TOWN COMMITTEE, QILA DIDAR SINGH Versus MUHAMMAD AYUB

This is appeal directed against the decision dated 27‑9‑1986 recorded by the learned Court No.7, Gujranwala, whereby the respondent has been directed to be re‑instated in service.

2. The respondent was an octroi clerk. His services were terminated on the report of selection committee. In written statement objections were taken by the appellant that the appellant committee was neither an industry nor the respondent was a workman. The learned lower Court has, relying upon the judgment of this Court dated 7‑4‑1984 delivered in Appeal No.GA‑509/83, held that labour Courts have jurisdiction. The question of committee was not an industry had not been raised it the said case but in the present case we find such an objection in the written statement. I.R.O. by virtue of section 1(3)(a) does not apply the octroi branch is working in administration of State. Levying and collection of taxes is a regal function of the Government and if anybody has authority under the law to levy or collect taxes it performs regal functions and thus I.R.O. is not applicable to it. If Standing Orders Ordinance applies a petition under section 25‑A may be brought by virtue of Standing Order 12(3) provided the establishment is covered by the definition of industry. Definition of Industrial Establishment is given in section 2(f) of Standing Orders Ordinance according to which it means a factory defined in section 2(f) of the Factory Act. A factory is that within precincts thereof manufacturing process is carried on. No doubt Municipal Committees have water works where pumping of water is done and thus manufacturing process is carried on but it cannot be said that in the octroi posts such a process is done or that they have any remote connection with it. It therefore, cannot be said that the respondent is employed in a factory or in an Industrial Establishment. So, he could not bring 25‑A petition even by virtue of Standing Order 12(3) of Standing Orders Ordinance. In the case relied upon by the learned lower Court the employee was not an octroi clerk but a chowkidar. In the absence of evidence to the contrary it can be said that a chowkidar guards the whole premises including the portion where any manufacturing process is carried on. But an octroi clerk who works at an Octroi post cannot be said to have any connection with the part of premises where any manufacturing process is done. However, this argument of the learned counsel for the appellant has no force that appellant has statutory rules of service and thus Standing Orders Ordinance for this reason is not applicable. No rules have been produced so it cannot be said the rules if any have statutory character. Rules which have been framed under any statute and have been published in official Gazette can be said to be Statutory Rules.

3. As a result the appeal is accepted and setting aside the impugned decision, the grievance petition is dismissed.

M.Y.H./277/Lb.P Appeal accepted.