MALIK HUSSAIN Versus LALA RAM CHAND

1. M. R. KHAN, J. ‑These two certificated appeals are directed against the judgment and order of a Division Bench of the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar, dated the 8th June 1956, by which Civil Appeal No. 86/33 of 1955 and Civil Revision No. 258 of 1955 were dismissed with costs.

2. In order to appreciate the points of controversy in the two appeals, it is necessary to state the relevant facts. Kala Khan, a resident of the Peshawar City was the owner of the following agricultural lands situated in Mahal Tirai in the suburb of the city:‑

(i) Whole of Khasra Nos. 266 and 272 having an area of

3. 18 kanals

(ii) Whole of Khasra Nos. 259, 277, 265, 269, 271, 273, 274,

4. 275, 270 and 276 having an area of

5. 36 kanals 17 marlas

(iii) Half share of Khasra Nos. 267, 268 and 278 having in that share an area of (the other half was owned by his co - sharer Wazir Muhammad)

6. 3 kanals 18 marlas

7. Total

8. 58 kanals 15 marlas

9. Kala Khan had also some residential houses in the Peshawar City. He was indebted to one Lala Ram Chand who is the first respondent in both the appeals. Ram Chand obtained a money decree against Kala Khan and in execution of that decree auction‑purchased Kala Khan's two full houses and half of his another house. Kala Khan died in the year 1934 in Shariat, leaving behind three sons Gul Muhammad, Ghulam Ghaus and Sher Muhammad, three daughters Mst. Ghuni, Mst. Faruq Sultana and Mst. Khurshid Begum and one widow Mst. Amirunnessa. Under the Muslim personal law of inheritance, each son inherited 14/72 share, each daughter inherited 7/72 share and the balance 9/72 share was inherited by Mst. Amirunnessa, the widow. At the time of Kala Khan's death, all his sons and daughters, other than Gul Muhammad, were minors. Gul Muhammad and Mst. Amirunnessa considered that the retention of the town properties would be more advantageous to them. Accordingly, they, on their own behalf and on behalf of the sons and daughters of Kala Khan, except Mst. Khurshid Begum, who by that time attained majority, entered into a transaction of exchange with Ram Chand. By a registered deed of exchange, dated the 15th February 1935, they gave agricultural lands bearing Khasra Nos. 266 and 272 measuring 18 kanals to Ram Chand and in lieu of those lands got back the houses which had earlier been auction‑purchased by Ram Chand in execution of a money decree against Kala Khan. On the same date, namely, the 15th February 1935, Gul Muhammad and Mst. Amirunnessa personally and also on behalf of the other minor sons and daughters of Kala Khan (not including Mst. Khurshid Begum) sold to Ram Chand the remaining agricultural lands left by Kala Khan for a considera tion of Rs. 7,060. Subsequently, Ram Chand purchased the remaining half of Khasra Nos. 267, 268 and 278 from Kala Khan's co‑sharer, Wazir Muhammad by a registered sale deed, dated the 20th July 1942 for Rs. 1,000. In this manner, Ram Chand acquired by exchange and purchases the entire agricultural lands which formerly belonged to Kala Khan and also Wazir Muhammad's half share in Khasra Nos. 267, 268 and 278. The total area of the lands thus acquired by Ram Chand measured 62 kanals and 18 marlas out of which 58 kanals and 15 marlas had formerly belonged to Kala Khan. On the 21st December 1943, Ram Chand sold the said 62 kanals and 18 marlas of lands by a registered sale deed to two brothers Malik Hussain and Abdur Razzaq for Rs. 30,000. Mst. Khurshid Begum brought Suit No. 80/1 of 1944 for a decree for possession of lands in her 7/72 share out of the lands left by her father Kala Khan. In that suit, all the heirs of Kala Khan, Ram Chand and his vendees Malik Hussain and Abdur Razzaq were parties. This suit was fought up to the High Court, and Mst. Khurshid Begum ultimately obtained a decree in her favour declaring her 7/72 share in the paternal property. However, during the pendency of the said suit, Mst. Khurshid Begum brought another suit, namely, Suit No. 97 of 1945 on the 17th February 1945 claiming pre‑emption of 65/72 share out of 62 kanals and 18 marlas of lands sold by Ram Chand to Malik Hussain and Abdur Razzaq on payment of proportionate price or in the alternative for pre‑emption of the entire 62 kanals and 18 marlas of lands on payment of the full sale price. On the same date, Ghulam Ghaus, Sher Muhammad and Mst. Ghuni and Mst. Faruq Sultana, the other sons and daughters of late Kala Khan, who had inherited 42/77 share out of the paternal property, brought Suit No. 96/1 of 1945 against Ram Chand and his vendees Malik Hussain and Abdur Razzaq and the other heirs of Kala Khan. In that suit, they asked for the following reliefs :‑

(i) A decree for possession in 42/72 share out of 62 kanals and 18 marlas of lands on the basis of their title.

(ii) A decree for possession in 30/72 share out of 62 kanals and 18 marlas of lands on the basis of right of pre‑emption on payment of proportionate price or, in the event of the success of the claim of Mst. Khurshid, a decree for possession in 23/72 share of the said lands on the basis of right of pre emption subject to payment of proportionate price.

10. In Suit No. 96/1, an alternative prayer was also made for pre‑emption of the entire 62 kanals and 18 marlas of lands on payment of the full sale price.

11. During the pendency of Suits Nos. 96/1 and 97/1 of 1945, Abdur Razzaq died, and his legal representatives were brought on record. Both these suits were heard together and were disposed of by the Senior Subordinate Judge, Peshawar, by his judgment, dated the 14th July 1955. The suits were contested by the vendees, namely, Malik Hussain and the legal representatives of Abdur Razzaq. They took various pleas in defence, but these were rejected by the trial Court, and both the suits were decreed. The trial Court held that Mst. Khurshid Begum, the plaintiff of Suit No. 97/1 of 1945 was the owner of 7/72 shares out of 58 kanals and 15 marlas of lands left by her father Kala Khan. The plaintiffs of Suit No. 96/1 of 1945 were found by that Court to be the owners of 42/72 shares of the said lands. Accordingly, the remaining shares, namely, 23/72 shares out of the said 58 kanals and 15 marlas, in the opinion of the trial Court, were available for pre‑emption by the plaintiffs of the two suits. Besides, half share of Khasra Nos. 267, 268 and 278 which had been purchased by Ram Chand from Kala Khan's co‑sharer Wazir Muhammad was also held to be available for pre‑emption. Having regard to the respective shares of the plaintiffs of the two suits in the paternal lands, the plaintiffs of Suits Nos. 97/1 and 96/1 were found to be entitled to pre‑empt all those lands which are available for pre‑emption in 1/7 and E/7 shares, respectively.

12. On the above basis, a decree was passed in Suit No. 97/1 of 1945 in favour of Mst. Khurshid Begum as follows :‑

13. "(a) A decree for possession on the basis of right of pre‑emption in respect of 1/7 of 23/72 share out of 58 kanals and 15 marlas of lands left by Kala Khan, on payment of proportionate sale price of Rs. 1,282‑3‑0.

(b) A decree for possession on the basis of right of pre emption in respect of 1/7 of half of Khasra Nos. 267, 268 and 278 which had earlier belonged to Wazir Muhammad, a co‑sharer of Kala Khan, on payment of proportionate sale price of Rs. 351‑10‑0."

14. Again, on the same basis, a decree was passed in Suit No. 96/1 of 1945 in favour of the plaintiffs of that suit as follows :‑

15. "(a) A decree for possession of 42/72 shares out of 58 kanals and 15 marlas of lands left by Kala Khan, on the basis of their title i.e., right by inheritance.

(b) A decree for possession of 6/ 7 of 23/72 shares out of the said 58 kanals and 15 marlas of lands by way of pre‑emption, on payment of proportionate price of Rs. 7, 669‑2‑0.

(c) A decree for possession of 6/7 of half of Khasra Nos. 267, 268 and 278 which had earlier belonged to Kala Khan's co‑sharer Wazir Muhammad, on payment of propor tionate price of Rs. 1,508‑4‑0."

16. Thus, the trial Court, besides passing a decree for possession in Suit No. 96/1 on the basis of title, passed decrees for partial pre emption in both the suits on condition of the pre‑emptors' paying Rs. 10,811‑3‑0 in all to the vendees (i.e., the appellants) out of the sale price of Rs. 30,000.

17. The vendees, namely, Malik Hussain and the legal representatives of Abdur Razzaq preferred Civil Appeal No. 123 of 1955 against the decree passed in favour of Mst. Khurshid Begum in Suit No. 97/1 of 1945. The same vendees preferred Civil Appeal No. 121 of 1955 against the decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs of Suit No. 96/1 of 1945. The District Judge, Peshawar, heard both these appeals together and, by his judgment, dated the 30th September 1955, dismissed both of them and affirmed the decrees passed by the trial Court, The vendees then preferred Regular Second Appeal No. 86/33 of 1955 in the High Court of West Pakistan, Peshawar Bench, against the judgment and decree passed by the District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 124 of 1955. As, however, the decree passed in favour of Mst Khurshid Begum in Suit No. 97/1 of 1945, as affirmed in Civil Appeal No. 123 of 1955, was one for possession only on the basis of right of preemption and not on the strength of title as well, the vendees filed Civil Revision No. 258 of 1955 against the judgment of the District Judge in Civil Appeal No. 123 of 1955.

18. The Second Appeal No. 86/33 of 1955 and the Civil Revision No. 258 of 1955 were also heard together by a Division Bench of the High Court and were disposed of by a single judgment. In the High Court, two points were pressed on behalf of the vendees. It was firstly contended that they were prejudiced on account of the trial Court's refusal to issue a writ of commission for the examination of Ram Chand who had migrated to India at the time of Partition. The second contention was that partial pre‑emption as granted by the trial Court on payment of proportionate price and upheld on appeals by the District Judge was bad in law. The learned Judges of the High Court found both these contentions to be without any substance and accordingly they, by their judgment, dated the 8th June 1956, dismissed both the civil appeal and the civil revision.

19. The vendees made two applications to the High Court under Article 158 of the 1 956‑Constitution read with sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of the High Court, dismissing their appeal a d revision. Leave was granted in the usual course, and the present two appeals were admitted.

20. A preliminary objection has been raised on behalf of the pre‑emptors‑respondents that both the certificated appeals abated inasmuch as Malik Hussain, one of the appellants having died, his legal representatives were not brought on record within time. It appears from the record that on the appellants' two applications for leave to appeal to this Court, certificates of fitness were granted by the High Court on the 30th October 1958 and that, after obtaining security from the appellants, both the appeals were declared to be admitted on the 9th December 1958. During the pendency of the appeals, Malik Hussain who was the appellant No. 1 in both the appeals died on the 13th March 1965. Malik Hussain's legal representa tives made an application to this Court on the 3rd June 1965 through their duly appointed Attorney Mr. G. S. Gideon for being substituted in his place. Besides, swearing an affidavit in support of that application for substitution, the said attorney sent notice to the respondents about that application. This Court did not appear to have taken any action on the said application for substitution and the matter remained idle till the 5th April 1967 on which date two applications were made in the High Court through Advocate Mr. Yunus for bringing on the record of the two appeals, the legal representatives of deceased Malik Hussain. It was stated in those applications that the said legal representatives had made an application for substitution in this Court on the 3rd June 1965, under a mistaken advice. These facts are clearly borne out by the record. The application for substitution, dated the 3rd June 1965 which has been traced out bears the seal of this Court of the said date. The said application has been kept in the relevant file of the High Court. It follows from these facts that the application for bringing on record the legal representative of Malik Hussain was, in fact, made within time, but it was filed in this Court on the bona fide belief that the appeals having been already admitted, this Court would be the competent Court to pass orders on that application. However, having realised that the High Court which had granted the certificates of fitness and admitted the appeals was the proper Court under the then applicable rules (i.e. the Supreme Court Rules, 1956) to entertain an application for substitution, the original application dated the 3rd June 1965 was either taken back by the appellant's Advocate or this Court's registry returned it to him for its presentation in the High Court. No entry in the diary is, however, available at this stage to show the exact date on which the original application for substitution was taken back or returned. But be that as it may, the fact remains that the legal representatives of Malik Hussain applied well in time for being brought on the record. The High Court, by its two separate orders, dated the 27th April 1967, allowed the said legal representatives to be impleaded in the two appeals subject to all just exceptions. Having regard to the facts and circum stances stated above, it cannot be stated that the orders of the learned Judges of the High Court allowing substitution suffer from any legal infirmity, and no legitimate exception can be taken to those orders.

21. It was next urged on behalf of the appellants that they were prejudiced by the trial Court's refusal to issue a writ for the examination of Ram Chand on commission in India. It appears from the trial Court's judgment that it gave very convincing reasons why it was thought futile to issue such a writ. The same grievance of the appellants was agitated both before the District Judge and the High Court. The learned District Judge as also the learned Judges of the High Court found no substance in this grievance. It appears from the record that Ram Chand went away to India at the time of the Partition and his whereabouts in India are unknown. Nevertheless, in order to secure the evidence of Ram Chand, interrogatories, at the instance of the appellants, were sent first to Hardawar and then to Delhi, but he could not be traced in either of those two places. The appellants having failed to give any definite address of Ram Chand in India, the Courts below were right in their view that it would have been futile to issue a writ of commission. Even otherwise, the evidence of Ram Chand, as rightly held by the Courts below, would not have advanced the case of the appellants inasmuch as all the relevant documents to which Ram Chand was a party were admitted into evidence and are on the record. Hence, no legitimate exception can be taken to the trial Court's refusal to issue a writ for the examination of Ram Chand on commission in India.

22. As stated earlier, a partial pre‑emption was granted in this case on the plaintiffs‑pre‑emptors' paying Rs. 10,811‑3‑0 to the vendees‑appellants out of the sale price of Rs. 30,000. The appellants took objection to the partial pre‑emption both in the first appellate Court and the High Court and contended that even if the pre‑emptors are found to be the fractional owners of the suit lands as claimed by them, they are not entitled to a decree for pre‑emption in respect of the remaining share except on payment of the full price of Rs. 30,000 which they, as vendees, had paid to the vendor Ram Chand. This, however, did not find favour with either of the appellate Courts, although the concurrent finding of fact was that the appellants had, in fact, paid Rs. 30,000 to Ram Chand as consideration for the sale transaction under pre‑emption. It appears that two conflicting decisions with regard to partial pre‑emption were cited before the learned District Judge. The first of these is Muhammad Azim v. Ar. Sher Ali (A I R 1933 Pesh. 74) and the second is the case of Labh Singh v. Kehr Singh (A I R 1945 Lah. 11). The view taken in the former case was that the pre‑emptor must take over the whole bargain and cannot be allowed to pick and choose portions thereof, but in a case where land belonging to the pre‑emptor has been included in the sale. He can exclude that portion and seek pre‑emption for the remainder, generally at a proportionate price. In the latter case, however it was held that when a sale purports to include property which the pre‑emptor claims as his own, the pre‑emptor should be allowed to pre‑empt only that part of the property which does not belong to him, but he should be required to pay the same amount that the vendee had to pay for the bargain.

23. The learned District Judge preferred to follow the decision reported in A I R 1933 Pesh 74 which was a decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Peshawar. Both the said conflicting decisions and some other reported cases to which we shall refer presently, were cited before the learned Judges of the High Court. They were of the opinion that the view taken by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Peshawar was both correct and binding on the District Judge. Accordingly, the decrees for partial pre‑emption in this case on payment of proportionate price were maintained by them. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the view taken by the High Court with regard to partial pre‑emption is not legally correct.

24. The question of partial pre‑emption generally arises in the following circumstances, namely :‑

(i) When the pre‑,‑raptor himself claims title to a part of the lands sold or to a share out of those lands.

(ii) When the pre‑emptor assails the vendor's title to a part of the lands sold or the extent of his title thereto.

(iii) When the pre‑emptor sets up title of third persons to a part or share of the lands sold.

25. The question is whether in any of the above circumstance the pre‑emptor can exclude that part or share of the lands sold to which the vendor's title is denied or disputed on one ground or the other and be permitted to pre‑empt the remainder on payment of proportionate price. An answer to this question will depend upon whether the pre‑emption has been claimed under the Muslim personal law or under a statute. If the claim for pre‑emption is one under a statute, as in this case, then, the provisions of the relevant statute will govern the matter. Before proceeding to examine the provisions of the statute applicable in this case, it would be worthwhile to consider how far the judicial decisions relied on by the learned Judges of the High Court in support of partial pre‑emption are relevant and correct. The case reported in A I R 1933 Pesh. 74 which was relied on by the learned Judges was itself based on a decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Mahomed Latif v. Govind Singh (I L R 5 All. 382). The learned Judges placed reliance also on another decision of the Allahabad High Court in the case of Abdul Aziz v. Mst. Mariyam Bibi (A I R 1926 All. 710). It appears that both these decisions of the Allahabad High Court related to pre‑emption not under the statute law. Even otherwise, the view of the Allahabad High Court does not appear to be uniform. In the case of Sabodra Bibi v. Bageshwari Singh (A I R 1915 All. 529 = 29 1 C 1000), the same High Court dismissed a claim for partial pre emption and gave the following reason therefore:‑

26. "A pre‑emptor is not entitled in a pre‑emption suit to put the vendor on proof of his title to the property which he purports to sell. The principle of pre‑emption is substitution. A pre‑emptor is, therefore, bound to take the title which the vendee was ready to take."

27. The right of pre‑emption is in essence a right of substitution; it means that the pre‑emptor, in the event of the success of his claim, stands in the shoes of the vendee as respects all rights and obligations arising from the sale of the property under pre‑emption. Mahmood, J. in his celebrated judgment in the case of Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah (I L R 7 All. 775), stated the right of pre‑emption under the Muhammadan Law as follows :‑

28. " . . . . . it is simply a right of substitution, entitling the pre‑emptor,, by reason of a legal incident to which the sale its. If was subject, to stand in the shoes of the vendee in respect of all the rights and obligations arising from the sale under which he has derived his title."

29. The right of pre‑emption is one of substitution even in the case of pre‑emption under statute law, unless the statute itself has made a departure in this regard to any extent. As for instance, the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913 provides that the Court itself may, in certain circumstances, fix the price to be paid by the pre‑emptor instead of the price entered in the deed of sale and purported to have been paid by the vendee as consideration for the transaction. From the doctrine that the right of pre‑emption is one of substitution, it follows that, unless the statute conferring the right of pre‑emption otherwise provides, the pre‑emptor must take over the whole bargain, that is to say, the pre‑emptor must seek pre‑emption of the whole of the subject‑matter of the sale and pay the entire price paid by the vendee as consideration. This, however, is subject to certain limitations which, at any rate, do not include the vendor's defective or want of title. It is not necessary to detail here all those limitations. Suffice it to say by way of example that a pre‑emptor is not bound to seek pre‑emption of the whole of the property sold and pay the full sale price if his right of pre‑emption extends over only a portion of the property sold or if a portion of the property is capable of pre‑emption and the other is not. In case of any such limitation, partial pre‑emption on payment of proportionate price may be permitted as of necessity and not because the pre‑emptor wants it. It is noticed that in the present case the pre‑emptors' right of pre‑emption is not subject to any kind of limitation; their right of pre‑emption extends over the whole of the lands sold, and no part of the lands is incapable of pre‑emption.

30. In this case, preemption has been claimed under statute law. The area in which the lands under pre‑emption lie is covered by the North‑West Frontier Province Pre‑emption Act, 1950. This Act was enacted on the 20th March 1950, but the sale which gave rise to the right of pre‑emption took place on the 21st December 1943. Section 10 of the said Act provides that in respect of all sales and foreclosures completed before the commencement of that Act, the right of pre‑emption shall be determined by the law in force at the time of such completion. Now, the Chief Commissioner of the then North‑West Frontier Province, by Notification No. 9121‑G./12‑49‑22‑24, dated the 20th October 1924 issued under sections 5 and 5‑A of the Scheduled Districts Act, 1874, as amended by the Devolution Act, 1920, extended to the North‑West Frontier Province the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913 (Punjab Act I of 1913), subject to certain modifications in sections 15, 19 and 22 of that Act. Thus, the claim for pre‑emption in the instant case shall have to be determined having regard to the provisions of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913. the question whether partial pre‑emption is permitted under the said Act was decided by the High Court of Lahore in several cases. The first of these cases that has come to notice is the case of Bishen Singh v. Mst. Bishni ((1919) P R 275). In that case, Shadi Lal, J. endorsed the view that where the vendor is found later to have owned only part of the land sold, the purchaser, if he acted bona fide, is not compelled to surrender the remaining portion of his purchase to a pre‑emptor at a price less than the price which he paid for the entirety of his purchase. Another Single Judge of the same High Court took the same view in the case of Dhala v. Khanun and others (A I R 1935 Lah. 635). Lastly, a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court considered the question of partial pre‑emption in the case of Labh Singh v. Kehr Singh, to which a reference has been made hereinbefore. The view taken in that case may be repeated here with advantage. It was held therein that a pre‑emptor, who claims to be the owner of a part of the property sold and seeks pre‑emption of the other part, may be permitted to pre‑empt that part to which he does not claim title, but he should be required to pay the full price, that is, the amount which the vendee had to pay for the bargain. The case under consideration is identical with the case of Labh Singh v. Kehr Singh Besides, the same statute law, namely, the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913 which governed the case of Labh Singh v. Kehr Singh is also applicable in the present case. On the ratio of the decision in Labh Singh v. Kehr Singh, the pre‑emptors here shall be required to pay the full amount of the consideration which the appellants as vendees had paid to the vendor Ram Chand for the transaction of sale.

31. This is so, even is me pre‑emptors are satisfied with the decree for pre‑emption only in respect of fractional shares as passed in the two suits the learned Judges of the High Court however, by‑passed the decision of the Lahore High Court in Labh Singh v. Kehr Singh saying that the decision of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Peshawar in Muhammad Azim v Ar. Sher Ali, was binding on the subordinate Courts it Peshawar. Moreover, they preferred to follow the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Abdul Aziz v. Mariyam Bibi stating that the decision in that case settled the law that partial pre‑emption is permitted. While by‑passing the view of the Lahore High Court and favouring that of the Allahabad High Court, it escaped the notice of the learned Judges that the pre‑emption claimed in the Allahabad case was not founded on statute law, whereas the Lahore view was based on consideration of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913 which itself, as stated earlier, is the governing law in this case also. It also escaped their notice that even the earlier Allahabad case of Mahomed Lalif v. Govind Singh relied on by the Court of the Judicial Commissioner, Peshawar in A I R 1933 Pesh. 74 was not a case for pre‑emption on the basis of any statute law. In this state of things, the consistent view of the Lahore High Court in cases of pre‑emption under the same statute law, namely, the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913 had more persuasive value and deserved greater consideration. However, the correctness of the view of the Lahore High Court in Labh Singh v. Kehr Singh, is apparent from the provisions of section 25 of the Punjab Pre‑emption Act, 1913. Sub sections (1) and (2) of section 25 of that Act which are relevant here run thus :‑

32. "25.‑(1) If in the case of a sale the parties are not agreed as to the price at which the pre‑emptor shall exercise his right of pre‑emption, the Court shall determine whether the price at which the sale purports to have taken place has been fixed in good faith or paid, and if it finds that the price was not so fixed or paid, it shall fix as the price for the purposes of the suit, the market value of the land or property.

(2) If the C9urt finds that the price was fixed in good faith or paid, it shall fix such price as the price for the purposes of the suit."

33. It appears from these provisions that if the Court finds that the price mentioned in the deed of sale was, in fact, paid, then, the pre‑emptor, in order to pre‑empt, shall be required to pay that price, and it shall not be necessary for the Court to determine the market‑value of the property and fix the price for the purpose of pre‑emption. The concurrent finding of the Courts of fact is that the appellants paid Rs. 30,000 as the price of the lands sold out of which Rs. 29,500 was paid by them to the vendor in the presence of the Sub‑Registrar who made an endorsement to that effect. This finding remained unchallenged. Hence, the pre‑emptors here are under a statutory obligation to pay the sum of Rs. 30,000 to the appellants, even if they are content with the decrees for pre‑emption passed in their favour in respect of fractional shares of the lands sold. In fact, the pre‑emptors, in their alternative reliefs claimed in the respective suits, agreed to pay the full sale price.

34. In the result, the decrees for possession passed in the two suits are maintained subject to the payment of Rs. 30,000 by the pre‑emptors to the appellants. The pre‑emptors in the two suits shall pay the sum of Rs. 30,000 proportionate to the shares in which the decrees for pre‑emption have been passed in their favour. Both the appeals are allowed only to the above extent, that is, as respects the amount payable to the appellants by the pre‑emptors. In the circumstances of the case, we leave the parties to bear their own costs.

35. S. Q. Appeals partly accepted.