MUHAMMAD YUNAS Versus THE STATE

1. DORAB PATEL, J .‑This is an appeal under Article 185 of the Constitution against the judgment of the Lahore High Court convicting the appellant for contempt and sentencing him to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 or in default two months' simple imprisonment.

2. The relevant facts are that Second Appeal No. 500 of 1975 (in which the appellant before us is the respondent) was fixed for hearing in the Lahore High Court on 18‑2‑1975, therefore, one Mr. Francis, in a crude attempt to influence in the appellant's favour the learned Judge who was to hear this appeal, approached that learned Judge who forthwith issued a notice of contempt to him. The learned Judge in Chambers then asked Mr. Francis whether he contested the facts of the notice but Mr. Francis said that the facts read out to him were true. Mr. Francis was then asked why he should not be punished for contempt and his reply was "except for my unqualified apology, I have nothing to say and I further state that I have never done it before. This is the first chance that I have committed such a mistake". Mr. Francis then said that the appellant before us was a party to the said appeal and had requested him to "make recommendation to the High Court Judge so that the case be decided in his favour . . . . . Accordingly. the learned Judge in Chambers issued a notice of contempt to the appellant which was immediately served on him as he was present. The appellant was then asked whether he contested the facts stated in the contempt notice issued to him but his reply was the same as that of Mr. Francis namely that he had nothing to say and that he should be pardoned. The learned Judge in Chambers then asked both the contemners separately if they had anything to say in their defence "even for mitigation of the offence" but they both apologised and on this apology the learned Judge in Chambers observed in the judgment under appeal: "They simply apologised. I, after considering the gravity of the offence and taking notice of the apologies which I did not treat as genuine as also the statement made by Mr. Francis that it was, according to him, his first chance that he had committed such a mistake, come to conclusion that both the accused contemners had committed grave contempt of this Court". Accordingly, both the contemners were convicted and both of them were sentenced to six months' simple imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000 or in default two months' simple imprisonment. Only the appellant has come in appeal against this judgment because the Provincial Government has pardoned Mr. Francis.

3. As the appellant had attempted to obtain a decision in his favour in the appeal against him in a most shocking manner there cannot be any doubt that he was guilty of contempt. But Mr. Buttar pointed out that the appellant had not attempted to challenge his conviction in this appeal and had only relied on the fact that he was illiterate and had submitted an unqualified apology therefore learned counsel pressed the appeal only on the question of sentence and learned counsel's submission was that the sentence imposed on the appellant was contrary to the law declared by this Court in a series of cases and in particular he referred us to this Court's judgment in A. K. M. A. Awal v. The State (PLD1964SC562).

4. The sentence of imprisonment passed against the appellant is the maximum permissible under the law, but it was passed because the learned Judge in Chambers was not satisfied about the genuineness of the apology submitted by the appellant. Now, apart from the fact that the learned Judge in Chambers was in a better position than we are to decide whether the apology submitted was genuine, I agree with the view that an apology submitted mechanically is not sufficient by itself to purge the contemner's contempt. A contemner cannot save himself from punishment by submitting an insincere apology. He must submit an unconditional apology and show by his conduct that he has repented of his behaviour. Additionally, the learned Single Judge has also taken into account the fact that interference with the Courts was increasing, and it cannot be said that this was a circumstance extraneous to the law of contempt.

5. Mr. Buttar, however, stressed the fact that the appellant was genuinely repentant and that he had perhaps not been able to express himself clearly because he was not assisted by counsel. This aspect of the case requires examination, but the better course for the appellant would be to approach the learned Judge in Chambers again. In this view of the matter, as to the authorities cited by learned counsel, I would only observe that I would re‑affirm the view taken in the majority judgment of this Court in Awal's case, and it was unfortunate that the attention of the learned Judge in Chambers was not drawn to the judgment. Therefore, on this ground also, the appellant should approach the High Court again.

6. Mr. Buttar then pointed out that as a layman, the appellant was not in a position to give any assistance to the Court. That is correct. And the further submission was that the Court itself should have asked the appellant whether he wanted to engage a lawyer. Now whilst there cannot be any doubt about the Court's power to punish summarily for a contempt committed in the face of the Court, and the contempt in the instant case was of this obnoxious type, the contemners had submitted their apologies and the law of contempt is not as simple as it was a hundred year ago. It also does riot appear that the Court was assisted by the Advocate- General, therefore, I venture to think that it would have been better if the learned Judge in Chambers had given the appellant an opportunity of engaging counsel if he so wished. Such a procedure may not be required by law, but if it is followed it will help to ensure that the judgments of the High Court are not contrary to the law declared by this Court. Further what is far more important is that if such a procedure is followed especially in those cases in which the Court has any intention of passing a sentence o imprisonment, justice will not only be done but will be seen to be done and in my humble opinion, this will enhance and not diminish the dignity of the' Courts which is the ultimate object of the law of contempt.

7. The appellant should, therefore, approach the High Court again and if an application in this respect is filed it should be placed immediately before the learned Judge in Chambers as the appellant has already been in jail for three months. With these observations the appeal is dismissed.

8. S. A. H. Appeal dismissed.