ZULFIQAR ALI Versus ALI AHMED
1. MUHAMAD AFZAL ZULLAH, J.‑‑Leave to appeal has been sought by a tenant against his eviction and dismissal of his writ petition in that behalf.
2. The case stood concluded in the High Court through a compromise between the parties. Learned counsel contended that the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the High Court had no authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of the petitioners. He has in this behalf relied upon the contents of the Power of Attorney.
3. Firstly, the compromise was not between the counsel representing the parties but as recorded in the impugned order it was between the parties, and, was evidenced by the statement of both the learned counsel. Therefore, the argument raised by the learned counsel has no basis.
4. Even if it would have been a compromise entered into between the two counsel on the assumption that they had the authority to do so and the Constitutional petition would have been disposed of in A pursuance of the compromise; we still would not have granted leave to appeal. A counsel representing a party having "prevented" or "deprived" the Court from passing an order on merits, ordinarily that party would not to be granted leave to appeal. This Court in its discretionary jurisdiction for grant of leave to appeal, would not come. to the assistance of such a party.
5. When told about this position, the learned counsel stated that the High Court acted illegally in allowing the respondents‑landlords to recover Rs.3,200 as arrears of rent; some part of which would not be recovered, if the respondents would have filed the suit‑‑ the claim would have become time‑barred.
6. Technically speaking, the learned counsel might be right but in case like the present one it is not the question of the respondents trying to seek remedy for the recovery of a time‑barred rent. On the other hand, the position is reversed when a debtor wants to make payment despite the knowledge that the suit for recovery would be time‑barred. As in the latter situation there is no question of the remedy having become time‑barred before a Court of law. A debtor is not a Court of law. He can always pay back his debts even if a suit for recovery in that behalf had become time‑barred. The question of acknowledgement raised by the learned counsel in this context is not relevant.
7. In the light of what has been stated above, we find no force in this petition and the same is accordingly dismissed.
8. M . B . A . / Z‑34 / S Petition dismissed