not. (See Haji Muhammad Shah v. Sher Khan PLD 1994 SC 294 and Province of Punjab and others v. Muhammad Hussain and others PLD 1993 SC 147, Mr. K.M. Nadeem relied upon the case of Muhammad Yousuf v. Syed Ghayyur Hussain Shah and 5 others 1993 SCMR 1185 wherein it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court that in a suit for damages it is Article 120 of the Limitation Act which is applicable and which provides filing of suit within a period of six years. In that case, respondent filed a suit for recovery of Rs.5,00,000 as damages sustained by him as a result of malicious prosecution initiated on the complaint of one Alamgir who was predecessor in interest of appellant before the Supreme Court. However, Article 23 of the Limitation Act, 1908 was not cited before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which reads as follows:--

"23. For compensation One ??????????????????????????????? when the plaintiff is for a malicious year ?????????????????????????????????????????? acquitted, or the prosecution prosecution. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? is otherwise terminated. "

5. Malicious prosecution has been defined as a malicious institution against another unsuccessful criminal or bankrupcy or liquidation proceedings without reasonable or probable cause. (See Ratanlal and Dhirajlal's The law of Torts edited by Justice (Retd.) G.P. Singh, XXII Ed. 1997, Wadhwa & Co. Nagpur, India). Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan in Muhammad Akram v. Mst. Farman Bi PLD 1990 SC 28 at 34 has given five elements of tests defining malicious prosecution including adverse effect on plaintiff's reputation and suffering of damages. It was further held that a plaintiff would be entitled to claim damages for malicious prosecution in respect of civil action. It was held by the Privy Council that "foundation of an action for malicious prosecution lies in abuse of the process of the Court by wrongfully setting the law in motion and it is designed to discourage the perversion of the machinery of Justice for an improper purpose. "(Muhammad Amin v. Jogendra Kumar; AIR 1947 PC 108) Article 23 governs all such suits which are filed for recovery of compensation arising out of malicious prosecution. It is to be filed within a period of one year from the date of acquittal of plaintiff or when the prosecution was terminated. Even in the case of a suit for compensation arising as a result of Libel or Slander the maximum period provided under Articles 24 and 25 of the Limitation Act, is one year from the date when the libel was published or in the case of slander when the words are spoken. It was held by a Division Bench of Lahore High Court in the case of Chaudhry Sharif Ahmad v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan and another 1989 MLD 902 that "the period of limitation for bringing suit for compensation for libel and slander, as set by Articles 24 and 25, is one year and commences when the libel is published or when the words are spoken".

6. There are other cases from Indian Jurisdiction where it was held that Article 23 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which is para materia to Article 23 of our (Pakistan) Limitation Act, that in a suit for malicious prosecution, it would be .Article 23 which applies and that time will run from the order of acquittal and not from the dismissal of revision or appeal filed against the order of acquittal. (See Madho Lal v. Hari Shanker and another AIR 1963 Allahabad 547 Madan Mohan Singh v. Ram Sunder Singh AIR 1930 Allahabad 326 and Kulasekkara Chetty v. Tholasingam Chetty AIR 1938 Madras 349.

7. In the case of Yahya Bakhtiar v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1993 Quetta 78, it was held by a learned Single Judge of Balochistan High Court that Article 23 would apply in the suits filed for compensation as a result of malicious prosecution .which prescribes the period of one year from the date plaintiff was either acquitted or prosecution was terminated. However, on the question of commencement of the limitation period for filing a suit for damages for malicious prosecution, it was held that the same could run from the date of short order through which the plaintiff was acquitted. The rule laid down in the case of Bhagat Raj v. Mt Gurai Dulaiya and another (AIR 1938 All 49) was followed.

8. Learned Assistant Advocate-General has submitted with utmost deference that the rule laid down in the case of Muhammad Yousuf (supra) to extent of point of limitation is per in curium and has placed reliance on the case of Muhammad Rafique and 16 others v. Sultan Bakhsh and another PLD 1991 Kar. 320 where it was held by a learned Single Judge of this Court that a precedent is not binding if it was rendered in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the force of statute. This Court while forming the said rule in the case of Muhammad Rafiq (supra) relied upon the commentary from the book "Salmond on Jurisprudence" XIIth Edition, pages 150 and 169 as well as on the case Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. (Pvt.) Ltd. (1944) 1 KB 718 and held as follows:--

??????????? .......... ? The rule apparently applies even though the earlier Court knew of the statute in question, if it did not refer to and had not pressed to its mind, the precise terms of the statute. Similarly, a Court may know of the existence of a statute, and yet not appreciate its relevance to the matter in hand, such a mistake is again such in curia as to vitiate the decision. These are the commonest illustrations of decision being given per incuriam, in order that a case can be decided per incuriam, it is not enough that it was inadequately argued. It must have been decided in ignorance of a rule of law binding on the Court, 'such as a statute .. . . . . . "

9. The case of Young v. Bristol Aeroplane (supra) was proved by the House of Lords. (See Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd. (1946 AC 163 at 169). This doctrine was considered by a Full Bench of the Indian Supreme Court in Mandeshwar Prasad and another v. Kanahaiya Lal (Dead) through legal heirs AIR 1975 SC 907, wherein it was held, inter alia, that this doctrine will not be extended to cases which were merely not fully argued or which appear to have taken a wrong view of the authorities or misinterpreted a statute. Reliance was placed in the cases Cassel & Co. Ltd. v. Broome (1972) 1 All. ER 801 and Morelle v. Wakeling (1995) 2 QB 379. It would be pertinent to quote a paragraph from the case of Mamleshwar Prasad (supra) written by Justice (retired) V.R. Krishan Iver who delivered the said judgment on behalf of Full Bench.

"7. Certainty of the law, consistency of rulings and comity of Courts -all flowering from the same principle--converge to the conclusion that a decision once rendered must later bind like cases. We do not intend to detract from the rule that, in exceptional instances, where by obvious inadvertence or oversight a judgment fails to notice a plain statutory provision or obligatory authority running counter to the reasoning and result reached, it may not have the sway of binding precedents. It should be a glaring case, an obvious omission. No such situation presents itself here and we do not embark on the principle of judgment per incuriam. "

10. The doctrine of per incuriam was also considered by this Court in yet another case Abdul Razzak v. The Collector of Customs and another 1995 CLC 1453 where one of the point for consideration was the scope of section 96, C.P.C. whether appeal lies only from original decrees passed by any Court exercising original Jurisdiction. 'In this connection, reference was made to the cases Tamizun Nisa v. Parween Fatima NLR 1985 Civil 325 and to an observation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of Pakistan made in Ghulam Hussain v. Shahbaz Khan 1985 SCMR 1925. Following view was held by a learned Single Judge, Wajihuddin Ahmad, J. (now Chief Justice) of this Court;-

"The observation appears to be -in the nature of obiter dicta but even an obiter of the apex Court is binding. However, the quoted observations, because it does not take into consideration the constraints in section 96, C.P.C. is ex facie, with all respect, per incuriam. A per incuriam decision, even of the highest Court, does not behind any other Court and it matters little that such Court itself be at the lowest rung in the hierarchy of Courts. "

11. Learned Assistant Advocate-General has also referred to the case Ch. Abdul Ghani Ghumman v. Province of Punjab and 2 others PLD 1975 Lahore 1238 wherein it was held by a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court, Mushtaque Hussain, J. (as he then was) that Article 23 of the Limitation Act, would apply in case a suit is filed for damages arising out of malicious prosecution. The same view was also held by this Court in Muhammad Zubair Qureshy v. Munir Hussain Shirazi and 4 others PLD 1991 Karachi 214. As a result of this discussion, I am of the considered view that Article 23 would apply in cases where suit for damages has been filed claiming compensation for malicious prosecution. However, in order to determine whether it is a case for recovery of compensation arising out of malicious prosecution, it is necessary that the contents of the. plaint be looked into before passing any order for rejection of plaint as prayed by Assistant Advocate-General.

12. It is the case of the plaintiff that by virtue of an agreement dated 26-11-1987 he entered into business for distribution of drugs for Hyderabad Region manufactured by the defendant No. 1 that some dispute arose between the plaintiff and defendant No. l which was of civil nature; that such civil dispute was maliciously converted into a criminal prosecution with the purpose to harass, intimidate and humiliate the plaintiff; that on 31-7-1991 an F.I.R. bearing No.221 of 1991 under section 420/406, P.P.C. was lodged by the defendant No.2 namely Muhammad Saleem Gohar with S.I.T.E. Police Station; that the plaintiff obtained bail and filed a petition for quashment under section 561-A, Cr.P.C. before the High Court; That on 7-5-1992 the proceedings pending against the plaintiff were quashed by this Court vide Criminal Miscellaneous No.558 of 1991; that defendant No.l filed petition seeking leave to appeal before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was declined vide judgment dated 13-10-1992; that the plaintiff prayed for the following reliefs:--

"(a) ?????? Declaration that the defendants are liable, jointly and severally, to pay to the plaintiff a sum of Rs.50,00,000 by way of damages;

(b) ??????? Decree against the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay damages to the plaintiff in the sum of Rs.50,00,000 with 14% interest from. the date of filing till realization;

(c) Costs of the suit; and

(d) ???????..

13. The criminal proceedings were quashed mainly on the ground that the dispute was of a civil nature and that the defendants Nos. l and 2 instead of seeking redress through a civil Court, lodged the F.I.R., so as to pressurize the plaintiff to make payment of the amount due. A Full Bench of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Criminal Petition No.52 of 1992 refused to grant leave to appeal on the following consideration, inter alia:--

"6.--For the observation mentioned above, High Court has relied upon case of Shaikh Muhammad Taqi v. The State 1991 PCr.LJ 963 in which it is held that breach of contract cannot give rise to the criminal prosecution and the amount still payable can be recovered through competent civil Court. We are unable to find any flaw or legal infirmity in the judgment of the High Court impugned before us, hence, leave is refused and the petition is dismissed. "

14. It was vehemently argued by Mr. K.M. Nadeem that the provisions of Limitation Act, particularly Article 23 are violative of Injunctions of Islam and is, therefore, not enforceable. It was further argued that in Islam a right to sue never extinguishes and neither does the remedy become barred by lapse of time. It was stated by him that the principles of prescription and limitation were never recognised by the Muslim Jurisprudence. Reference was made to the book "Indian Limitation Act," by H.C. Mitra Edited by B.B. Mitra, 13th Edition, Calcutta, where at page 2 it is observed that the old Hindu Law recognized both the prescription and limitation but the Muslim Jurisprudence recognized neither of them. Reliance was also placed on an observation made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mir Baluch Khan and others v. Mst. Lal Bibi and others PLD 1972 SC 84 at page 98, wherein it was observed, in Shariat there is no bar of limitation to the institution of a suit or other legal action for enforcement of a right in property or in personam. " He also referred to the provisions of Article 2-A read with Objectives Resolution Article 268(6) of the Constitution 1973 and several other provisions of the Enforcement of Shariah Act, 1991 and argued that after introduction of Article 2-A in the Constitution through which the Objectives Resolution was made substantive part of the Constitution and that after enactment of Enforcement of Shariah Act, 1991, High Courts have become empowered to strictly apply the Islamic Injunctions and to enforce the same. He concluded by submitting that the Islamic concept of administering Justice is never subject to the harsh law of limitation. Interestingly, some similar plea was also urged before a Division Bench of this Court in Saghir Ahmad Warsi v. I. D. B. P.- 1989 MLD 968 challenging, the imposition of interest which was answered in the following words:--

"3.--Then it was contended by Mr.Muhammad Ali Jan Advocate that in any case after the enforcement of the Shariah Ordinance, no interest can be charged. Reliance has been placed on the case of Messrs Bank of Oman Ltd. v. Messrs East Trading Co. Ltd. and others reported in PLD 1987 Kar. 404, in which a learned Single Judge of this Court while dealing within interlocutory application, held that in view of Article 2A of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 the interest cannot be charged. In this behalf it may be observed that simplicitor enforcement of the Shariah Ordinance would not nullify the loan Agreement entered into between the parties. As regards the above order of the learned Single Judge, it will, suffice to observe that the matter is under appeal and the stay has been granted. "

15. The implication of Article 2-A was considered by this Court in the case of Aijaz Haroon v. Inam Durrani PLD 1989 Karachi 304 at 327 where it was held that the Objectives Resolution is not just another Constitutional provision and even if it were so, all the provisions do not carry equal status. Yet in another case Habib Bank Limited v. Messrs Waheed Textile Mills limited and 5 others PLD 1989 Karachi 371 this Court again considered the legislative history of Article 2A, its effect and implication. Article 268(6) of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973, was also considered in reference to Article 2-A. Reference was made to the cases of Full Bench titled as Muhammad Bachal Memon v. Government of Sindh PLD 1987 Karachi 296, Irshad H. Khan v. Mrs. Parveen Ajaz PLD 1987 Karachi 466, Mirza Qamar Raza v. Mst. Tahira Begum and others PLD 1988 Karachi 169 and Malik Ghulam Mustafa Khar and others v. Pakistan and others PLD 1988 Lahore 49 and it was held as follows:--

.. ... ... ... It may again be observed with great respect, that, Article 268(6) cannot be invoked by the Courts to bring any legislation in accord with the Injunctions of Islam, even if the same are reflected in the Holy Qur'an or Sunnah, unless the same is permitted by the Constitution itself. Article 268(6) also cannot be called in aid to overcome the restrictions imposed by Article 203-G or 227(2) of the Constitution. No doubt, the Objectives Resolution has now been made a substantive part of the Constitution, nevertheless by its own force it cannot render the Injunctions contained in the Holy Qur'an or Sunnah an integral part of the Constitution. Article 268(6), therefore, cannot be invoked by the Courts in any case to bring any existing law in accord therewith by necessary adaptions.

44. I am accordingly of the view that the provisions of the Objectives Resolution read with Article 2-A of the Constitution cannot be given effect to by the Courts inasmuch as that no law in Pakistan can be tested by the Courts on the touchstone of the Objectives Resolution to bring it in accord with the Injunctions of Islam except within a limited sphere as pointed out above, and the Courts in Pakistan are under a moral and legal obligation to give effect to the law in force in Pakistan. Consequently, even if the contention of Mr. Maji that charging of interest is prohibited by Islam, is accepted, still the laws in force in Pakistan permitting the plaintiff to charge interest on the principal amount due against the defendant must be given effect to."

16. Aritcle 2-A of the Constitution, 1973 or for that matter, Objectives Resolution, were never treated to be as supra-Constitution. In the case of Mehmood Khan Achakzai and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1997 SC 426 it was held, inter alia, that it is not open to Court to hold that a provision of Constitution can be struck down on the ground of its being violative of the Objectives Resolution. It is settled rule of the interpretation that the Constitutional provisions are to be read in context with its other provisions in order to promote the spirit of Constitution; to harmonise its various provisions; not to bring any ambiguity and not to destroy any of its provision. The relevance of Article 2A came up for consideration in the famous case of Hakim Khan and 3 others v. Government of Pakistan through Secretary Interior and others PLD 1992 SC 595 wherein it was held as follows:--

"This rule of interpretation does not appear to have been given effect to in the judgment of the High Court on its view that Aritcle 2A is a supra Constitutional provision. Because, if this be its true status then the abovequoted clause would require the framing of an entirely new Constitution. And even if Article 2A really meant that after its introduction it is to become in control of the other provisions of the Constitution, then most of the Articles of the existing Constitution will become questionable on the ground of their alleged inconsistency with the provisions of the Objectives Resolution. According to the opening clause of this Resolution the authority which Almighty Allah hag delegated to the State of Pakistan is to be exercised through its people only 'within the limits prescribed by Him'. Thus, all the provisions of the existing Constitution will be challengeable before Courts of law on the ground that these provisions are not 'within the limits of Allah' and are in transgression thereof. Thus, the law regarding political parties, model of election, the entire structure of Government as embodied in the Constitution, the powers and privileges of the President and other functionaries of the Government will be open to question. Indeed, 'the very basis on which the Constitution is founded nemely the trichotomy of powers i.e. that the three great organs of the State have their own particular spheres of authority wherein they exercise their respective powers or the system of checks and balances could be challenged, alongwith all the ancillary provisions embodied in the 1973, Constitution in relation thereto. Thus, instead of making the 1973, Constitution more purposeful, such an interpretation of Article 2-A namely that it is in control of all the other provisions of the Constitution would result in undermining it and pave the way for its eventual destruction or at least its continuance in its present Form . . . . . . . "

17. Section 28 of the Limitation Act, 1908 also came up for consideration before the Shariat Appellate Bench to the case of Maqbool Ahmed v.Government of Pakistan 1991 SCMR 2063, where it was held in reference to section 28 that the same is contrary to the Injunctions of Islam while no other provision of Limitation Act, was declared as such. It was also held that there is no prohibition in fixing the time limit for filing a suit in either Qur'an or in Sunnah. Following observation of Mr. Justice Muhammad Taqi Usmani, with whom the other learned Judges have agreed, would be relevant if reproduced, which runs thus:---

18. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of Maqbool Ahmad (supra), I do not think it necessary to discuss the rules laid down by a learned Single Judge of Lahore High Court in the case of Allah Ditta v. The State PLD 1992 Lahore 45 and in the case of Mir Baluch Khan and others (supra) as relied upon by Mr. K.M. Nadeem, Advocate. Suffice to say that anything in a judgment must be understood as having been said with reference to facts of that particular case. State .v. Rab Nawaz PLD 1974 SC 87, Hamida Bano v. Ashiq Hussain PLD 1963 SC 109.

19. From whichever angle it is looked, either from the point of view of Article 23 or from the point of view of Article 25 of the Limitation Act, the instant suit appears to be barred. It is the case of plaintiff that the proceedings were quashed by this Court on 7th May, 1992 while the instant suit was tiled on 6th November, 1995 after a lapse of more than three years. Even if the date of disposal of leave petition by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is accepted as the first day for the purpose of time which is 13th October, 1992 again this present suit was filed after a lapse of three years and twenty four days. This suit , which is filed against defendants Nos. l and 2 on the basis of slander and against defendants Nos.3 to 5 as malicious prosecution , should have been filed within a period of one year as provided under Articles 23 and 25 of the Limitation Act, 1908.

20. As a result of above discussion, I hold that this suit being hopelessly time-barred, the plaint is liable to be rejected, which is accordingly rejected.

A.A./N.60/Kar ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Plaint Rejected.