RAHIM JAN Versus SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION OF PAKISTAN
This matter concerns a petition for leave to appeal against a High Court judgment that dismissed an appeal filed under the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, on the grounds of being time-barred. The core legal question was whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1908, specifically Section 5 regarding the condonation of delay, were applicable to an appeal filed under the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997. The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that the appeal was indeed time-barred. The Court noted that the petitioner failed to provide sufficient justification for the delay in filing the appeal, despite having knowledge of the impugned order's date. Furthermore, the Court implicitly endorsed the legal position that the specific limitation framework governing the appeal precluded the application of general condonation provisions. Consequently, the petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused, establishing that statutory limitation periods for special appeals must be strictly adhered to absent compelling, explained circumstances for delay.
- Does Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 apply to appeals filed under the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997?
- Can an appeal be dismissed as time-barred if the appellant fails to provide a valid reason for the delay in filing?
- Is a party's knowledge of an impugned order relevant to the determination of limitation for filing an appeal?
- Section 34, Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997
- Section 29, Limitation Act, 1908
- Section 5, Limitation Act, 1908
MUNIR A. SHEIKH, J. ‑‑‑The appeal filed on 21‑9‑2001 by the petitioner before the High Court under section 34 of the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act, 1997, against the order of the Commission, dated 30‑5‑2001 has been dismissed through the impugned judgment, dated 29‑10‑2001 by the said Court as barred by time. It has been held that by virtue of section 29 of the Limitation Act, section 5 of the said Act was not attracted to the said appeal for the purpose of condonation of delay.
2. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner and find that against the order, dated 30‑5‑2001 of the Commission, the petitioner was obliged to file appeal within 60 days but instead of doing that, he filed Constitutional petition before the High Court on 20‑9‑2001 which was withdrawn on the next day i.e. 21‑9‑2001 and thereafter the appeal before the High Court was filed.
3. We have examined the application made by the petitioner before the High Court for condonation of delay and find that he himself had admitted that he had the knowledge of the date having been fixed by the Commission in the case as 30‑5‑2001 and even if he was not able to appear on the said date, nothing was said in the application as to what prevented him from filing the appeal within period of limitation before the High Court.
4. The view taken by the Lahore High Court in the impugned judgment that the appeal was barred by time does not suffer from any legal infirmity, therefore, this petition has no merits which is accordingly dismissed, and leave refused.
Q.M.H./M.A.K./R‑43/S
Petition dismissed.