IFTIKHAR AHMAD Versus PRESIDENT N.B.P

SAAD SAOOD JAN, J.‑‑These are 75 appeals by special leave. They are being taken together as they raise a common question of law, namely, whether an employee of a bank can approach a Labour Court to seek redress in respect of his grievance relating to his terms and conditions of service.

2. For fixing the terms and conditions of service, including rates of wages, of the employees of the banks and other financial institutions the Federal Government periodically constitutes Wage Commissions under section 38‑A(1) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, hereinafter referred to as the Ordinance. So far four Commissions have been constituted. A decision of the Wage Commission remains operative ordinarily for a period of three years and is to be deemed as an award of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission the award takes effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law or in any other contract of service and is binding on the employers.

3. The appellants in all these appeals were serving in different nationalised banks. Their services were terminated or they were removed from service by their employers consequent upon disciplinary proceedings taken against them. They moved grievance petitions under section 25‑A of the Ordinance before the Labour Courts of their areas against the actions taken against them. The banks objected to the competency of the Labour Courts to entertain their petitions and took the position that the appellants' remedy, if any, lay before the National Industrial Relations Commission alone. The Labour Courts rejected the objection with regard with regard to their jurisdiction and proceeded to dispose of the petitions on merits. In come cases they accepted the petitions and in others they dismissed them. The parties adversely affected, whether these were the employees or the banks, preferred appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunals. In a few cases the banks concerned invoked the constitutional jurisdictions of the High Courts of Sind and the Punjab to call in question the competency of the Labour Courts to entertain the petitions. In the appeals before the Labour Appellate Tribunals, too, the banks reiterated their objection with regard to the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts. The Labour Appellate Tribunals also rejected their objection, whereupon in cases where the decisions on merits went against the banks they preferred constitutional petitions before the High Courts of Sind and the Punjab.

4. In order to resolve the controversy with regard to the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts to entertain the grievance petitions of the appellants the Lahore High Court formulated three questions, namely: ‑‑

(i) Whether or not the Wage Commission Award is to be treated as an Award of National Industrial Relations Commission and can be enforced by the latter,

(ii) ??? Whether or not the Wage Commission Award is covered by the definition of the term 'award' as given in section 2(11) and as used in section 25‑A of the Ordinance, and,

(iii) ?? Whether the Wage Commission Award supersedes the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance.

After examining various provisions of the Ordinance the High Court held that the award of the Wage Commission was an award of the National Industrial Relations Commission and could only be enforced by it; further, the said award was not an award within the meaning of section 25‑A and section 2(11) of the Ordinance and that the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance stood superseded by the Wage Commission Award. Accordingly, it took the view that the Labour Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions of the appellants.

5. The High Court of Sind also formulated two propositions for the purpose of examining the competency of the Labour Courts in the matter. These were:‑‑

(i) ???? Whether or not the National Industrial Relations Commission has jurisdiction to entertain petitions or the Labour Courts had jurisdiction to entertain petitions, and

(ii) ??? Whether the Wage Commission Award superseded the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance.

The High Court held that the Wage Commission Award was not an award within the meaning of section 25‑A of the Ordinance and as such the Labour Courts were not competent to entertain the petitions of the appellants and, further, the jurisdiction in this regard vested exclusively in the National Industrial Relations Commission. In respect of the second question the learned Judges did not record any specific finding although it does appear from their judgment that they thought that one of the conditions necessary for excluding the appellants from provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance was wanting. However, in accordance with the view taken with regard to the first proposition they also held that the Labour Courts had nD jurisdiction to entertain the petitions of the appellants.

??? 6. ????? Leave to appeal was granted, to the appellants to consider the questions:‑‑

(i) whether the Labour Courts constituted under section 35 of the Ordinance had jurisdiction to entertain, try and adjudicate the grievances of the workers employed in the nationalised: banks and financial institutions arising out of the infringement of any terms of the award of the Wage Commission constituted under section 38‑A of the Ordinance,

(Il) ??? whether the National Indu.;trial Relations Commission had no jurisdiction under section 22‑B(iii)(a) of the Ordinance to entertain and adjudicate the cases of workers employed in the nationalised banks and financial institutions for redress of their individual grievances granted under any law or an award or A settlement,

(iii) ??? whether the provisions of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing ' Orders) Ordinance are applicable to the cases of workers employed in the nationalised banks and financial institutions, and

(iv) ?? whether the dismissed workers employed in the nationalised banks and financial institutions are not covered by the definition of worker as embodied in section 2(xxviii) of the Ordinance.

Before examining these questions it will be of advantage to take notice of the relevant provisions of the Ordinance.

7. With the object mainly of regulating the relations between the employers and workers, the Industrial Relations Ordinance was promulgated by the President in November, 1969. By Ordinance IX of 1972, it was amended and, inter alia, sections 22‑A to section 22‑F and section 25‑A were inserted therein. Section 22‑A(1) directed the Federal Government to establish the National Industrial Relations Commission. The functions of the Commission were set out in subsection (7) thereof. Amongst others, one of its functions was:‑‑ "to deal with cases of unfair labour practices specified in sections 15 and 16 on the part of employers, workmen, trade unions of either of them or persons acting on behalf of any of them, whether committed individually or collectively, in the manner laid down under section 25‑A or section 34 or in such other way as may be prescribed, and, to take, in such manner as may be prescribed by regulations and under section 22‑F, measures calculated to prevent an employer or workman from committing an unfair labour practice."

Subsection (9)(a) of section 22‑A empowered the Commission to initiate prosecution, trial or proceedings or to take action with regard to any matter relating to its functions. Subsection (11) conferred exclusive jurisdiction on the Commission in matters which fell within its competence by providing that no Registrar, Labour Court or Tribunal should take any action or entertain any application or proceedings in respect of any matter which fell within the jurisdiction of the Commission. The conferment of the exclusive jurisdiction on the Commission was subject to a qualification which was set out in subsection (12). This subsection saved the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts to entertain cases of unfair labour practices on the part of employers or workmen, whether individually or collectively. This saving was again subject to a rider to the effect that a Labour Court would not take action or entertain any application or proceedings in respect of a case of unfair labour practice which was already being dealt with by the Commission. Apart from that subsection (9)(b) empowered the Commission to withdraw from a Labour Court any application, proceedings or appeal relating to an unfair labour practice.

8. Section 22‑B(2) permitted the Chairman of the Commission to constitute Benches from amongst its members. Under subsection (3) the Benches were inter alia to exercise such powers and perform such functions as were exercised and performed by a Labour Court in relation to cases based on allegations of unfair labour practices brought before the Commission for trial of offences or enforcement of, or for redress of individual grievances in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to any employer or worker by or under any law or any award.

9. The Labour Courts entertained the grievance petitions of the appellants under section 25‑A of the Ordinance. This section reads as follows:‑‑

"(1) ?? A worker may bring his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement for the time being in force to the notice of his employer in writing, either himself or through his Shop Steward or Collective Bargaining Agent within three months of the day on which cause of such grievance arises.

(2) ??? Where a worker himself brings his grievance to the notice of the employer, the employer shall, within fifteen days of the grievance being brought to his notice communicate his decision in writing to the worker.

(3) ??? Where a worker brings his grievance to the notice of his employer through his Shop Steward or Collective Bargaining Agent, the employer shall, within seven days of the grievance being brought to his notice, communicate his decision in writing to the Shop Steward or as the case may be, the Collective Bargaining Agent.

(4) ??? If the employer fails to communicate a decision within the period specified in subsection (2) or as the case may be, subsection (3), or if the worker is dissatisfied with such decision, the worker or Shop Steward may take the matter to his Collective Bargaining Agent or the Labour Court or, as the case may be, the Collective Bargaining Agent may take the matter to the Labour Court and where the matter is taken to the Labour Court, it shall give a decision within seven days from the date of the matter being brought before it as if such matter were an industrial dispute:

Provided that a worker who desires to so take the matter to the Labour Court shall do so within a period of two months from the date of the communication of the employer or, as the case may be, from the expiry of the period mentioned in subsection (2) or subsection (3) as the case may be.

(5) ??? In adjudicating and determining a grievance under subsection (4), the Labour Court shall go into all the facts of the case and pass such orders as may be just and proper in the circumstances of the case.

In holding that the Labour Courts were not competent to entertain the petitions of the appellants one of the considerations which prevailed with the learned Judges in the High Courts was that the award given by the Wage Commission was not an award within the meaning of subsection (1) of section 25‑A. In support of this view they referred to the definition of the term 'award' as given in clause (ii) of section 2 of the Ordinance. According to this clause the term 'award' meant the determination by a Labour Court, Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and included an interim award. They thought that as the award given by the Wage Commission was not included in the definition, section 25‑A(1) had to be read as not referring to such an award. Consequently, as the terms and conditions of service of bank employees were governed by the award of the Wage Commission, they could not approach the Labour Court to seek redress for their grievances.

10. It is difficult to subscribe to the view taken by the learned Judges in the High Courts. No doubt, the award given by the Wage Commission is not included in the definition of the term 'award' as given in section 2(ii) of the Ordinance, but then as the governing clause of section 2 itself states the definitions given therein are to be read subject to anything repugnant in the context in which the defined terms occur. Apart from that, as held by this Court in Bank of Bahawalpur v. Chief Settlement and Rehabilitation Commissioner PLD 1977 S C 164 that although normally an expression if defined in a Statute has to be given the same meaning wherever it occurs therein, yet there is ample authority for the principle of interpretation, that a definition of a term in a Statute is merely declaratory in nature and should not be unnecessarily inflicted where it does not fit in with the subject or context. Here, it is to be noticed that in section 25‑A(1) the term 'award' is preceded by the word 'any'. It needs hardly an authority to contend that the word 'any' adds amplitude to the content of the word to which it is prefixed. It is, therefore, not right to construe the term 'award' as referring to only those which have been specified in the definition given in section 2(ii) and thus ousts the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts in respect of employees whose terms and conditions of service are governed by an award of the Wage Commission.

11. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the provision with regard to the constitution of the Wage Commission. was made in the Ordinance soon after the nationalisation of the banlts. The consideration for giving the decision of the Wage Commission the status of an award of the Full Bench of the National Industrial Relations Commission was to provide one forum where employees of the nationalised banks could seek redress in respect of their grieva6ces. This was particularly necessary as the branches of the Banks were spread all over the country and apart from the possibility of conflicting views being taken by various Labour Courts it would have been most inconvenient for the banks to defend the proceedings initiated by their employees before different Labour Courts. ,In the circumstances while examining the ,jurisdiction of the Commission and the Labour Courts, the distinction between institution organized on industry‑wise basis and institution with limited sphere of activity ought to be drawn and in respect of the grievance of the employees of the banks the National Industrial Relations Commission should be taken to be enjoying exclusive jurisdiction.

12. There is no merit in this contention. So far as filing of grievance petitions is concerned there is no specific provision in the Ordinance which may be taken to support the distinction spelt out by the learned counsel. If the intention had been that the employees of institutions organized on all‑Pakistan basis should approach the National Industrial Relations Commission alone for redress of their grievances there would have been some indication in the Ordinance itself . Not only there is do such indication in the Ordinance itself, the provisions of section 25‑A which adumbrate the circumstances in which a Labour Court may be moved for redress have been extensively worded. It may perhaps be of interest to note here that even in respect of grievances arising out of unfair labour practices, curbing of which is a specific. function of the Commission, the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts has not been ousted. However, that may be, there seems to be no justification for holding that an employee whose terms are governed by an award made by the Wage Commission cannot seek redress for his grievance before a Labour Court.

13. The other ground which prevailed with the learned Judges in the High Court was that under section 22‑B(3)(a) of the Ordinance the Benches of the National Industrial Relations Commission were competent to hear the grievance petitions of the bank employees and as such the jurisdiction of the Labour Courts stood ousted by operation of the bar contained in section 22‑A(11). It is difficult to support the view taken by the learned Judges for on closer examination of both these provisions it will appear that no exclusive jurisdiction has been conferred on the said Benches. Section 22‑B(3)(a), as initially) enacted, ran as follows:‑‑

The Benches shall:‑‑

In relations to cases based on allegations of unfair labour practices brought before the Commission for enforcement of, or for redress of individual grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to any employer or worker by or under any law or any award or settlement, perform such functions and exercise such powers as are performed and exercised by a Labour Court.

When clause‑wise translated it reads as follows:‑‑

"In relations to cases based on allegations of unfair labour practices brought before the Commission:

(a) ??????? for enforcement, or,

(b) ??????? for redress of individual grievances in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to any employer or worker:

(i) by or under any law, or

(ii) ??????? any award, or

(iii) ??????? settlement, the Benches shall perform such functions and exercise such powers as are performed and exercised by a Labour Court."

This clause was amended by Act XVI of 1975 and the words 'trial of offences, or' were added before the word 'enforcement'. Thus, the amendment merely added another category of cases to the jurisdiction of the Benches without bringing about a basic change in its complexion.

14. It will be noticed that the governing words in the clause are 'in relations to cases based on allegations of unfair labour practices brought before the Commission'. It will therefore appear that the cases which the Benches are empowered to hear under the clause must have an element of unfair labour practices in them; it does not encompass cases where no allegation of unfair labour practices is made. It may be mentioned that sections 15 and 16 of the Ordinance set out instances of unfair labour practices on the part of the employers as well as workmen. It is, therefore, not right to construe the clause in question as conferring a general jurisdiction upon the Benches I to entertain all kinds of grievance petitions even though they may not be relatable to unfair labour practices. Apart from that, as already mentioned above section 22‑A(12) specifically recognises the competence of Labour Court, albeit subject to some qualifications, to entertain petitions arising out of unfair labour practices. It is, therefore, not right to say that section 22‑B(3)(a) confers exclusive jurisdiction on the Benches of the National Industrial Relations Commission to entertain the grievance petitions of the bank employees.

15. It was no longer disputed before us that the Ordinance applied to the Banks and such of their employees as were covered by the definition of worker or workmen as given in section 2(xxviii). The judgments under appeal were disposed of after examination of the question of jurisdiction alone. To determine whether an employee was) worker/workman or not an inquiry into facts is also required. The grounds upon which the status of the appellants as worker/workmen was challenged were not examined in the High Courts. We would accordingly express no opinion in the matter.

16. For the reasons stated above, we are unable to agree with the view taken by the High Courts of Sind and the Punjab that the petitions filed by the appellants before the Labour Courts under section 25‑A(4) of the Ordinance were not competent solely for the reason that their terms and conditions of service were regulated by the award of the Wage Commission. As the right to approach to the Labour Court was available to them under the Ordinance itself, it is unnecessary to examine the further question whether they could also invoke the jurisdiction of the said Courts under Standing Order 12(3) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employees (Standing Orders).

17. As we are unable to sustain the view taken in the High Courts that the Labour Courts had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions of the appellants we accept these appeals, set aside the judgments and orders recorded by the High Courts. We are informed that apart from the question of jurisdiction of the Labour Court there were other issues also which required determination. Accordingly, we would remand the appeals to the High Courts for consideration of the other issues. There will be no order as to costs in these appeals.

M.B.A./I‑25/S ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Order accordingly.